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Preface 
Britain had four different reasons to be interested in South America 
in the 1820's. Diplomatically, she opposed the Holy Alliance in her tacit 
approval of the breakaway of the:: former Spanish colonies and Brazil from 
their masters, and set out to ensure that no European power could in future 
gain territorial advantages in South America. British recognition of the new 
nations was asjcrucial for their success as was the Monroe Doctrine. 
The second reason for interest was due to the current feeling in 
Britain that she was the one great liberal power that could lend support to 
those struggling for independence anywhere around the globe. Britain had 
fought the peninsula wars to oppose foreign domination and while the new 
liberal constitution in Spain was soon to vanish, Britain still had the chance 
to encourage the liberalism in her crumbling colonial empire. 
Thirdly, South America was important to Britain as part of the world 
struggle for economic influence. Britain had by 1815 won the supremacy of 
the Atlantic trade that she had fought for against France, Holland and Spain ; 
throughout the eighteenth century and was thus in a position to exploit the 
advantages for trade which her advanced economy gave her. Moreover, she 
was desperate for new markets overseas, especially as the continent of 
i , 1 
Europe was erecting high tariffs to keep out British goods. Cotton was the i 
first commodity that was mass produced for a large market and South' 
America provided a new and exciting area of consumption for British 
exporters. 
The fourth reason for interest was as a sphere for investment and 
this represents the main field of enquiry for this study. At home, the 
amount of money that was available for large scale investment had been 
growing mainly because of the rapid growth of the National Debt throughout 
i 
the Napoleonic Wars, which resulted in the interest payments on it account-
ing for over half the calls on the national exchequer. The redistributive 
effect of the National Debt, in taking money from the poor and giving it to 
the rich, meant that more and more was available for investment, and yet, 
the actual mechanisms for investment,especially in home industries,were 
poorly developed . It was in this era of low interest rates and few outlets 
for investment that British investors turned to South America, in the form 
of loans to the governments of the new nations, and through companies 
formed in London to exploit the natural treasures of the continent. 
Several of the South American governments were indebted to British 
merchants, shipowners, soldiers, and naval officers by the time they had 
won their independence, and they continued their association by raising 
money for their countries in the London capital market. The questions 
to be answered in this context concern the actual mechanisms of invest-
ment, the people involved, the often dubious methods of share issue and 
price raising, the possibility that the South American nations incurred too 
heavy a debt for the sums they actually received and the reasons for the 
early defaults on the loans. For a more detailed analysis of these problems 
the case-histories of loans to Colombia, Buenos Aires, Chile and Poyais 
will be discussed. 
Loans to governments are one part of the picture; the other is the 
formation of companies, almost exclusively mining companies, for 
operation in South America. The activities of these companies were more 
in evidence around the Stock Exchange than they were in South America, 
as vast sums were made by the originators of the schemes and this study 
is partly concerned with the methods of these men and the propaganda by 
which they succeeded in fooling an over-optimistic public. The basis for 
the expectations of the investing public will be discussed and a close study 
made of the Rio De La Plata Mining Association and the Chilean mining 
associations in order that the reasons for the failure of the companies 
may be clearly seen. 
The burst of speculation which reached its height and broke in 1825 
revealed the weaknesses of the existing laws relating to company forma-
tion and brought about the repeal of the Bubble Act which was the maj or 
obstacle in this respect. Attempts in Parliament by promoters of South 
American mining companies to put joint-stock companies on a firm legal 
basis tended to dissolve into discussions on the merits or otherwise of 
these associations, as did disputes in law when their legality was 
questioned. 
Not surprisingly, the merchants and financiers of Britain connected 
with South America were the group most concerned that the British 
government should recognize the new nations at the earliest opportunity. 
Their opinions expressed in petitions to the Crown and to Parliament 
are worthy of attention as a pressure group of some considerable 
influence. 
Lastly, the effect of the boom and the subsequent collapse of the 
investment process is considered both in its short-term consequence to 
Britain and the nations of South America, and also in the imp ortance 
it had for the Anglo-South American relationship that was to flourish 
later in the century. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE GROWTH OF BRITISH INTEREST IN SOUTH 
AMERICA 1800 - 1825 
The Break-Up of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires in South America 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the two countries of the Iberian 
peninsula held complete sway over the vast continent of South America. ' 
Twentyfive years later, the South Americans had gained almost total 
economic and political independence. The emancipation of Latin America 
from European control, although it was to a large extent a product of the 
revolutions in France and North America, may be ranked as important as 
any in the world. .. 
The area affected, however, was far wider than that of the thirteen 
British North American colonies which formed the United States, and the 
total of inhabitants much greater. It extended not merely over South America, 
but included the strategic centre of Central America and a large undefined 
area in North America. Spanish America had been subjected to far stricter 
5 
control from Europe than Britain had ever exercised over her North American 
colonies and even at the end of the eighteenth century remained a closed and 
almost an unknown continent to the rest .of the world. Its Governors 
appointed from Spain had far more power than those in British North America. 
The Church appointments of a deeply religious people were also in the hands > 
of the distant monarch: ^Through the Church it was subjected to the censor-
ship of the. Index. Its population was more mixed than that of North America, 
-3-
since the Spaniards and Portuguese had never employed towards the native 
i 
Indians the system of ruthless destruction which the Anglo-Saxons had used. 
Even though its commerce was kept within rigid lines, South America 
was the source of much wealth. In the eighteenth century it remained the 
world's greatest source of supply of the precious metals, and it was not only 
a source of supply but also a market of vast potentialities. Yet Spain failed 
to exploit it and failed to participate in the commercial expansion of Europe."1 
The stream of gold and silver which flowed from the New World itself con-
tributed to the perversion of her economic development and while she rigidly 
applied a monopolistic system, she lacked the economic organization success-
fully to enforce i t . In the colonies themselves the most serious effects of 
this exclusive system were not the restrictions imposed upon colonial manu-
factures i but the increasing inefficiency of legitimate sources of supply, and 
the rise of prices. The result was an enormous contraband trade. Cause 
and effect moved in a vicious circle.. The more debilitated Spain became, 
the greater grew the contraband; the more the contraband, the greater1 
Spain's debility and the weaker her empire. ^ 
It is remarkable that the small state of Portugal should ever have been 
able to subject the vast area of Brazil to a control similar in kind to that 
exercised by Spain over her colonies. Though the rise of an aristocracy and 
C.K.Webster, Britain And The independence of Latin America(1938) 
Vol.1, p. 3. 
2. R.A.Humphreys, British Consular Reports On The Trade And Politics. 
of Latin America, 1824-1826. (1940) p .v i i . , '. . • •• 
3. Ibid: ~ - -
the special position o!f Britain, in the Portuguese economy made conditions 
.somewhat different, the trade of Brazil was a monopoly of the mother 
country, and Brazilian interests were subordinated to the necessities of the 
European merchants. -
Even so, the monopoly of the trade of the New "World claimed by 
Spain and Portugal was challenged from the'seventeenth century onwards by 
Holland, England and France. These three countries, besides forming 
settlements in North America, established bases in the West Indies for 
tapping the resources of the Iberian possessions, and furnished the Pen-
insular states with those commodities which owing to economic limitations, 
they lacked for the upkeep of their trans-Atlantic markets. Holland took 
the lead in these movements in the seventeenth century, but thence-forward 
the contest for the avenues of trade lay between Great Britain and France.D 
In the period before 1807, British interests predominated in Portugal, 
and French on the whole in Spain. Great 3ritain, in addition, claimed the 
major share of the trade in slaves to Spanish America and of the contraband 
4. C.K. Webster, op.cit., vol.1, p.4. 
5. J.S.Jones, Historical Study of Anglo-South American Trade, With 
Special Refer e:xe To The Period 1807-1825, London University Ph.D., 
TS34, Abstract. 
"Everthing during the eighteenth century worked to increase the tension 
between Spain and the other kingdoms of her Empire." Salvador de 
Madariaga, The Fall Of The Spanish American Empire (1947), p.329. 
with the mainland from the -West Indies.^ 
From 1807 onwards Great Britain, by treaty agreement, held a. 
direct intercourse with Brazil, and, under the protection of her warships, 
contrary to the wishes of Spain, with the Spanish American provinces. 
.As at the same time she maintained, to an extent, her old connections 
through the West indies and the Peninsula, she thus came to monopolise 
to a large extent the external commerce of Latin America. . . 
The Spanish colonies were first thrown upon their own resources 
in 1796, when Spain went to war with England for the fourth time in 
fifty-seven years, and, with a brief interval, remained at war for twelve 
7 
years more. A brief prosperity was succeeded by an intense depression. 
Threatened on the northern borderlands by the territorial expansion of the 
United States, faced by the sea-power and the commercial expansion.of 
England, the empire collapsed, and with Napoleon's invasion of Spain, the 
Spanish American Revolution began. 
Britain's role in the wars of independence was an important one 
although.her military power was used very little directly in the. struggle 
after Sir Home Popham's attack on Buenos Aires in 1806 and General 
Whitelocke's expedition, both of which ended in failure and ruled out any 
ft 
ideas of physical conquest by Britain. ° What the British government 
was seeking was not territory, but trade and bullion. It also wished to 
6.. J .S . Jones,op. cit*. ; • 
7. R.A.Humphreys, op. cit., p. v i i . 
8. However as Salvador de Madariaga notes, "Ideas kept pouring in from .: 
English amateur conquerors", op.cit., p.329; 
protect Brazil and prevent the extension of French power and influence 
in South America. Castlereagh from the first wished to avoid "the 
hopeless task of conquering this extensive country against the temper of 
its population.." "In looking to any scheme for liberating South America, " 
he advised the Cabinet, "it seems indispensable that we should not pre-
sent ourselves in any other light than as auxiliaries and protectors". 
Britain had long been the protector^ of Portugal and it was by her 
advice and with the escort of her ships in 1808 that the Portuguese royal 
family and many of the Court and upper classes emigrated to Brazil -when 
Napoleon invaded the Iberian peninsula. Until the end of the war, Britain 
practically governed as well as defended Portugal and the price that she 
asked and obtained was the right to trade at low duties with all the terr i-
tories of the House of Braganza. "One of the almost immediate effects of 
this change was to bring Great Britain for the first time into direct 
commercial contact with Brazil . . . . A convoy of merchants went out to 
Rio de Janeiro where they arrived in July 1808, to form commercial 
establishments. Meanwhile there was formed in London a committee of 
merchants trading to London and Brazil. 
Similarly, the right to trade with the Spanish colonies, (although 
how definitely it was given and with what time limit was later a matter of 
dispute) had to be granted by Spain when Britain became her ally against 
9. J.S.Jones, op.cit., pp. 90-91 
Napoleon. . Spain was reluctant to give up her position of monopoly but 
by 1810 a new relationship existed between Britain and the Latin-
American world. It is a major element in all the negotiations that 
followed that Britain would not abandon the privilege to trade with Brazil 
and the Spanish colonies, for as wil l be seen, ^  trade was increasing at 
a promising rate. However, there was no special reason why Britain 
should desire that her new trading partners be independent states, and 
she was ready and for a time anxious that the authority of the Mother 
Country be recognized by the colonies. 
The Latin American states realized, though, that Britain with 
her mighty fleet was the key to their success. Only by means of the 
British fleet could Spain have re-established her power; only by per- . 
11 
mission of Britain could any other power have assisted her to do so. 
As late as 1823 Bolivar, the great liberator, could write "Only. England, 
mistress of the seas, can protect us against the united force of European 
12 
reaction." Public opinion in Britain was all the while forming on the 
side of the emancipators. The growing liberal movement was, of course, 
from the first deeply interested in their success. As early as 1809, the 
Edinburgh Review published a long article, inspired by Miranda, , the 
10. .See pp. 
11..C.K.Webster, op.cit., vol.1, p.11. -; 
12. Quoted in Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826 (1927), 
p. 154. • . , ;•• V 
great Venezuelan patriot, entitled, "South American Emancipation". 
In the years after 1815, a war-weary Europe saw in the lands of the 
Spanish empire a new El Dorado. "He must indeed be more temperate, 
he must be a cold reasoner, " said Brougham in 1817, "who can glance 
13 
at those regions and not grow warm." 
When the Napoleonic wars were over, and Ferdinand had re-
established absolutism and the Inquisition in Spain, the Spanish govern-
ment grew exceedingly unpopular in England. Quite apart from any 
commercial expectations, there was a real desire to see freedom 
triumph in South America. The revolutionaries defended themselves 
against Spain to a large extent with arms bought with the money they 
were able to raise in London, while many British soldiers died on the 
battlefields of South America, having travelled out in the same spirit 
14 
that took others to fight for the independence of Greece. 
The British Recognition of Independence 
Thus liberalism and commercial expansion were united in the 
first quarter of the nineteenth century and both were on the side of the 
new republics. The resources of Britain's merchants and bankers, 
coupled with the even more important protection of her fleet, were of 
13. R.A.Humphreys, op.cit., p.ix. 
14. See the gratitude for British^ssistance recorded in the Hispanic- ; 
American Historical Review, vol. vi, 1926, pp.190-191. 
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initial importance in the successful break-away of the colonies. Britain 
followed a strict neutrality in her dealings with the new states and was 
always willing to mediate between Spain and (as it was becoming increas-
ingly clear) her former colonies. However, she kept to a plain intimation 
made by Castlereagh in 1817, that force should never be employed against 
the colonies by any other state than Spain. As Webster has put it, "It is 
not too much to say that once thiJt declaration had been made, the in- J 
dependence of Spanish A.merica was assured. For by refusing to allow 
# 
Europe to intervene while the issue was still in the balance, Castlereagh 
made the immediate triumph of the revolution certain. San Martin had 
already, it is true, taken his army over the Andes, and had fought the ; 
battle of Chacabuco on February 12th 1817. But his position in Chile 
was not consolidated until Maipu was won in 1818, while in the north 
Bolivar was only just getting control of the line of the Orinoco, and the ' 
victory of Boyaca which decided the fate of New Granada did not take place -
until 1819. At this period, therefore, even a small European force might 
have been decisive as to the immediate future, and the action of Britain 
15 
in refusing to allow force was all important". Henceforward, with 
revolution in Spain in 1820, even Wellington considered independence in- | 
i ' 
evitable, and recognition of the new states was regarded "rather as a 
15. C.K.Webster, op.cit>.,- vol I , p. 14. 
: \ • . • - 1 0 -
16 
matter of time rather than of principle." 
It was not, Jhowever, until 1822 that Britain recognized the flags 
of South American vessels, an act which constituted recognition "de 
facto", and it was not until October 1823 that commissioners were 
appointed to go to Colombia and Mexico to ascertain the actual state of 
affairs in those two countries with a view to recognition "de jure". At 
the same time, consuls were appointed for Buenos Aires, . Montevideo, 
Chile and Peru, and to accompany the Colombian and Mexican com-
missioners. Recognition of Buenos Aires, Colombia and Mexico led 
the way in 1825, significantly in the form of the signing of commercial 
treaties. . 
. Recognition by Britain set the seal on nationhood and was well 
received in th&» country, but rapturously in the new states. For 
example, when Sir Woodbine Parish left London in December 1823 for 
the provinces of the Rio de Ja Plata, he was armed with very full in-
structions for the recognition of the republic and was welcomed heartily 
by the inhabitants who realised the significance of his mission. Not long 
afterwards^ Parish received instructions from Canning, the Foreign 
Secretary, to treat with the government of the republic for the negotiation 
of a treaty "placing on a permanent footing the commerical intercourse 
which has so long existed between H„M„ subjectejand those states." ^ 
16. F .O.92/48 . E a r l Bathurst to the Duke of Wellington. C.K.Webster, 
op.cit . , -voi.II, p.-71.. . -
17.. E . L.Delgado, The Economic Development Of The Argentine, London 
.University P h . D . . 1939, p. 17. ~ '• "~ 
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Th.e announcement of the British Government's intention was made at a 
dinner party given by the Scottish residents in Buenos Aires on St. 
Andrew's Day (November 30th) 1824. A scene of the wildest enthusiasm 
followed the declaration. Parish in describing it says, "We were a very 
numerous party. I believe upwards of seventy and I must say I never saw 
such a scene in my life as took place after what I told them They 
appeared al l mad, and I expected that the tables and chairs would have 
followed the bottle and glasses out of the windows, in true Spanish style. 
Some of the Buenos Aireans who were desirous to drink Mr.Canning's 
health insisted upon having bottles of wine to drink it in, and yet they were 
s o b e r . " 1 8 
The'Growth of Br itish Trade to South America 
" - 1800-1825 : 
Well might the merchants have been enthusiastic over the prospects 
j 
of Anglo-^South American trade in 1824, for trade had been on the increase 
19 : for the past twenty years. It is difficult actually to quantify it during 
18. Reginald Lloyd, Twentieth Century Impressions Of Argentina (1911) 
p. 64. See also, Nina L.Kay-Shuttleworth, Sir Woodbine Parish and 
Early Days in Argentina (1910) p. 292. -
19..11'I called a new world into existence', boasted Canning- but his claim : 
.to fame rests on the recognition and not the creation oi a new condition. 
To the British merchants, rather, and to their American rivals, 
belongs the credit for shaping the circumstances that called forth 
. Canning's boast on the one side of the Atlantic and the Monroe Doc-
trine on the other, " Goebel, D . B . "British Trade To The Spanish 
Colonies, 1798-1823, " American Historical Review^ 43, (1938) 
pp. 288-320. - . 
the first years of the century as it was carried on as contraband trade via 
the West Indies. A resident British agent in San Domingo informs us in 
1810 that smuggling into Spanish America from the West Indies was triple 
the regular imports. Apparently, passes for carrying on a clandestine 
intercourse with the British islands were freely granted by the governors. 
The Spanish vessels cleared out ostensibly for Quadaloupe, Martinique and 
St. Domingo, then in possession of their allies, and when returning from 
the British possessions produced false clearances and fabricated papers by 
way of form. These documents were obtained with astonishing ease; pass -
ports to any island, or ship's papers of any nation, could be obtained for a 
trifle, especially at Curacao, which would deceive the most scrutinising 
cruiser at sea. The officers charged with the prevention of this trade often 
91 
shared in the prof its. -
. Walton gives us an insight into the type of cargo suitable for the 
Spanish American colonies. His list of commodities, running to close on 
two dozen pages, reveals that there was no great demand for any one 
article, and that the cargo to command a quick and profitable sale depended 
on a wise selection of a huge variety of goods, prominent amongst which 
were linens. It was emphasised that the linens should imitate the German, 
for which there was a strong prderence^and that goods and spices from the 
East Indies should be cheap, to avoid being uniersold by the U . S . A . The 
20...W.Walton, Present State Of Spanish Colonies, (1810) vol.II, p. 164. 
21. Ibid., vol H, p. 16.1. : " ,, ;: N. 
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articles generally were to be cheap and showy, and made up in assorted 
packages of a weight not exceeding 100 lbs. , as a l l goods had to be carried 
22 
into the interior on hiules or the heads of Indians. 
After the whole coast of the South American continent had been thrown 
open to Britain in 1809 when she became Spain's ally, a good deal of specula 
tion was indulged in with unhappy results . It was probably want of judgment, 
through lack of knowledge of the market conditions, in making up properly 
balanced assortments for the South American markets, that was part cause 
of the failures in the speculation period of 1809-11. . Many of the cargoes 
23 
under such conditions could only be disposed of partially. More cotton 
goods are said to have been sent to Rio de Janeiro in a few weeks than had 
OA 
been consumed there in the previous twenty years. Trade with the South 
American continent, however, revived in 1812, and afterwards showed steady 
progress. 
After 1815, South America provided one ray of light in the gloom of 
England's commercial depression. England was rapidly changing into a 
manufacturing nation,. and consequently becoming increasingly dependent 
upon the sale abroad of her surplus productions to secure her normal supples 
of food and raw materials. But the European nations, her principal custom-.: 
ers, impoverished by the protracted struggles of the war, were unable to 
22. Ibid., vol.1, pp.-327-349. ;. 
23 . J , S a Jones, English Foreign Trade In The Firs t Half Of The Nineteenth j 
Century, Together With Some Observations On The War Period of f79~3-: 
1814, London University M . S c . , 1928, p.7Wi '• " "~ l 
'24. Ibid., p. 74. 
take her goods in as large quantities as before, whilst at the same time they 
displayed a tendency, as did the United States, to aim at their exclusion by 
fostering their own industries behind high tariff walls. Crouzet has pointed 
. out that Britain in 1815 was in a position to dominate the world economy, but 
needed new expanding markets, especially for her major export, cotton 
Oh. 
goods, which was suitable for a mass market. In these conditions, the great 
question of the time became therefore that of finding an adequate outlet for 
the nation's expanding production, and this she sought in the first instance by 
turning her attention, as indeed she had done during the Napoleonic Wars, to 
the possibility of developing the Latin American markets, as well as those in 
the East . 
The image that South America presented to many people in Britain, 
as in the rest of Europe, was that of the new " E l Dorado". For over 200 
years it had been known that great riches had been taken out of the continent 
by Spain: Legends of a very imprecise nature had grown up over South 
i 
i, • • 
American mineral treasures in particular, although little was known in de-
tail, for the Spaniards had not encouraged foreigners to explore their lands 
in the New World. . Many Britons firmly believed in the immense wealth of 
South America, but would have found it difficult to explain of what: it con-
sisted and where exactly it was to be found. ' V - ' 
. For an example of increase in British activity in this period, \attention 
will be focussed on Buenos Aires and the States of the Rio de 3a Plata. The 
257 F . Crouzet7" uWars) Blockade & Economic Chance i n Europe. 
1 7 9 2 - 1 8 1 5 " Journal of Ecomomic. History,,' XXIV, l ? 6 f • 
; ; ' - i 5 -
States were particularly neglected by Spain, partly due to the distance that 
separated them from the Mother Country, partly to other pre-occupations 
of the Court of Castiile, and perhaps, as Sir Woodbine Parish says, to their 
25 
lack of gold and silver. Britain had an unfortunate early clash with 
Buenos Aires in 1806 when Sir Home Popham with a military force took 
possession of the city for a short time. He immediately saw the prospects 
of the market for English manufacturers and sent out a circular letter to 
English manufacturing towns inviting them to send out consignments of their 
wares. By the time the British force decided to evacuate Buenos Aires, . 
< 
the port was encumbered with vessels having more goods on board than the 
country could consume in five.years. 
Mr. Forbes, the U . S . A . Consul-General at Buenos Aires, in 1821 
26 , 
acknowledged the immense prestige of the British there and their rich trade. 
Exports to Buenos Aires had in fact doubled in the period 1817-19, having 
27 
grown from £330, 000 to £660, 000, while the sea-borne commerce of 
Buenos Aires was almost entirely in English hands, and the river-borne 
28 • '• trade wholly so. Forbes observed that of the 15, 000 foreigners on the 
PI ata, 3, 500 were sfeid to be British, in whose hands lay the greater part 
of the commerce of the region; most of these lived in the city of Buenos 
Aires, but a number of them, on the other hand, owned large "estancios" 
farther inland. The majority of the merchants were Scottish. In Buenos 
25. Sir Woodbine Parish, Buenos Aires And The Provinces Of The Rio De I 
La Plata, (1838) p . l ; • • . 
26. J.S.Jones-, P h . D . , op.cit., p.283. 
27. Ibid., p.261, p . l . 
. 28.... E . L ?pelgadp, op. cit. ,.. PP.-.13rl4. 
. Aires alone there were thirty-nine British commercial houses having 
correspondents at Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo, whilst both there and in 
, the provincial towns a host of English and Scottish shopkeepers resided. 
Several wealthy traders had become directors of local banks. It was partly 
because of the fact that British interests in the Plata had become so extens-
ive that the British Government sent' out a mission to report on the question 
29 
of whether a stable government worthy of recognition existed there, s . 
Consul-General Parish's reports give us further insight into British 
involvement. Writing from Buenos Aires in April 1824, Parish confirmed 
that British interests there exceeded al l others, half the public debt and the 
best part of the most valuable property being in the hands of our subjects who 
were universally respected and appeared to enjoy the good will of a l l 
on 
parties. Three months later he forwarded home an extended report, 
drawn up by the merchants there, on the trade of the river Plata. This 
account was divided into two sections, the Import Trade and the Export 
Trade, both of which were treated to an extent historically. Under the old ; 
Spanish regime, it said, with its oppressive regulations, the trade of. i 
Buenos Aires was monopolised by a few individuals, who enhanced their : 
fortunes by charging high prices for goods imported and paying their own 
prices for the local produce exported. In 1796, Cadiz sent to the port 
about 2.8 million dollars worth of goods, and received in exchange 5million 
in specie and produce, the latter accounting for 1, Q.75, 877 dollars/Including , 
29. J.S.Jones, P h . D . , op.cit., p.283. 
30. F . 0 . 6 / 3 , 25 April, 1824, Parish to F . O . X ? 
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th e contraband trade the imports might have amounted in general to 3 million 
dollars, it was thought, but British manufactures comprised in these were 
trifling; the use of plain cotton goods was then almost unknown, French and 
German linens being the articles used instead, and these, together'with the 
productions of Spain, formed the principal imports of the province. In 1810 
the old exclusive privileges were entirely abolished, and the trade..was 
thrown open to foreigners. The resulting intercourse was at first subject 
to some fluctuation owing to political causes, whilst over-enthusiastic and 
incorrect reports led to the 3uenos Aires market being glutted, as were 
others at this time. In addition, the exaction of unreasonable duties, and 
the importation of articles badly suited to the demand, here as elsewhere, 
helped to contribute to cause losses to those first engaging in the trade. 
However, with a growing knowledge of the miarket of Buenos Aires in 
Britaia and the abandonment of high import duties, an extensive and prosper-
ous trade grew up. ^ 
The amount of the imports at Buenos Aires from the opening of the 
trade to 1816 did, though, fluctuate considerably. Some improvement 
then took place until 1820, when there was another temporary decline be- i 
cause of excessive trade in 1819 and the reduction of territory under the 
government of Buenos Aires . The commerce of the port made great pro- : 
4 1 
1 
gress between 1820 and 1824 owing to the good administration of its public 
affairs, the encouragement given to trade, the rapid increase of population ! 
31. For copies of the report, see F.O.119/1 , F . O . 6 / 4 , Parish to F . O . : 
30 July 1824. 
32. F.O.119/1 , fs . 17-18. 
including a great influx of foreigners, and a reduction of prices for foreign 
33 
articles together with a rise for the local produce. Actually, by 1824 
it traded with almost every part, of the world, though to the greatest extent 
with England, the chief imports from which were plain and printed caiicoes 
:and cloth. Indeed, the country population at large was almost entirely de-
pendent on British manufactures, from which it was to be gathered that 
British trade would maintain its superiority over a l l others, and henceforth 
would not fluctuate greatly. 
In fact 1824 was a boom year as can be seen from the following 
official declared values of exports from Great Britain to the States of the 
River Plate. 3 4 
1822 £ 981,000 
1823 * £ 664,000 
1824 £ 1 , 1 4 2 , 0 0 0 
1825 £ 850,000 
1826 £ 371,000 
1827 £ 155,000 
The figure for 1824 is outstanding and was not approached until 1849 
35 
when British exports more than doubled in a year to reach £ 1 , 399, 580. 
The increase in trade in 1824 was part cause, part effect, of the feverish 
interest that anything South American was having in England and the drastic 
reversal in trade was an indication of subsequent disillusionment. In 1824 
however, further proof that commercial intercourse was growing between 
the two countries was the establishment of a regular monthly packet service : 
33. J.S.Jones, Ph.D.., op.cit., p.290. 
34. P . P . 1826, X, p.480. 
35.. Sir Woodbine Parish, op.cit., p.360. / . • 
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from Liverpool to Buenos Aires . ^ 
Buenos Aires and the states of the Rio de la Plata were fairly re -
' presentative of the growth of British interests in South America up to 1825. 
In fact, though, of the several Latin American states our largest dealings 
were with Brazi l , for under a treaty of 1810, which did not expire until 
1825, Britain retained the advantage of 15% import duty as against 24% paid 
37 
by other nations. This privilege enabled Britain practically to dominate 
the trade of the country. Exports rose from just under £ 2 million in 1816 
• — 
to over £ 4 million in 1825, whilst our imports from there similarly 
38 
doubled (from nearly £ l million to nearly £2 million). The principal 
exports of Brazi l were sugar, coffee, cotton, bullion and specie. The 
sugar and the cotton were taken mostly by Great Britain, which took in 
addition some coffee, tobacco, drugs, dyewoods, hides, gold, precious 
stones and specie', in exchange..-for cottons, woollens, linens, glass and 
earthenware, brass and copper ware, hardware and cutlery, and iron and 
39 > 
steel chiefly, with.cottons accounting for over 50% of the total. 
The revolutionary struggles at times seriously'inconvenienced 
36. E.L.Delgado, op.cit. 
37. J.S.Jones, P h . D . , op.cit., p.399. "V 
38. The Brazilian trade appears to have progressed fairly smoothly, for 
official references to the commercial affairs of Brazi l are rare. In 
general, British merchants only approached the state departments 
when they had grievances to bring forward. 
39. P . P . . 1820, E I , p?460, and 1826-7, XVIH, p.404. 
J . S . Jonesj- P h . D . , op. c i t . • - V 
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British trade with the South American states, particularly along the Pacific 
coast, where Chile generally had first call upon our merchandise, the surplus 
being afterwards sent forward to Peru. However British naval forces in the 
Pacific were able to ensure some protection for British interests, and in 
December 1824, when the revolutionary forces entered Lima, the prospects 
of trade began to improve, and the west coast attracted more attention from 
British merchants. .Consequently we find that exports to Chile and Peru, 
which had been growing slowly from £33 , 000 in 1816 to £561, 000 in 1822, 
rose to £898 ,000 in 1823, and an average of nearly £ l | million in 1824-5, 
with a corresponding rise in imports, though these were on a much smaller 
s c a l e . ^ The commodities sent to the coast were very much similar to those 
shipped to the Plata, and the principal returns were bullion and specie. 
From Chile, in addition, our vessels carried copper and hides, the former 
mostly to India, and from Peru, where English manufactures were in general 
use, come cocoa, cortex, hides, cotton and wool. Peru and Chile (as well as 
Buenos Aires) had a growing trade with the East Indies,, and in both countries 
the principal part of the foreign trade was in the hands of the British. By 
1825 there had been a great deal of over-stocking of the Pacific coast with 
British merchandise, particularly cotton goods. 
Besides the large commission agents, the English in Valparaiso seem 
to have .been a motley crew of traders, sailors and adventurers. "English 
traders, shoemakers, saddlers and innkeepers, " wrote Maria Graham, 
40. J.S.Jones, P h . D . , op.cit., p.404 
"hang out their signs in every street; and the preponderance of the English 
language over every other spoken in the chief streets, would make one.. 
fancy Valparaiso a coast town in Britain. "4* According to J .Miers , many 
49 
were "sailors, or .persons in the lowest sphere of life;" and Robert 
Proctor, who like Miers was somewhat embittered by his experiences, 
described the town as "full of English, many of them of the lowest descript-
ion and of the worst characters, " who acted as brokers and smugglers.^ 
Our commercial connections with the northern coast of South 
America, with Central America, and with Mexico, continued for a great 
part of the period up until 1825 to be conducted through the old channels of 
the West Indies. In these regions also, until the year 1822, the struggles 
of the revolutionary movement were a cause of hindrance to commerce, a l -
though Britain maintained a strict attitude of neutrality. Privateers of the 
contending parties, (as well as others) interfered with British shipping, but 
by admitting Spanish vessels and employing British ones, and using the 
services of our warships both for convoy and in bringing back to a large 
extent thespecie received for our merchandise, Britain managed to keep up 
an intercourse with the mainland. ^ 
British trade with Colombia appears to have been particularly im-
pressive. "The power of England, " observed a French traveller, "is 
41. Maria Graham, Journal Of A Residence In Chile During The Year 
1822 (1824) p. 131. 
42. J .Miers , Travels In Chile And L a Plata (1826) pp. 446-447. 
43. Robert Proctor, Narrative Of A- Journey Across The Cordillera Of The 
Andes, (1825) p.TOlT 
44. J.S.Jones, P h . D . , op.cit., p.405. 
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without a rival; no fleets but hers are.to be seen; her merchandises are bought 
.'almost exclusively; her commercial agents, clerks and brokers are every-
45 
where to be met with I " 
With the exception of the years 1796 and 1798, our exports to the 
Latin American countries had been comparatively small until 1806-7, when 
Britain first established direct contact with the Southern Continent. They then 
rose, following a period of speculative trading, to an average of about £ 6 -
milliori in 1809-10, then dropped to rise again to £ 5 | million in 1818, and 
following a second drop, eventually reached £10 million in 1825. Our imports 
from these countries were: on the whole rated much lower than our exports to 
them,the difference being made up by shipments of bullion and specie. Brazi l 
and the foreign West India Islands were Britain's best customers until the 
twenties, whenjfollowing the culmination of the struggles for independence, 
the Spanish American states came.;into prominence. 
The Latin American countries were pre-eminently a market for 
our cotton goods, for these accounted for about 50% of our exports to them. 
Next in importance came woollen goods and linens, forming roughly 25%, • 
whilst the remainder were composed of glass, earthenware, hardware, 
cutlery, silks, iron and steel, millinery, beer and ale, brass, copper and 
miscellaneous articles. Our principal imports in exchange were coffee", 
cocoa, hides, sugar, cotton, cochineal, dyewoods and tallow, besides 
45. G.Mollieta* Travels In The Republic of Colombia In The Years 1822 And 
1823 (1824) pp .215-216 . 
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bullion and specie. Iri addition to. that resulting from a direct trade, con-
siderable quantities of our merchandise must have passed as well to these 
countries through the British West Indies, the foreign West India islands, 
.Portugal, Spain, the U iS .A . and,Gibraltar. 
The great rise in the exports from under £ 3 i million in 1819 to over 
£10 million in 1825 was followed by a cris is and decline in trade, though a 
recovery was made in 1828. The causes of the trouble were very similar to 
those which led to the cris is of 1810, that is, overstocking of the market by 
9 
exporters whe were.not regular mercantile houses with branch connections, 
but manufacturers attempting to get rid of surplus stock which had been on 
their hands for some time through slackness of trade in England. Their 
speculations were, injudicious and badly managed, they had little knowledge of 
the state of the country, and the specie and produce for making returns proved 
insufficient: 46 -
Conclusion 
It is evident then that after striving for over two hundred years, 
Great Britain had succeeded by the 1820s in gaining for herself predominant 
command of the Latin American trade; The persistent pursuit of this goal 
was by no means an isolated incident, but rather it was part and parcel.of the 
wider struggle for world territorial possessions and world commerce.- Both 
diplomatically and commercially Britain came to play a vital role in South 
46. For a discussion of the effects that the loans from Britain to the newly-
formed governments had on this burst of speculation, see pp. 158-161. 
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American affairs during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, at a time 
when the image of " E l Dorado" in South America could be contrasted strongly 
with the depressing economic realities of the European continent. South 
America was a land of unknown riches waiting to be transformed by the 
genius of the world's most advanced economy. However, she was governed 
by men who were thankful of the part Britain had played in the Wars of 
Independence. Loans from Britain to the new governments and investment 
by British companies in the new states therefore became in a sense inevitable 
The following chapter should indicate more precisely the attractiveness of 
South America from the point of view of the British investor. 
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CHAPTER n 
GENERAL FACTORS BEHIND THE BRITISH INVESTMENT BOOM 
OF 1824 - 1 8 2 5 - • • 
The prosperity that reached its climax in 1825 has often been referred to 
as the first truly modern cyclical boom in British economic history.* The 
basis for that conception is the enlarged role played by capital market floata-
tions. From 1822, but more particularly in 1824-5, docks, railways, giS and 
water companies, and, above all, foreign governments, mainly South American,! 
and companies formed to work the South American minesfcame to London for 
funds on an unprecedented scale. 
Coinciding in time with the stock market boom was a considerable specula- ; 
tion in imports. Commodity stocks were found to be low towards the end of 
1824, and with cotton leading, import prices rose, and large quantities of the :! 
staple commodities were contracted for. ^ Exports paid for in part by the new \ | 
South American loans were shipped in large quantities. A boom at the same 
period in the United States also brought increased orders to the textile and j 
iron industries. 
These demands, coming when the system was already close to full em 
ployment, pushed capacity to the limit and induced investment in new plant and '•• 
machinery. In cotton, iron, wool and the coal industry, the same pressures 
can be traced in 1824-5 and the same sorts of expansion. Non-agricultural 
1. A.D.Gayer, W.W.Rostow and A.J.Schwartz, The Growth Of The British 
Economy, 1790-1850 (Oxford 1953) p. 171. ~"" 
2. See New Monthly Magazine, Vol XV, 1825, Commercial Report, Feb;23rd, j 
p. 131, for the short-lived speculation in commodities. r 
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prices, a f te r sagging in 1822-4, rose sharply in this f ina l phase of pros-
per i ty . They turned downward, however, i n the spring of 1825, and rose 
again only at the close of 1826. By that t ime the financial aspects of the 
panic had been liquidated, and excess stocks had, largely, been worked of f . 
The Resumption of Cash Payments 
I t can be reasonably argued that the basis f o r the boom lay in the 
monetary measures of the government and the Bank of England. I t was 
decided by "Peel's A c t " of 1819 that the Bank was to resume f u l l cash pay-.. v 
ments by May 1st, 1823, but this f ina l date was anticipated and on May 1st, 
1821, the paper currency, established since 1797, was replaced by a 
currency on a metallic basis, of which the country had been deprived f o r 
24 years and 2 months.^ However, under the instructions of the House of 
Commons of 1819 the Bank had been required not only to pay off i n gold 
within four years the amount of their £ 1 notes then i n circulation (about 
7, 500, 000), and provide the requisite surplus bullion f o r insuring the con-
ver t ib i l i ty of a l l i t s l iabi l i t ies , but also to provide the coin f o r paying off 
about £7 mi l l ion or £ 8 mi l l ion of country small notes in 1825. The 
3. A.D.Gayer , W.W.Rostow and A.J .Schwartz . , op . c i t . , p.172. 
4. A.Andreades, History Of The Bank Of England (1909), p . 242. 
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Governor of the Bank later estimated that i t had been necessary to procure 
£ 2 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 of gold f r o m foreign countries within the space of four years 
f r o m 1819. 5 
The supply of gold could only be purchased by reduced prices of 
commodities, the Bank withdrawing a given amount of securities in the f i r s t 
instance, the notes fo r which could be re-issued in payment of the gold i m -
ported. Thus, buying at a loss, the Bank had at the February balance of 
1821, when i t was preparing to resume cash payments two years before .the ' 
appointed day, more treasure in hand (£11 , 900,000) than ever in i t s 
h i s t o r y . 7 I t was assumed that the small notes were to be paid off two years 
hence. Leave to issue these small notes in England had always been treated 
by Parliament as a temporary war measure, to be discontinued as soon as 
the metallic basis fo r the currency had been completely restored. One ob-
ject of abandoning £ 1 notes was to isolate the poor f r o m any fluctuations 
ar is ing f r o m a paper currency, as we l l as ending the easy forgery of these 
notes. The Act of 1816, which extended the suspension of cash payments 
but contemplated resumption in 1818, had allowed two years f r o m the date of 
o 
resumption within which the issue of notes under £ 5 was to cease. 
5. P .P.183f | 2 9 VJ p.69. House of Commons Committee on the Renewal of 
the Bank Charter, Memorandum of the Governor of the Bank of England. 
6. Ibid . 
7. J.Clapham, The Bank of England (Cambridge, 1944), v o l . I I , p .75. 
8. 56 Geo. I l l , c . 2 1 . 
i 
Ricardo, who had always feared "the ev i l consequences which might ensue 
f r o m a sudden and great reduction of the circulation, as we l l as f r o m a 
great addition to i t , " ® had suggested in 1819 that i t might be wise to con-
tinue the use of the £ 1 note - at any rate f o r some time - so as to ease 
pressure on the gold. His ideal currency would have contained such notes 
permanently " i n a l l the country dis t r ic ts" , ^ though not in London. But 
his advice had not been taken: the Act of 1816 s t i l l applied and the can-
cellation of the Bank's own small notes was to be followed by the country 
issues. 
Parliament suddenly changed i ts mind, though, and scared by recent 
pr ice fa l l s and influenced by widespread agitation against "Peel's A c t " o f , 
1819, extended the bankers' power to issue small notes unt i l 1833, the 
year in which the Bank's charter was t imed to e x p i r e . " T h e consequence 
of that measure was, to leave in the possession of the Bank an inordinate 
12 
quantity of bu l l i on . " 
The f i r s t step to expand credit was taken in December 1821, with the 
substitution of ninety-five days fo r the tradit ional s ix ty-f ive days as the 
13 
maximum currency of bi l l s discounted by the bank. However, the major 
9. D . Ricardo, Proposals For An Economical And Secure Currency: Works^ 
(1951), p . 407! " 
10. -D.Ric ardo. Plan For The Establishment Of A National Bank: Works, . 
"p. 509. 
11 . J.Clapham, op .c i t . , vol.11, p .76. 
12. Memorandum of the Governor of the Bank of England, op. c i t . : : 
13. L.S.Pressnel l , Country Banking In The Industrial Revolution, (Oxford 
> 1956), p.478. J.Clapham, op .c i t . , vo l . 11, p .85. 
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development i n the process by which money became "cheap" was the con-
version of government stock. 
The Conversions of Government Stock, 1823-1824 
Great significance was attached to this with reference to the boom 
years by Pa lmer, the Governor of the Bank of England, during the 1832 
Committee on the renewal of the Bank Charter. 
Q. ' W i l l you state to the committee what in your opinion was 
the nature and march of the c r i s i s in 1825? 
A . The Committee w i l l of course understand me as expressing 
merely a speculative opinion, and in no way committing '* 
other parties who may have different views. I have always 
considered that the f i r s t step towards the excitement was 
the reduction of interest upon the Government securities; 
the f i r s t movement i n that respect was, I think, upon 
135,000,000 1. of Five per Cents, which took place i n 1823; 
in the subsequent year, 1824, followed the reduction of 
80,000,000 1. of Four per Cents. I have always considered 
that reduction of interest, one-f i f th i n one case and one-
eighth i n the other, to have created that feverish feeling i n 
the minds of the Public at large, which prompted almost 
everybody to entertain any proposition f o r investment, how-
- 3 0 -
14 
ever absurd, which was tendered " 
The funded debt i n 1822 amounted to rather more than £ 7 9 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 
The money had been borrowed at 3 per cent., 4 per cent., and 5 per cent., 
and more than £153 , 000, 000 of the amount carr ied interest at 5 per cent. 
This portion of the debt was usually known as the Navy 5 per cents, and the 
Act under whichthis money had been chiefly borrowed, stipulated that the 
5 per cents should be irredeemable t i l l £25 ,000 , 000 3 per cent Stock had 
been paid off . A previous Act had directed that no portion of the 3 per cents 
should be redeemed without twelve months' notice to the holders. The 
Sinking Fund, had, however, discharged considerably more than £ 2 5 , 0 0 0 , 000 
of the 3 per cents, and the Government therefore contended that i t was at 
15 
l iber ty to proceed with the redemption of the 5 per cents. 
The terms offered fo r the redemption of the 5 per cent Stock were as 
fo l lows. Every holder of £100 5 per cent Stock was to be at l iber ty to r e -
ceive £105 New 4 per cent Stock. But any person objecting to this arrange-
ment was to be paid off at par. 
The value of £100 4 per cent Stock in February, when the offer was 
made, was about £98 ; the value of £100 5 per cent Stock was about £ 1 0 5 . 1 0 s . 
The holder, therefore, who accepted the Government terms received Stock 
14. P . P . 1832! 1 I ^ L Q.606 , House of Commons Committee On The Renewal 
of the Bank Charter. Evidence of John Horsley Palmer. 
15. Spencer Walpole, A History of England-From The Conclusion of the 
Great War i n 1815, (1914), vol.11, p . 119. 
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worth about £103 ; the holder who refused them had the alternative of 
accepting £100 in money. There could not, under these conditions, be much 
doubt about the success of the scheme. The dissentients among the fund-
holders were very few, and about £150 ,000 , 000 out of the whole amount of 
£153 ,000 ,000 was converted into a 4 per cent S t o c k . 1 6 
Similar manoeuvres in 1824 brought a conversion of 4 per cent 
Stock to 3^ per cent. In February the price of Consols had r isen to 90; . 
the old 4 per cents, redeemable at par were quoted at about 102; and the 
t ime had therefore a r r ived at which i t was both possible and desirable to 
redeem this Stock. The old 4 per cent annuities amounted to about 
£ 7 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 and involved an annual charge of about £ 3 , 000,000, but they 
could not be legally redeemed without six months' notice to their holders. 
Robinson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed to give the holders 
of the 4 per cents six months' notice that the Stock would be redeemed, un-
less, within six weeks f r o m the receipt of the notice, they desired to ex-
i 17 
change i t f o r 3j per cent Stock. x 1 In the great major i ty of cases the ex-
18 
change was at once made and the Treasury thereby saved £375, 000 annually. 
The relative surplus of money at the Bank of England, which w i l l be 
shown later to have contributed to the inflationary pressures of the boom 
years, was exhibited in 1822 when the Government t r i ed to r i d itself of the 
i i i - n 1- TT—n M M - r a — M m i ^ ~ r ~ ' 
16. I b i d . , p . 120, J.Clapham, op .c i t . , p.478. \ . 
17. Hansard,. N.S. , X , 317. 
18. W.D.Jones, Prosperity Robinson (1967), p . 102. 
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naval and mi l i t a ry pensions l i ab i l i ty of around £ 5 , 0 0 0 ; 000 inherited f r o m 
the Great War. This was known as the deadweight annuity - or just the 
Deadweight. Ministers argued that i t was not real ly part of ordinary ex-
penditure, " i n fact had nothing to do with i t " . The pensions were a dwindling 
19 
l iab i l i ty , "a dead expense". The government proposed to issue a 45-year 
annuity of £ 2 , 800,000 a year, so "saving" £ 1 , 200,000;from the funds raised 
by selling the annuity they would meet the heavy pensions costs of the ear l ier 
and reduced costs of later years. The scheme had obvious deficiencies that 
were propounded by Ricardo, Hume and others, but was passed by a con-
fused House of Commons . 2 0 
I t became necessary to f ind some capitalists who were prepared to 
undertake the contract, and the largest capitalists declined to have anything 
21 
to do with i t . In 1823 the Government appealed to the Directors of the 
Bank of England. Very reluctantly they agreed to take £585, 740 of the 
22 
annuity, paying f o r i t £13 ,089 ,419 spread over f ive and a quarter years. 
This was not to be the only t ime that the Bank was to lend money to the 
Government. 
19. Hansard, N . S . , VH, 164: Vansit tart . 
20. The debates are summarized in W.Smart, Economic Annals of the 
Nineteenth Century, (1910), v o l . I I , pp.85-8T 
21 . Spencer Walpole, op.-cit., vo l . U r p . 122 
22. J.Glapham, op .c i t . , vol.11, p.89. 
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Though the Directors had been glad, when accumulating treasure 
against resumption of cash payments, to reduce their holdings in the f loat ing 
debt, they were only too wi l l ing i n the years of high bullion reserves and 
low prof i t s - f r o m 1821 to 1824 - to oblige the Treasury i n most emergencies 
I t advanced £ 4 mil l ions on Exchequer b i l l s that had been issued by the govern 
ment during the summer of 1822: this was to enable the Treasury to assist 
the hungry Ir ish, , as wel l as to faci l i tate the current loan conversion opera- s 
t ions, and to extend i ts own c i r c u l a t i o n . ^ 
The Credit Policies of the Bank of England and of the 
~~ ' Country Banks ~ 
The Bank thus co-operated wi th the Government in i ts reflationary 
measures, but to this should be added the Bank's independent policy of . ' 
lending money on mortgage, which i t had vi r tual ly abandoned a century 
24 
ear l ie r . The Bank proposed to lend money on mortgage in May 1823, as 
one way of using i ts surplus bullion and enhancing i ts flagging prof i t s , and 
when a very attractive mortgage proposal was made to the Committee of 
Treasury in October i t was accepted at once. The Duke of Rutland had 
mortgages and encumbrances on his land amounting to £280, 000 and asked 
f o r a single mortgage of £300,000 at 4 per cent so that he might clear these 
of f . His rent r o l l was returned at £71 ,000 and because of "the great e l i g ib i l -
i t y of the security", the committee at once recommended i t to the Court who 
23. L.S.PressneH, op . c i t . , p.480. J.Clapham, op . c i t . , p .86. 
24. L.S.Pressnel l , op . c i t . , p.479. 
25 accepted i t the next day. 
When accepting this Rutland mortgage, the Court agreed to proceed 
wi th a policy of lending on the security of land up to a sum of £2 , 000, 000. 
Once i t was known that the Bank was open to landlords, applications poured 
in f r o m a l l over the kingdom. Before the year was out, nearly f i f t y had 
been received. The Marquis of Bath wanted £200, 000; the Duke of Devon-
shire £130 ,000; Mr .Buckna l l Estcourt £70 ,000 ; E a r l Cowper, the E a r l of . 
Chichester, Sir John Trevelyan and a crowd of others are a l l on this f i r s t 
OR 
l i s t of 1823. Nearly a l l were accepted.' 
The business slackened off in 1824; there were only a dozen applica-
tions f r o m January to May, but one was big and another the biggest yet • 
received. The trustees of Sir Corbet Corbet wanted £104, 000 and the E a r l 
of Oxford not less than £350, 000. The fo rmer got their mortgage, the 
latter did not. The Bank refused to lend on Scottish or I r i sh land but 
appear to have been overworked wi th their English correspondence. The 
Directors were accused in Parliament in 1824 by the radical , Joseph Hume, 
of "acting as pawnbrokers on a large scale", at a t ime when new mortgage 
business was already slackening off . They were more reasonably accused 
by Edward El l ice of locking their money up in^an unrealizable f o r m of 
security, the very thing that had brought down so many country banks in 
25. J.Clapham, op . c i t . , p .82. 
26. I b i d . , p.83 
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1 8 1 5 . 2 7 The money lent out exceeded £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 000 by the end of January 1825, 
28 
and by July 1825 i t had reached an apparent maximum of £ 1 , 452, 396. The 
operation was dis-continued in October 1826. 
However, the Bank had also decided, by September 1823, to lend on 
government securities and upon i ts own stock. A t r i v i a l amount was lent at 
f i r s t - a thousand pounds or so - but in June 1824 i t bounded up to £ 1 , 000,000, 
and barely dipped below that f igure unt i l July 1825, when i t dropped to 
29 
£166, 500 to t r a i l away almost to nothing. 
The Bank^hen^made every ef for t to put i ts unaccustomed wealth to 
good effect and perhaps in this way contributed to the over-speculation that 
was to occur. However, the bullion at the Bank reached in January 1824 
the enormous and unprecedented amount of £14 , 200,000 and was in A p r i l 1824 
as high as £ 1 3 , 800,000, while the circulation in A p r i l 1824 was £19 , 300,000,' 
30 
or only one mi l l ion higher than i t had been in February 1823. The Bank 
influenced the boom only indirectly: i t was financed direct ly by the private 
bankers in London and the country bankers. 
The debt conversions and the f a l l of the bank rate f r o m 5 per cent to 
31 
4 per cent in June 1822 had an immediate effect on the credit situation of 
the country bankers, i f only because a f a l l in the rate of interest, by reducing 
27. Hansard, N . S . , X, 226. 
28. See statistics of mortgage lending etc. i n Committee on the Bank Charter, 
1832, Appendix No.6. 
29. Ib id . L.S.Pressnel l , op . c i t . , p.480. 
30. T.Tooke, History of Prices (1834 vol .n, p . 174. 
31 . J.Clapham, op . c i t . , p . 84. - . . . 
the prof i tabi l i ty of their London balances and investments in b i l l s , compelled 
them to employ their resources more fu l ly , more a c t i v e l y . ^ On the other 
hand, fa l l ing rates of interest and r i s ing confidence among the public could 
be expected to stimulate the circulation of the means of payment generally. 
The country banks, some of which in 1819 had expressed a dislike of smal l 
notes, now either threw their d i s l ike to the wind, or found i t impossible to 
33 
resist their customers' demand f o r them. One estimate of the total v o l -
ume of country bank notes stamped each year in the period 1821-3 puts the 
f igure at 4 mil l ions, r i s ing to 6 mil l ions in 1824and in 1825 to more than 
8 mi l l ions . In the provinces, small notes became the common method of 
paying wages, and by 1825 one-half or more of the issues of the bankers in 
35 
many dis t r ic ts were notes of less than £ 5 . 
Henry Burgess, then the secretary of the Committee of Country 
Bankers, presented to the Bank Charter Committee of 1832 a series of 
index numbers f o r the note issues of 122 country banks, in July of each year 
f r o m 1818 to 1 8 2 5 . ^ A simple ari thmetic average of a l l the indexes showed 
that issues had fa l len unbrokenly f r o m 1818 to 1823 by 12 per cent. F rom 
1823 to 1825 they rose by 16 per cent. Since the statistics are of ratios only, 
32. L.S.Pressnel l , op .c i t . , p.480. 
33. A.E.Feaveryear , The Pound Sterling (Oxford, 1931) pp.218-219. 
34. Hansard, N . S . , XIV, 17, Lord Liverpool . 
35. Wi l l i am Cobbett, Rural Rides (1830), fol.n, p .24. 
36. Committee on the Bank Charter, 1832, Q.5165. 
I 
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and not of absolute amounts issued they are of l imi ted value. The issues of 
s ixty-four of the banks had r isen less than the average, and some had 
actually fa l l en- those of forty-nine had r isen by more than the average -
some of them by very much more. Clapham's suggestion of a "minimum 
37 
extra issue of 20 to 25 per cent", may not be f a r out f o r many banks. 
Even the sound Bedford Bank increased i t s issues by 16 per cent between 
38 
December 1823 and December 1824. The increases in the issues cited 
by Burgess are the more revealing when an examination i s made of the 
r i se between July 1824 and July 1825, when the country notes were to reach 
their peak:-the overal l overage was a r ise of 6.7 per cent, but f i f t y banks 
* 
showed rises of 10 per cent or more. 
As early as July 1822, Barclays could wr i t e to bankers at Whitby 
that "money can scarcely be employed at a l l or b i l l s obtained at a higher 
rate than 3£ per cent f r o m the brokers the present unusual abundance 
of money renders the occupation of i t so d i f f i cu l t , and when occupied i t i s 
at so low an interest that af ter a mater ial sacrif ice f r o m being unable to 
employ our money, and par t icular ly since the payment of the last dividends, 
we are obliged to place a l i m i t on the balances of correspondents on which 
40 
interest is allowed". r> 
37. J.Clapham, op .c i t . , vol.11, p .97. 
38. L.S.Pressnel l , op . c i t . , p k 481 
39. Ib id . 
40. K . F . D i x o n , The Development of the London Money Market, 1780-1830. 
London University P h . D . , 1U62, p . i ee ~ 
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There was also a considerable increase in the volume of b i l l s of 
exchange. Wi l l i am Leatham, a Quaker banker of Yorkshire , estimated 
that the total stamped in 1825 was £260 mil l ions, £28 mil l ions more than 
in 1824; the daily circulation of bi l l s he estimated to have increased f r o m 
£58 mil l ions to £65 mi l l ions . 4 1 
These were days of very easy paper money. Credit was expanding 
rapidly and yet there were few opportunities f o r investment. The debt 
conversions, in particular, partly accentuating, part ly reflect ing the down-
ward tendency in the long-term rate of interest, had the immediate effect 
of exciting "among persons whose incomes were i n consequence diminished, 
a restless feeling, and a disposition to hazardous inves tmen t . " 4 2 There 
was a proverb current i n the financial wor ld that "John B u l l can stand 
many things but he cannot stand 2 per cent". 
The Progress of the Trade Cycle 
" 1821 - 1825" 
Before turning to a detailed analysis of the investment boom that 
focussed itself on South American prospects, i t • i s wise to interpret more 
fu l l y the underlying trends of the Br i t i sh economy in the f i r s t half of the 
eighteen-twenties. A descriptive account of the t iming of the booms, f o r 
4 1 . W. Leatham, Letters on the Currency (1840), pp.67-68. 
42. T.Tooke, op .c i t . vol.11, p . 191. -
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i t w i l l become apparent that there was i n real i ty more than one, w i l l then 
be outlined. 
A clearly marked cycle can be traced f r o m 1820 when recovery 
f r o m the depression of the post-war years was already under way, to 1826, 
the bottom of the succeeding depression. The economic system gradually 
recovered to the end of 1824. Security and commodity prices then rose 
in a spectacular inflationary spira l and industry moved to an unstable f u l l 
employment. In the spring of 1825 a turning point came, and by December 
there was severe financial panic. The depression deepened unt i l the 
closing months of 1826, when a m i l d revival began. ^ 
This was an age when advances were made towards f ree trade. In 
1823-5, t a r i f f s , with the exception of those on grain, were generally 
lowered, and their administration s impl i f ied . Huskisson's new t a r i f f s </. 
ranged between 10 and 30 per cent, while the old rates varied between 18 
44 
and 40 per cent. These alterations were by no means an acceptance of 
the blessings of pure free-trade, but.were a ref lect ion of the confidence 
that Br i t i sh manufacturers had in an unrestricted international market. 
In another sense.as Gayer, Rostow and Schwartz agree, they were s t r i c t ly 
a product of the boom of 1822-5, as in 1825 Br i t i sh manufacturers were 
less concerned wi th foreign competition than with cheaper supplies of raw 
43. A.D.Gayer , W.W.Rostow and A . J.Schwartz, op . c i t . , p .171 . 
44. W.Smart, op . c i t . , v o l . I I , pp. 192-226, 264-290. 
• " f* ! , 
I - 40 -
materials . The t iming of the t a r i f f reductions was closely connected wi th , 
and indicative of, Br i ta in ' s economic growth in the early twenties. 
Domestic prices f e l l almost continuously f r o m 1818 un t i l the trough 
i 
was reached in May, 1822. The index remains at this low level through 
the rest of 1822, but moves rapidly up f r o m January to June 1823. Af t e r 
breaking sharply to October, i t r ises by February 1824 to about the level 
of the previous June. Unt i l September i t sags slightly, only to r ise steadily 
through the last quarter of 1824 to a peak in May 1825, f r o m which t ime i t 
45 
fa l l s severely away to a low point in July 1826. 
* 
The conditions of supply fo r agr icul tura l commodities were the 
pr incipal determinants of the price level . The r i se in the index i n the 
early months of 1823 and the f a l l and recovery in the latter half of the year 
are clearly connected with fluctuations i n the grain m a r k e t . ^ The low 
point in the domestic index comes i n May 1822j i n grain prices in October, j 
The movement of non-agricultural domestic commodities determines the 
lower turning-point, as they tended to recover slightly in the spring of 1822 
f r o m the long downward movement begun i n 1818. A few domestic com-
modities ref lect a fur ther brief spurt about December 1822 to February 1823 
45. Ib id . p .74. 
46. T.Tooke, op .c i t . , vol.11, pp. 121-122. • '-• 
i 
i n response to fears of a general European war . ' The major r i se was 
in colonial products, whose supply, i t was feared, would again be obstruct-
ed, but some domestic commodities as we l l were affected. Af t e r the 
short r ise , they sagged again unt i l 1824, while later in that year, the sub-
stantial r i se began which ended abruptly with the cessation of the boom in 
the middle of 1825. Individual domestic prices, of course, vary consider-
ably in their movement, although they agree i n the decisive r i se and f a l l 
of 1 8 2 5 - 6 . 4 8 
Except fo r the r ise in the prices of colonial produce i n the early 
months of 1'823, and of cotton, i n the latter months of the year, import 
prices tended to f a l l steadily f r o m the beginning of 1822 to October 1 8 2 4 . 4 9 
A t that t ime, an apparent deficiency of commodity stocks, combined wi th 
the feverish speculative optimism which pervaded the stock exchange and 
industry, caused a commodity import boom. This reached i ts peak i n May 
1825, when a severe decline set in , which persisted to July 1826. ^ Over-
trading manifested itself par t icular ly in the case of cotton which was of 
paramount importance and i t was here that the reaction was f i r s t f e l t . The 
decline of overal l import prices in 1825-6 brings the index to i ts lowest 
51 
point since 1791. 
Between 1821 and 1824 Tooke states that "the trade and mahufact- r 
47. Ib id . pp.79n. and 140-141 
48. See A.D.Gayer , W.W.Rostow and A.J.Schwartz, o p . c i t . , p.176, 
F i g . 50,-Prices, 1821-6. 
49. T.Tooke, op .c i t . , vol.11, pp.140-141. 
50. I b i d . , pp. 154-156. 
51 . A.D.Gayer , W.W^Rostow, and A.J.Schwartz, o p . c i t . , p .181 . 
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ures of the"country had never before been in a more regular, sound, and 
satisfactory state." That picture conforms to available non-statistical 
evidence on the iron industry. In 1822 the Staffordshire iron trade was 
reported "in the fullest state of activity", while the manufacturers of iron-
mongery and cutlery boasted that their wares "were beyond the danger of 
rivalry". 5 2 Even in Birmingham, which had suffered most directly from 
a cessation of war-time orders after 1815, "the whole body of the working 
classes were well employed, and a great number of new houses had been 
built. " 53 1824 was a year of "great prosperity everywhere" 5 ^ w i t h the 
55 
rising prices of the latter months extending profits and causing strikes. 
A s a result of the new investments, orders for rai l iron, water-mains, lamp 
posts and mining machinery were coming to the foundries on a larger scale 
than ever before. The iron industry in the early months of 1825, exhibited 
al l the characteristics of an industry operating at strained full capacity: 
consumers eager to buy; manufacturers raising prices in natural response 
to the inelastic demand as well as by monopoly agreement; rising wages 
and s t r i k e s . 5 6 
52. W. Smart, op.cit., vol.'ll, p. 123. 
53. Ibid., p. 145. 
54. Ibid., p. 183. 
55. Ibid., pp.231-233. 
56. A.D.Gayer , W.W.Rostow and A.J.Schwartz, op.cit., pp.194-5. 
Beveridge gives a weighted index of physical output for a l l industries 
as follows:-
1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 
3270" ST72 SFT5" 10376" 1T2TY 134TTT 
1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 
lOO" 10770" 10O" 9T7T S O " _ c o n t d t « 
'•• • • • ' . ' . A . " . 
Expectations held in the latter stages of the boom caused an extension 
of "plant". For instance, in the coal industry, old pits were extended and 
new ones sunk, while there was also an improvement in the pumping 
machinery of several collieries, making possible the exploitation of deeper 
veins. This extension of plant was most significant in thejjtextile industry and 
particularly with the increase in the number of power-looms. It is significant ! 
that the riots during the depression of 1826 were characterized by the de-
struction of many of the new power-looms. 
As has been indicated, labour fared well in the final years of the boom, i 
and with a shortage of hands, money wages rose rapidly. Efforts at organiza-
tion were aided by the repeal, in 1824, of the Combination Acts. A part of 
the new freedom was withdrawn in the revised Act of 1825; but labour's 
f 
organization at least was no longer illegal. In 1826, however, money wages 
fell sharply, retail prices considerably less: it was a year of widespread and : 
severe distress. ^ 
Exports grew satisfactorily in the early 'twenties. With the exception 
of 1823, there was a steady increase in the volume of exports, from 1821 to 
1824, followed by a minor decline in 1825, and a drastic fall in 1826. The 
rise in prices in 1824-5, however, makes 1825 a peak year in the annual 
t 
William Beveridge, "The Trade Cycle in Britain before 1850", Oxford 
Economic Papers, Number 3, 1940. 
57. A.D.Gayer , WW.Rostow and A.J .Schwartz /op .c i t . , p.173. 
I 
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figures for the real value of exports, whilst the official values of imports are 
also at a peak in that year. The most important increase in exports (1821-5) 
and the sharpest decline (1825-6) appear in the export figures for Central and 
South A m e r i c a . 5 B The substantial decline in shipments to the United States, 
in 1826, clearly reflects the consequence of the panic of the previous year 
and the depression there. While the sales of British merchants to the Con-
tinent still constituted the largest single category of their business, they play 
a relatively minor role in the fluctuations of total exports.**9 The speculative 
boom in foreign trade, from the closing months of 1824 to about Apri l 1825 
has been described in its impact on prices. Many of the contracts were made 
when prices and interest rates were low, and the general prospects for trade 
highly optimistic. ®® The rise in prices, 'however, discouraged purchases 
abroad, while producers at home found that their import requirements were 
more than fully met. A money market experiencing severe stringency -
partly in consequence of the increased credit demands for foreign trade 
financing - helped reverse the upward trend. 
The character of this whole business cycle, however, can be dis-
tinguished from earlier cycles by the scale and scope of new private invest-
ment. There was an increase in railway constructions, new docks were built 
and what appears to be the greatest building boom until the forties took place. 
58. See pp. 17-25. 
59. A.D.Gayer , W.W.Rostow and A.J.Schwartz . , op.cit., p.182. 
60. T.Tooke, op.cit., vol.II, p. 147. 
I . . . V 
Gas-light, insurance, building, trading, investment and provision com -
panies, and above a l l companies concerned with South America and the loans 
to that continent impart to these years their unique character. 
Fifteen new railways, covering 256 miles and costing £ 3 . 6 4 millions, 
61 
were completed from 1823 to 1826. In 1824-5, two large docks companies 
and the West India and General Steam Navigation companies were formed, 
the latter two involving £4 millions^. ^ Even so, the boom in MTerican 
and South American mining share's was the most sensational of the develop-
M 
ments in the capital market in these years. The attitude of the investing 
public was made optimistic by the government's formal recognition of these 
states in 1824, and the "restlessness f T >of the British investor suffering from 
declining yields made for an easy acceptance of both government and'mining 
prospectuses. More than half of the forty-four mining companies which 
i 
appeared in 1824-5, and. survived until 1827, were operating in Latin 
A m e r i c a . ^ Finally, the public was induced from 1822 to 1825 to export 
enormous amounts of capital overseas in government bonds, predominantly 
to South America, and these bonds, in the amounts actually paid up, con-
stituted the largest single category of new investment which can be estimated 
for the period. 
The course of this extraordinary cycle in new investment can be traced 
in the security indexes as well as in the price of Consuls, Bank Stock and 
61. G.R.Porter , Progreasof the Nation(1849), pp.329-330. 
62. Henry English, A. Complete View Of The Joint Stock Companies Formed 
During The Years 1824 and 1825 (1827) p. 8. ' 63. Ibid. pp.4-6. 
India Stock, i The security index, inclusive of mining shares, moves up 
gradually throughout 1822. From December to April 1823 it declines 
in response to the war fears mentioned earlier. This movement appears 
in al l security prices. From the spring of 1823 the upward movement 
is resumed at an accelerated pace, until June 1824. From June to Octo-
ber the index tapers in its rise, but in October the wi?ld speculation in 
mining shares broke out. From October until January 1825, the index 
inclusive of mines rises extravagantly to be checked iri February-March 
from whence it declines ever more rapidly to September 1826.^ 
The index exclusive of mines, after rising through 1822-3, begins 
gradually to decline in October 1824, after a very minor advance in the 
previous quarter. The decline was checked in the first half of 1825, 
probably due to a shift from mining shares, on their first decline, into 
other securities, before the credit structure supporting the whole market 
collapsed. From September 1825, the index falls without interruption; 
the major decline ending, however, by March 1826. The prices of 
Consuls, India Stock and Bank Stock, although there are marked dis-
similarities in their movement, a l l show turning-points in 1824, antici-
pating or at least preceeding the Stock Exchange crash. 
During the financial cr is is the Bank of England came to the rescue as 
the lender of last resort. During the period"of industrial and commercial 
expansion, as has been indicated, the Bank did not enlarge its discounts 
, - - - n • • ! • i • • i • i i MM • • • • • M ^ M W • mim* fa » w n " w i n — i M~* 
64. A.D.Gayer , W.W.Rostow and A.J.Schwartz . , , op.cit ;., pp.190-191. 
65. Ibid. p. 191. 
greatly, but during the latter half of 1825 until 1826 it increased its 
private loans against a rapidly declining reserve. 
The Attractions of Investment in South America 
The structure of the boom has now been outlined. The lowness of 
interest rates in the early 1820's may be contrasted with the great de-
ficiencies of the public investment mechanism. The sort of person who 
invested in the Funds knew very little about the opportunities for invest-
ment in manufacturing activities at home, and had knowledge of only a very 
limited range of nationally promoted and advertised schemes, such as 
those involving foreign governments. Hence there was a certain inevitabil-
ity about the rush to invest in South America; firstly in its governments 
and secondly in the new mining companies. 
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CHAPTER III 
British Investment in South American 
Governments, 
i 
- ! 
By the time their independence was won, and in some cases even before 
it was won, the new nations of Latin America were considerably indebted to 
British merchants, shipowners, soldiers and army and navy officers. Since 
Britain was the only country in the world with a large surplus of capital, it was 
natural that the governments of the new nations should float their first bond 
issues in the British market. Colombia was the first nation to avail herself of 
British capital and the affairs of the Colombian loans will be discussed first as 
they set a pattern for the loans to the other states. A general analysis will 
then be made of the total sums involved in this investment process as well as 
the individuals and firms concerned and the methods used to induce investment. 
A more detailed analysis will be made of the mechanics of raising the loans for 
Buenos Aires and Chile, and finally* the fraudulent "Poyais" loan will be dis -^
cussed. 
The Firs t Debtor: Colombia 
Colombia led the way in the settlement of her accounts after her own in- ..-. 
dependence had been won. The Colombian vice-president, Zea, arrived in 
i 
London in June 1820, with powers as minister plenipotentiary, although 
Castlereagh would have nothing to do with him officially. 1 Bolivar, acknow-
ledged as head of the government in Colombia, had sent Senior Zea to England , 
1. Castiereagh's refusal is at F.0.97:14 
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with powers to act for the service of the republic, and, if possible, to pro-
cure a loan to the amount of five millions sterling. ^ 
The new republic had honourable intentions. During the installation of 
the Congress at Angostura, the President spoke of the foreign creditors of 
the republic, "Those friends of mankind are the guardian geniuses of America 
and to them we owe a debt of eternal gratitude, as well as a religious fulfil-
ment of the several obligations contracted with them. The national debt, 
legislators, is the deposit of the good faith, the - honour, and the gratitude 
of Venezuela, respect it as the holy ark which encloses not only the ^rights 
of our benefactors, but the glory of our fidelity. Let us perish, rather than 
fail in any way the smallest point connected with the completion of those en-
gagements, which have been the salvation of our country and of the lives of 
4 
her children." Similarly, in the first public act by which the provinces 
forming the Republic of Colombia were united, the third article stated that 
"The debts which have been separately contracted by the Republics of 
Venezuela and New Grenada are, by this law, recognized, in solidum, as 
i 
the national debt of Colombia. Al l the public property of the State remains 
mortgaged for the payment of it, and the most productive branches of the 
5 
public revenue shall be applied thereto." With these worthy sentiments to 
2. An Officer Late In The Colombian Service, The Present State of Colombia 
(1827) p.234. 
3. Then part of "La Gran Colombia". 
4. Quoted in Alexander Walker, The Recognition, The Loan And The Coloniza 
tion of Colombia(1822) p. 82. This work also the introduction to Colombia 
. . . . . . A GeographicaLStatistical, And Polit ical Account (1822 - . 
1823). — ~ ? ~ ' 
5. Ibid;, pp.82-83. 
back him, Senor Zea arrived in England. 
Old claims and bonds were transferred to debentures paying ten per 
cent, but these were soon to become part of the two million pound loan 
that was floated in 1822. Such was the confidence in the new republic in 
England that Zea would have found no difficulty in procuring considerably 
more than the two millions that he obtained. This loan was contracted for 
by the house of Messrs. Herring, Graham and Poles; the Colombian 
government receiving eighty pounds for every hundred, and engaging to 
pay an interest of six per cent in half-yearly dividends, payable the 1st 
of May and November in each year, and to appropriate one per cent to the 
formation of a fund for the liquidation of the debt. 
It was generally considered in the City of London that the con- . 
tract made by Zea was, under the circumstances in which Colombia was 
then placed, and in comparison with the terms of loans raised by European 
7 
powers, extremely favourable to the republic. Al l concerned seemed 
well pleased and a celebration was held in the form of a public dinner to 
Senor Zea. They drank the health of almost everyone who had benefitted I 
Anglo-Colombian relations, including Messrs.Herring, Graham and 
Powles . 8 
In the interval, however, which had elapsed between Zea's ' 
appointment and the negociation of the loan, the constitutional government 
6. The Present State Of Colombia, pp. 234-235. 
7. Ibid. 
8. For a description of the dinner see Colombia etc., pp.728-747. 
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of Colombia had been established. On receiving intelligence of the steps 
he had taken and the manner in which the money had been appropriated, it 
issued a decree declaring that the powers granted to Zea by the president 
did not extend to financial arrangements and refusing to acknowledge the 
loan he had contracted as a debt of the nation.1 7 These measures aroused 
the indignation of a l l who were connected with the loan, as the documents 
with which Zea was provided, signed by the president and countersigned by 
the secretary for foreign affairs, contained the clearest evidence of the 
validity of his appointment, and his continuance in England, as accredited 
agent of the new government, seemed to imply their tacit acknowledgement 
of the powers with which he had been originally invested. 
The Government of Colombia was adamant about her new position. 
"If we give credit to what has repeatedly been written us from London, we 
must admit that the inconsiderate operations of Mr. Zea, both in political 
and financial matters, have essentially conducted to embarass and perplex. 
We have already noticed his circular note which, from its style, and the 
manner in which it was addressed, was certainly seen and received in 
many quarters with extreme displeasure. His financial transactions were, 
however, still more arbitrary, and destitute of every reason which could 
induce the executive to approve of them, even taking them on the ground 
9. The Present State of Colombia, p. 235. 
of expediency alone." 
The promoters of the loan sought to reassure the public and held a 
meeting of Colombian bond-holders on 11th January 1823, to explain that 
the loan was perfectly legal and to back their case produced the opinions of 
three eminent lawyers, Dr. Lushington, the Solicitor-General, and Mr. 
Serjeant,Lens who held that the contract entered into by Mr. Zea was 
binding. However the affair became even more confused when it became 
known that Zea had issued debentures to himself to the extent of 
19 
£66, 666.13s. 4d. French newspaper comments were reproduced in a 
1 o 
London paper to the effect that he acted illegally throughout. u Of course, 
the promoters of the loan rushed to his rescue and provided space for his 
version of the events to be known, as well as ensuring that their own conduct 
appear honourable. ^ However, it seems quite likely that the powers of Zea 
were revoked and the contractors informed of this several months before the 
15 
contract for the loan was signed. 
Unfortunately the circumstances of this affair were never thoroughly 
explained as Zea died within a few months of signing the loan. ^ The 
10. Colombian State Papers, translated from official copies (1823), p. 36. 
Report of Don Pedro Gual, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Columbia for the year 1823. 
11. Statement Presented To The Meeting Of The Holders Of Colombian Bonds 
(1823) pp.28-38. : '• -
12. The Contractor Unmasked; being letters to one of the contractors of the 
Colombian loan by a member of the honourable society of Lincoln's Inn 
: (1823) p. 16. 
13. See The Recognition etc. pp. 100-103. 
14. See the numerous letters of Zea and the promoters, and rebuts to their 
critics in "The Recognition etc. pp.82-107. 
15. The Contractor Unmasked, p. 18. 
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. Colombian government's complete rejection of the loan is confirmed by the 
unfortunate story of the two war-ships sent out by the contraction account 
of the loan. The "Charles" and the "Constantine" arrived separately at 
L a Guayra but the Colombian authorities refused to receive either and they 
17 
had to return to England. 
The successor to Zea, as agent to the republics in England twas 
Senor Revenga, a well-travelled man who was as qualified as anyone could 
be to promote the interests of his country. However, the arrival of Revenga 
brought little comfort to the contractors of the loan or the investors as he 
was not in a position to acknowledge the loan contracted by his predecessor. 
. "The contractors have only to add, that on the recent arrival of Mr. Revenga 
in this city, they laid before him the contract for the loan, the power under 
which it was raised, and the account of the appropriation ; of the proceeds. .! 
. Mr.Revenga acquainted them, that he should send the account to the Govern-
ment, but that he had no authority to interfere in respect to the loan, the 
Government not having up to. the 29th September last, received any official . 
notice of any loan having been contracted for its account, and it following, as 
a matter of course, that the Government could not give directions to approve 
or disapprove that of which officially it knew nothing." ^  It appears that 
Revenga lived in London under the constant threats of creditors to the 
Colombian republic, and he soon arranged for his recall . ^ 
17. The Contractor Unmasked, pp.29-30. •• 
18. Statement Presented etc. pp.22-23. Also Colombia . . . . . etc., 
p. 755. See The Contractor Unmasked, p. 6 and Revenga's letter to the . 
Daily Courier, June 24th 1823. 
19. Tne Present State of Colombia, pp.236-237. 
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Senor Hurtado was appointed to succeed him, and about the same 
time the Colombian government finding itself in need of money sent Senores 
Montoya and Arrublas, two wealthy Colombian merchants who were them-
selves considerable creditors of the country, to England as commissioners 
90 
with the object of raising a further loan. It was obvious that such a 
mission would be fruitless unless the former loan were acknowledged by the 
government, and Seffor Hurtado was empowered to take this step. The 
Colombian commissioners arrived in London early in 1824 and immediately 
made proposals to prominent capitalists. Money was abundant in England 
and despite the earlier setbacks, public confidence was strong in the re -
sources and stability of the new American governments. There was, there-
fore, considerable competition for this contract. 
The commissioners selected the offer of Messrs.B.A.Goldschmidt 
whereby the government received eighty-five per cent of £4 , 750, 000 to 
which they became indebted. The government of Colombia was to pay an 
interest of six per cent, payable half yearly, on the 15th of January and July 
and to appropriate an annual fund to provide for its redemption in thirty 
21 
years. It had been usual, in similar loans, for the contractors to retain 
a sufficient sum to pay the dividends of the first two years;- in the present 
instance, an amount equal to the dividends for that period was withheld, but 
it was stipulated by the contractors that the interest should commence from 20. Ibid., p.237 
21. Ibid., p.238. 
the 15th January 1824, although the loan itself was not contracted for until 
April subsequent to that date, and the first instalment upon it was not paid 
until June of that year, nor the last until the month of August 1825. A great 
part of the money thus withheld became a bonus for the contractors rather 
22 
than a security to the holders of stock for the payment of their dividends. 
By the eighth article of the contract the commissioners appointed the 
house of Messrs.B.A.Goldschmidt & Co. agents for the republic in all its 
mercantile transactions in England. By the ninth, they were appointed spec! 
agents and commissioners for the payment of the interest of the loan and 
management of the sinking fund, allowing them a commission of two per cent 
and all their expenses. According to the tenth article, the republic engaged 
to negotiate no other loan in Europe or elsewhere for two years without the 
approbation of Messrs . B . A . Goldschmidt and Co . , and if any loan were con-
tracted in England within or after the said two years, the house was to have 
the preference in taking it. 23 
When the terms of this contract became known in Colombia, they 
caused such dissatisfaction that it even became a question whether or not 
the loan should be acknowledged. This displeasure was still further increass 
by a protest forwarded to Bogota by certain London merchant bankers who 
complained of the manner in which the contract had been made. Messrs . 
F . & A. Bailey and I.L.Goldsmidt felt themselves unfairly treated by the 
Colombian loan as they had offered better terms to the agents than those of 
22. Ibid. 
23. Ibid., p.239. 
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B . A.Goldschmidt. They had offered eighty-eight per cent and on conditions 
more favourable to the payment of the first interest. The petition and 
affidavit which, together with other docunrents^ey addressed to the Vice-
24 
President of the Colombian Government pointed to the fact that the 
negotiations had been conducted in the manner contrary to accepted practice. 
Instead of the tender being opened in the presence of al l concerned and the 
highest accepted, 25 Goldschmidt had announced that he had contracted the 
loan before the hour when the last tenders were to be accepted, 26 and it 
27 
soon emerged that his offer was not the highest. 
A special commission of finance was appointed in Bogota to inquire 
into these circumstances, and report to the Congress the result of their 
investigation. It decided reluctantly to uphold the agreement but introduced 
a modification of the eighth and tenth articles, by which Messrs. B . A . 
Goldschmidt and Co. wttre appointed agents for the loan only, and it bound 
itself to give to that nous e a preference in case any new loan should be con-
tracted in England within two years only.^8 
These difficulties having been overcome, things went on very smoothly 
as long as any of the money reserved for the payment of the dividends 
remained in hand. However, when the term of two years, according to the 
conditions of the contract, had expired in January 1826, the dividend then 
24. Published in London as, A Statement Of Some-Gkreumstances Connected 
With The Mode Of Contracting The Colombian Loan In April 1824 (1825) 
25. Ibid., pp. 10-11 : -
26. Ibid., p. 12 
27. Ibid., p. 13 8. The Present State of Colombia, p. 241. 
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due was paid with the last of that money, and the government was left to its 
own resources to make future provision for debt payments. ^ 
It unfortunately happened that considerable commercial distress ex-
isted in England at the time that the first dividend to be provided for by a 
remittance from Colombia became due. The house of B.A.Goldschmidt was 
suffering financial embarrassment as were many other houses and it was 
for a while supposed that this was holding up payment of the dividends, a l -
though from the few direct communications which were made to the public 
30 
by Senor Hurtado this was hardly mentioned. The first serious alarm 
however felt by the public on the subject of Colombian stock was certainly 
excited by the failure of Goldschmidt at the beginning of February. On the 
28th of that month, Senor Hurtado published a letter in the newspapers with 
the object of quieting the apprehensions of the creditors of the republic, in 
which he stated " . . . that he had arranged with the house of Messrs . 
Herring, Richardson and Co. for the payment of the dividend on the loan 
of 1822, due the 1st of May, and that money for the payment of the dividend 
on the loan of 1824, due the 15th of July, having been ordered by the 
Colombian government to be deposited for shipment at Carthagena, he some 
3 1 
time past despatched a vessel for the purpose of bringing it to England." 
The dividend in May was paid in due course; but on the 15th of July 
there was no word of the money mentioned in the above letter, or any 
communication from Senor Hurtado on the subject. The bondholdersloudly 
29. Ibid., pp.241-424. 
30. Ibid.. p. 242. 
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voiced their discontent as they at least expected some explanation of what 
had occurred. Two or three days later, however, the Colombian minister 
again addressed the public stating that, " . . . having received several applic-
, ations f r o m persons describing themselves as holders of Colombian bonds, 
solici t ing information on the subject of the dividend, he thought proper to 
in fo rm them that the Colombian government having made arrangements f o r 
setting aside a certain portion of i t s revenue f o r the payment of the dividends 
upon i ts loans, he had despatched a vessel to bring the sum necessary fo r 
that purpose; in consequence, however, of the government of Peru, which 
had become debtor to Colombia in a large amount, having authorized the 
rais ing of a loan in England, the Colombian government had sent an order 
on the Peruvian agents in London f o r the amount, but that, owing to their 
inabil i ty to raise such a loan i t had not been honoured; that the Colombian 
government had not been informed of their circumstance, or of the failure 
of Messrs.Goldschmidt and Co. in t ime to remi t the requisite funds, but 
that he hoped to receive despatches shortly which would enable h im to make 
them a communication in every respect s a t i s f a c t o r y . " ^ 
The portion of the revenue here alluded to as being set aside f o r 
the payment of the interest of the debt was one-fourth of the produce of the 
customs, which, by -an act of congress, passed in the session of 1824, had 
been appropriated to that purpose, and was ordered to be sent f r o m the 
32. I b i d . , pp.243-244. 
different ports on the Atlantic coast to Carthagena, and f r o m those on the 
Pacific to Panama, where i t was to await the orders of the government f o r 
i t s tranmission to Europe. The money mentioned by the minister in his 
f i r s t communication as.having been deposited f o r shipment at Carthagena, 
by order of the government, was probably this same appropriated portion 
of the revenue;*- but as no tidings were received of i t , i t appears to have been 
33 
applied to other uses. 
As soon as the embarrassment i n the state of Colombian a f fa i r s 
i n England was known in Bogota, an extraordinary meeting of the congress 
was convened f o r the purpose of providing fo r the emergency, and i t i s worth 
noting that i n the decreet issued on that occasion, no notice whatever is 
taken of the fa i lure of the agents of the republic. The sole reason fo r the 
emergency was " . . . that ingelligence had just been received that Peru was 
not able to procure a fur ther loan in England, and as Colombia had re l ied on 
that resource to pay the interest upon her debt, i t was necessary immediately 
to provide means of payment lest the republic should suffer in i t s c r e d i t . " 3 ^ 
I t seems extraordinary at f i r s t glance that a nation should t rust the preserva-
tion of i t s credit to so uncertain a contingency, but as wi th most of the South 
American governments at this t ime, the government of Colombia had given 
l i t t l e thought as to the means whereby i t would pay off i ts debts, and some 
contemporaries speculated as to whether these governments had ever had 
33. I b i d . , p.244. 
34. I b i d . , p.245 
- 6 0 -
serious intentions to do so. The government of Colombia la id out extensive 
plans f o r raising the money to pay i ts debts. 35 However, what was possible 
in theory was impossible in practice and the nation remained i n default. 
The Organization Of The Loans 
The ease wi th which Colombia was able to raise money i n London wi th 
. v i r tua l ly no security i n 1822 persuaded others to participate, p r i m a r i l y to 
supply their miniature armies with uniforms and ammunition and acquire a 
ship or two. 
Byron wrote somewhat i ronical ly : 
"Every loan 
Is not merely a speculative hit, 
But sets a nation or upsets a Throne ." 36 
So began the mania f o r South American bond issues that was to prove 
disastrous f o r the Br i t i sh investor, as by the end of 1827 every issue had gone 
in to d e f a u l t . 3 7 
' Four issues, with an aggregate face value of £ 3 , 650,000 were sold to 
Br i t i sh investors in 1822, and ten issues, with an aggregate face value of 
£17 ,479 ,000 in 1824 and 1825, making a grand total of £ 2 1 , 1 2 9 , 0 0 0 . Mexico, : 
the largest borrower, floated an aggregate of £ 7 , 000, 000, including £600,000 
f o r the Municipal i ty of Guadalajara; but "La Gran Colombia", then embracing 
35. See The Present State of Colombia, pp. 245-251, f o r the Colombian plans. 
36. Don Juan, X I I , 5, 6. 
37. Br ie f histories of these bonds are included in Annual Reports Of The, 
V Council of The Corporation Of Foreign Bondholders (London) f o r 1873 and 
subsequent years, and in The Stock Exchange Year-Book (London) fo r years 
f r o m 1875. See f i g . ^ f o r details of each issue. "~ 
what later became the three nations of Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, was 
a close second, wi th £ 6 , 750, 000. B r a z i l borrowed £ 3 , 200,000; Peru, 
£ 1 , 8 1 6 , OOO a^nd Chile £ 1 , 000, 000. The province of Buenos Ai res , which car r ied 
out most of the external a f fa i r s of the loose Argentine Confederation, borrowed 
£ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , the ridiculous and largely mythical Kingdom of Poyais (on the 
east coast of Central America) floated a loan of £200 ,000 , and the United 
Provinces of Central America (which were never real ly united, and soon broke j 
up into the republics of Costa Rica, E l Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and | 
Nicaragua) borrowed £163 ,000 . j 
The negotiation of the loans followed well-defined l ines. An agent of j 
i 
the borrowing government appeared i n London, usually a high o f f i c i a l or private ; 
• i 
persons operating on a commission. The agent approached one or more issuing ! 
houses and arranged a contract with one of them setting out the te rms upon I 
which the loan was to be issued. ^ However, on-occasions, i t appears that j 
i 
! 
promoters (or issuing houses) actually approached the governments of South i 
American states pointing out how simple, what good policy and above a l l how 
cheap i t was f o r them to borrow money i n London . ° .. j 
Thenceforth the issuing house was i n charge of a l l arrangements. 
• ' i 
Usually i t sought the influence and assistance of other parties with whom to 
share the r isks and the profi ts . Prospectuses were prepared, often only i n manu-
script f o r m , and sent round to brokers andveealthy clients. Newspapers were 
supplied wi th reading matter extolling polit ica l conditions in the borrowing 
38. L . Jenks, The Migration Of Br i t i sh Capital To 1875 (1927), p . 47 ; . : 
39. P.H.Emden, op . c i t . , p . 40. 
states. Pamphleteers were engaged to prepare elaborate studies of resources 
topography fand customs of the relevant states. "Colombia 1 1 cited above 
is an excellent i l lus t ra t ion . The connection with the contractors was distinctly 
avowed in the introduction, while the book was intended to promote an elaborat 
scheme of colonization and development as wel l as the loan. ^ 
Nor were the promoters averse to share-rigging of the type so expertly 
practised by their brothers i n the f i e l d of company promotion. ^ Af t e r en-
thusiasm had been aroused to a high pitch, a selected group of insiders received 
large blocks of bonds and i t was promptly announced thatthe issues had been 
completely sold out; but i t was at the same t ime hinted and suggested that a fev 
bonds could s t i l l be bought f r o m original purchasers who might not recognize a 
gilt-edged security when they saw i t . This caused fur ther excitement and a 
feverish scramble by eager applicants. The contracting f i r m s and their 
associates then unloaded a l l they had at a p ro f i t and the bonds for thwith decline 
42 
in value. I f investors had bought the bonds at the price of issue announced, 
their total actual investment would have been £16 , 892, 220. But as the market 
was rigged against them, they invested considerably more, possibly £19 m i l l c 
or £20 mi l l i on altogether. 
There were not many f i r m s engaged in - this issuing business,, althouj 
more participated in what was later called the "underwri t ing". The h i s to r i c 
connection of Baring Brothers and N.M.Rothschi ld wi th Argentina and B r a z i l 
40. On the concoction of news, see Morning Herald, 29th December 1825. Oh 
underwriting, see J.S.Ricardo i n The Times, 28th October 1826. 
4 1 . See pp. 8 8 , 9 7 - 9 8 . 
42. J .F .Rippy, Br i t i sh Investments In Lat in America 1822-1949 (Minneapolis, 1959). D D . 19-20. ~ '• ~~ ~~ .. '• 
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respectively dates f r o m this period, and i t is essential at once to point out the:, 
distinction between their respectable dealings and the dubious promotions 
carr ied on elsewhere. Barings, as wel l as promoting the loan of 1824 to 
AO 
Buenos Aires , came to the rescue of the Mexican government, and i t was 
only an advance of £131,154 that prevented Mexico f r o m defaulting i n 1827 on 
her existing interest payments. Although the greater part of the advance was 
repaid by 1830 and no money was lost by the operation, Alexander Baring later 
remarked that since the default on interest payments reflected on the character 
of his house, he would have paid "some thousands to blot out the mistake. " 4 4 
Certainly Barings did not succumb to the prevail ing hysteria i n London 
over Lat in American undertakings. I n February 1825, the head of the house 
spoke in the House of Commons against the joint-stock m a j i i a as in te r fer ing 
with "legit imate" government loan making. He adhered to that policy and i n -
volved his f i r m in a relat ively small volume of Lat in American business even 
on government loans.; - Even so, later partners at the t ime of the "Baring 
Cr i s i s " of 1890 certainly had reason to wish that relations with Argentina had 
never been inaugurated. 
This relative aloofness,Barings shared with Rothschilds who concerned 
themselves solely w i t h B r a z i l . When Nathan Rothschild was offered a new 
Brazi l ian loan i n 1829, he was not par t icular ly keen to continue his association 
43. See pp. fe7- H 
44. R.W.Hidy , The House Of Baring In American Trade and Finance (Cambridge, 
Mass. , 1949) pp.66-67. - -
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with that nation. "This loan (£400,000) was offered to Mr.Rothschi ld at 50 pe; 
cent, who refused i t ; but when he suspected that other capitalists (Messrs. 
Baring) were offer ing f o r i t , he took i t , in conjunction with Messrs. Thomas 
and Co. at 54!" 4 5 
A.L.Haudinaud^ B.A.Goldschmidt, Barclay, Herr ing and Richardson, 
F r y s a n d C o . , J.and S.Ricardo, Thomas Wilson, Hullett Brothers and Reid, 
I rv ing and Co. contracted f o r most of the loans to minor states. These houses 
were not banks and they did not issue notes or keep current accounts, although 
some of them accepted d e p o s i t s . 4 ® Ricardos excepted, they were not stock-
brokers. They were mercantile f i r m s engaged in a large way in foreign trade 
with resources and connections which made possible an active business i n 
acceptances and exchange. I t was their importance in the remittance market, 
the mobile character of their assets, the extent of their connections more than 
their intr insic wealth that made the business of foreign loans available f o r then 
They seem to have had no sales organization and their success depended upon 
their f r iends and the manipulation of crowd psychology on the Stock Exchange. 
The terms of the loans varied widely, but i n general, governments pre -
fe r r ed to borrow at a low interest no matter how large the discount at which ! 
the loan was issued. The highest price of issue was 89 | f o r the Mexican loan 
47 • 
of 1825, while the lowest was 54 f o r the Brazi l ian loan of 1829 noted above. 
45. J.J.Stufe, A Review of the Empire of B r a z i l (18~5*7j p . 14 
46. L.Jenks, op . c i t . , p.48 
47. The Brazi l ian loan of 1829 is unusual as i t was an isolated loan issued at a 
t ime when public fa i th in South American governments was very low. The 
lowest price during the'boom' period was 58 f o r the Mexican issue of 1824. 
These prices are as listed in Hyde Clarke, "On The Debts Of Sovereign and 
Quasi-Sovereign States, Owing By Foreign Countries''^ Journal of the 
cant.'. 
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A large discount did not displease the investor who was thereby promised 
a large bonus when his pr incipal was repaid. There was a fur ther bonus 
extended for immediate payment of subscriptions in f u l l , the loans being 
payable in instalments over periods varying f r o m six months to a year. A 
th i rd bonus was frequently arranged by ante-dating the t ime f r o m which 
interest was to run upon the loan. However, even with these conditions 
4 8 
the prof i t s were not exorbitant. Jenks slightly underestimates the rea l 
interest which varied between 5.9 per cent and 8.6 per cent at the issue 
49 
pr ice . 
The prices of the loans on the Stock Exchange changed violently f r o m 
1822 to 1827. The Colombian bonds of 1822, issued at 84, rose to 96.5 
and dropped to 38.5. The Chilean bonds of the same year, issued at 70, 
rocketed to 93 and f e l l to 30. The''Poyais'loan of 1822, the bonanza invest-
ment offered by "King" Gregor McGregor ^0 rose only a point above the 
issue price of 80, but soon descended to the appropriate level of 0. The 
Peruvian issue of 1824, issued at 88.5, rose to 96.5 and plunged to 52.5, 
and the Province of Buenos Ai res issue of the same year, originally 
51 
offered at 85, touched 97 and nosed down to 69. 
The rea l p rof i t s of the loan business went to the contractors. Control-
ing a l l the stock they had an excellent chance to play the market in i t f o r a 
Statistical Society. June 1978, v o l . X L I , pp. 313-314. J .F .Rippy, op. 
c i t . , p.20, gives the issue price f o r the M$dcan loan of 1825 as 8 9 | . 
48. L.Jenks, op . c i t . , p .49. 
49. Computed f r o m Hyde Clarke, op. c i t . 
50. See pp. 7 4 - 7 6 , . 51 . See C.K.Hobson, The Export of Capital(1914), p .101 . 
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r ise , even though they could depend on a handsome prof i t without such 
manoeuvres. There was an immediate commission of f r o m two to f ive per 
cent upon the nominal amount of the loan. There were the possible prof i t s 
of undisposed interest and principal balances le f t in their hands sometimes 
fo r months. There was an agency fee f o r many years to come fo r handling 
payments and the operations of the sinking fund. 
The new Latin-American nations derived no benefit f r o m the high prices 
paid by imprudent Br i t i sh investors. The loan contracts .contained no pro-
visions that enabled them to a share of the proceeds in excess of the or iginal 
price at which the bonds were sold to the bankers. They received only the 
sums realized f r o m f ixa t ions at that pr ice, af ter the costs of distr ibution 
had been subtracted, and these costs were not moderate. 
Af t e r a l l the commissions, fees, discounts, and print ing costs had been 
deducted and service funds f o r the f i r s t eighteen months withheld, the La t in -
Americans found jthemselves with cash i n hand equivalent to about 60 per 
cent of the contracted debt. For some £12 mi l l i on they had obligated them-
selves to the extent of more than £21 m i l l i o n . The Mexican national govern-
ment seems to have been shorn more thoroughly than any of the restj- f o r 
two issues of bonds with a par value of £ 6 , 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 i t i s said to have receivec 
a net of £2 , 358, 578 in cash and suppl ies . 5 ^ 
I t was essential to the success of the loans that they run in s ter l ing. 
They were thus rendered independent of currency manipulations on the part 
52. C . A . T r u e , "Br i t i sh Loans To The Mexican Government, 1822-1832" 
Southwestern Social Science Quar te r lyXVII (March 1927) pp. 353-362. 
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of the borrowing governments. The retention of the business of agents i n 
remittance of dividends was important to the contractors, not only f o r the 
brokerage fees, but also fo r keeping them in contact with 'a clientele of 
investors and providing them with increased exchange fac i l i t ies ar is ing f r o m 
the monopoly of government remittances. Nor was this a l l . In accepting 
On. 
the Colombian loan of 1824, Goldschmidts secured a two-year option on a l l 
loans to be contracted and were appointed agents fo r a l l mercantile t rans-
actions in England on behalf of the Colombian government. ^ 3 They received 
a commission f o r rais ing the money, a commission f o r spending i t , and a 
commission f o r paying i t back. 
Two Case Studies - Buenos Ai res And Chile 
The loans to the new governments were the largest individual t ransfers 
of capital of this period. For example, a debt of £ 1 , 000, 000 held by English 
investors and the clients of an English banking f i r m represented the biggest 
single foreign interest i n the Argentine republic, and i n several ways, this 
loan of 1824 was typical of many of this t ime . 
I t was the f i r s t t ime that the House of Baring was publicly associated 
wi th securities f r o m the republic and i t was largely thanks to i ts great 
54 
reputation that the money was raised. I t cannot be said that the capitalists 
53. See p . 55-
54. R.W.Hidy , op . c i t . , p . 65. 
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inf l ic ted themselves on Argentina, f o r the dynamic leader of that nation, 
Rivadavia, actively pressed fo r foreign investment of a l l kinds, including 
the loan of 1824. Like the other investments which Rivadavia invited, the 
establishment of a s terl ing debt had a rational plausibili ty about i t relating 
to the necessities of the community. The intensions of Rivadavia as to 
what purposes he hoped the money would be used f o r appear rather vague, 
. "the construction of a port, i n supplying the city wi th water,. i n the building 
:-.of towns and ports on the southern f ron t i e r and in settling the uncivil ised 
lands." 5 5 
I t seems to have been his idea that the income f r o m the sale of bonds 
should be used to foster economic and. social developments.capable of 
rendering the republic more productive and hence, able to car ry the debt . 
and to liquidate i t through the means of a sinking fund. ^ The annual cost 
of the debt was approximately £65 ,000 , or i n the region of 13 per cent of 
the revenue of the Province of Buenos Ai res , which vir tual ly undertook . 
a l l external matters f o r the republic as a whole. An increase of claims 
on revenue of such dimensions can be described as sharp fo r an economy 
as pr imi t ive as the recipient nation's undoubtely was, but i t was not un- . . 
bearable provided the assumptions of Rivadavia and the promoters and 
agents of the operation were c o r r e c t . ^ 
Ferns sees the assumptions as two-fo ld : f i r s t l y , that the expenditure 
upon the war department would decline af ter the recognition of independ-
55. E.L.Delgado, op . c i t . , p . 18. ; 
56. H.S.Ferns, Br i t a in And Argentina In The Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 
1960) pp. 141^1327" — " ~ • . • ; : • 
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ence and the conclusion of the revolutionary contest with Spain; and secondly 
that the expansion, or at least the maintenance, of existing levels of in ter -
national trading f r o m which the principal state revenues were derived would 
take place. The Consul-General to Buenos Ai res , Woodbine Parish, i n his 
reports to the foreign off ice produced evidence that these assumptions were 
sound. Assuming that Baring Brothers had the best interests of their client 
at heart, they must have been convinced also, and they ^succeeded i n per-
suading the public that the situation i n Argentina jus t i f ied the advance of 
cash in return fo r bonds. ^ 
The six per cent loan was taken at 70 by Dom Fel ix Cast ro and John 
Parish Robertson, a relative of Woodbine Parish, who appear to have acted 
as agents on commission f o r Baring Bro thers by whom the bonds were sold 
to English investors at 85. Af t e r various charges had been deducted, the 
Buenos Ai res government received less than £600,000.59 i t appears r e -
markable that great numbers of presumably rational men l iv ing i n comfor t -
able bouses i n Bloomsbury ^ were suddenly induced to invest i n the bonds 
of a new-born government, as yet unrecognized by the Br i t i sh government, 
of a remote community about which they could have known next to nothing at 
f i r s t hand. Neither Canning in Parliament nor Woodbine Parish in his r e - J 
ports to the Foreign Office said specifically that investors could saf ely 
deal with the Government of the United Provinces of the Rfo de la Plata, but 
58. Ib id . 
59. R .W.Hidy , op . c i t . , p .65. 
60. The men who subsequently complained to the Foreign Office about the 
fa i lure of their investments i n Buenos Ai res seem mainly to have l ived 
in the vic ini ty of Bedford Square. H.S.Ferns op . c i t . , p . l 4 3 . n . 
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the conditions which Canning in his instructions to Parish laid down fo r 
recognition were also the conditions which satisfied an investor in public 
funds. In examining whether Canning's conditions were satisfied, Wood-
bine Parish produced evidence concerning the state of the revenues, the 
character of evidence,and the disposition and legislative activity of the 
Government which would have as f u l l y jus t i f ied an investment of capital 
in the bonds of the Government as they did recognition by the B r i t i s h 
61 
Government. In fact the interest payments ceased with that of July 1st 
1827, by which through a sinking fund the outstanding bonds had been r e -
duced to £997, 0 0 0 . 6 2 
Any examination of the fa i lure of the loan of 1824 takes us to the 
heart of Argentine pol i t ical and economic problems. Simply, the govern-
ment of Buenos Aires could not f ind the money because of the decline in 
C O 
international trade passing through Buenos A i r e s . ° However, with the 
social, economic and pol i t ical structure that Argentina possessed at this 
t ime, i t was nigh impossible to expect that she would pay off her debts. 
Corruption in high places was almost a national ar t while customs control 
was at best somewhat lax. Even i f the money raised by the loan had not 
been put to a large degree to fighting over Uruguay, and had i n fact been 
put to i ts expressed purposes, the immediate increase in the wealth of the 
6 1 . I b i d . , p . 143 
62. R.W.Hidy , op . c i t . , p.65 
63. H.S.Ferns, op .c i t . , p . 143. 
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country and consequently in the amounts in the government's coffers would 
not have met the debt-service charges: The loan might have resulted in 
long-term benefits fo r the nation, but to expect a prompt increase i n economic 
capacity was ludicrous. ^ 
The investment process was not re-established unt i l after the over-
throw of General Rosas i n 1852, when Senor Norberto Riestra was sent to 
London to pay the arrears of 24 years and transfer the loan to £ 1 , 500, 000. 
in three per cents. ^ 
There appeared in London in 1822 a printed paper headed "Chile Loan" 
in the name of "Don Antonio Jose De Y r i s a r r i , Minister Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipotentiary f r o m the Government of Chile and now residing 
in London, (who) has, by virtue of the special power vested in h im, contracted 
wi th Messrs.Hullet t , Brothers and Co., in conjunction with eminent houses 
in London and Paris , fo r a loan of One M i l l i o n Sterling fo r the Service of the 
Republic of Chile".®^ The uses to which the money was to be put are 
characteristically vague. The aim was "to r e f o r m the financial system, . . . 
64. See also H.S. Ferns'hypothesis that the permanent debtor status of 
Argentina favoured the ruling classes, op .c i t . , pp. 144-145. 
65. M.G.Mulha l l , The English in South America (Buenos Aires , 1878) p . 535. 
66. John Miers , op. c i t . , p . 210. The only detailed account of the Chilean 
loan of 1822 is that given by John Miers , and apologies are offered f o r 
the lack of evidence f r o m other sources. 
- 7 2 -
. . . to cal l fo r th the productive capabilities of a diversif ied t e r r i t o ry , an 
extensive coast, and a hardy population. The modern improvements in 
agriculture and mining -will be introduced and the number and funds of the 
banks i n Rescate w i l l be increased in the mining dis t r ic ts ; and these 
*6 
measures w i l l benefit the public revenue not less than the national prosperit] 
When this paper ar r ived in Chile, many were astonished by i t , r ea l i s -
ing that i t was ut ter ly impossible that the loan could be applied to any of the 
purposes which were mentioned. They were even more astonished to read 
if 
that the present annual revenue of the state is equal to nearly fourteen times 
the amount of the yearly interest of the loan, that the securities are a mor t -
gage on a l l the revenues of the state, estimated upon the produce of fo rmer 
years to amount to about FOUR M I L L I O N dollars, or £8.6.0,000 sterl ing 
per annum, and the following are specially pledged f o r the payment of the 
interest and redemption^of the. loan; I AVIZ:-
The nett revenue aris ing f r o m the mint estimated at 300,000 dollars or 
£60 ,000 per annum. 
And the land tax or diezmos, at 250, 000 dollars or 
£50 ,000 per annum. 
i 
Being upwards of half a mi l l ion of dollars, or about £110, 000,A nearly 
68 
double the amount of the yearly interest and contribution of the sinking f u n d . ' 
In fact, the Chilean mint could not even pay i t s current expenses and \ 
consequently produced no revenue whatever, as was made clear in a report 
by Don Jose Santiago P o r t a l e s , t h e head of the mint, of \ the possibili ty of 
rais ing money by loan, which was made on 15th A p r i l 1822. The report 
67. I b i d . , pp.210-211. 
68. I b i d . , p .211 . 
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condemned the proposals to raise money f r o m abroad but Y r i s a r r i in London! 
i 
i 
was obviously acting independently f r o m his government f o r he contracted the 
loan there on 18th A p r i l 1822, before the answer of the government in Chile j 
•• i 
to 'his proposals could be received. j 
I t was clear to the Chileans that Senor Y r i s a r r i had acted in haste so 
as to'procure f o r himself the greatest advantages f r o m his new-found 
friendship wi th Messrs. Hullett Brothers, ,and i t was argued that perhaps 
••• I 
the loan should not be recognized. However, while the matter was under 1 
i 
i 
discussion, a vessel a r r ived at Valparaiso f r o m England bringing a p ro- \ 
i 
portion of the loan in Spanish gold money amounting to £60 ,000 s ter l ing. ' 
"The temptation was too great fo r a venal and corrupt minis t ry to withstand, -; 
i 
i 
the money was accepted, and the bargain f o r the loan was ra t i f i ed . "69 : 
. . i 
The best informed people in Chile were totally ignorant of how the ! 
•I-
money was disposed.although i t was obvious that l i t t l e or none of the money j 
! 
f r o m England reached the public treasury. Y r i s a r r i stated that the revenue i 
I 
of Chile was "nearly fourteen times the amount of the yearly interest of the 
loan" and that this revenue amounted annually to about fourteen mi l l i on 
dol lars . Miers shows' 7 0 f r o m a statement of Benevente, a Chilean minister,! 
that in 1824 the revenue amounted to about fourteen mi l l i on dollars or about 
£235 ,006 and as the interest of the loan was £60 ,000 i t did -not represent 
a fourteenth of the revenue of Chile, but more than a quarter, and when the 
interest,charges and the sinking fund were aggregated, more than a t h i r d . 
Thus Chile was burdened wi th an enormous debt which she could not 
69. I b i d . , p.214. ' • • .. ~~ ~~ 70. Ib id . 
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hope to pay back, and M i e r s f ea r ed the w o r s t f o r the B r i t i s h i nves to r s 
not ing that not one do l l a r f r o m any r egu la r source of revenue had been 
appropr ia ted f o r any such p u r p o s e . ' ' 1 The p i c t u r e i s one of complete con-
f u s i o n , but t h i s was f o r a t i m e kept f r o m the publ ic i n B r i t a i n . 
I n 1824, the Chi lean Government persuaded a group of merchants to 
undertake to pay the in te res t to the agents i n London, f o r w h i c h they w e r e 
granted an exclus ive p r i v i l e g e to i m p o r t and s e l l tobacco, snuff , p lay ing 
cards , f o r e i g n wines , s p i r i t s and tea . However , by 1826 the loan was i n 
d e f a u l t . 7 2 
The Poyais A f f a i r 
The most b i z a r r e episode of the loan mania was that concerning the 
"Kingdom of P o y a i s " . Poyais was the new name f o r a d i s t r i c t on the n o r t h 
coast of Honduras on the Mosqui to shore, where Gregor MacGregor , an 
7 1 . I b i d . , p . 2 1 3 . 
72. See F . O . 16 /2 . Chr i s topher R i c h a r d Nugent to George Canning. No. 20, 
R . A*Humphreys , o p . c i t . , p . 99. See pp . 100-101 f o r the t e r m s of the 
cont rac t between the government and the merchan t s . 
The leader of the Chi lean nat ion, O 'Higgins , proposed an e m i g r a t i o n 
scheme and "a coloniza t ion cont rac t was concluded i n London i n 1825 
between the Chi lean representa t ive , M a r i a n o Egana, and R i c h a r d 
Gurney and Antonio Quiroga , whereby a considerable set t lement of 
I r i s h peasants was to be made on lands to the south of B i o b i o . The 
p r o j e c t , however, came to no th ing" . T h i s was fo r tuna te , as i t appears 
that the land mentioned was inhabi ted by hos t i le nat ives who k i l l e d any-
one who set foo t on the land . "The b a r r i e r of the brave I r i s h against 
t h i s savage hoard, and the so r t of commi tmen t of Great B r i t a i n to give 
p ro t ec t ion to the se t t l e r s , wou ld undoubtedly be a v e r y des i rab le objec t 
f o r the Ch i l e g o v e r n m e n t . " F . O . 6 1 / 8 , Char les M i l n e r R icke t t s to 
George Canning. No .26 , I b i d . , p . 168 n . 
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adventurer i n the Spanish-Amer ican w a r s , who had dis t inguished h i m s e l f 
«*• 73 under Simon B o l i v a r , founded a set t lement i n 1821 . I t was not long 
before he was back i n England and a prospectus that began as f o l l o w s was 
c i r c u l a t i n g i n the C i ty of London: -
" L o a n of T w o Hundred Pounds S te r l i ng F o r The Service 
Of The State And Government of Poya i s . 
Know a l l men by -these Presents , That WE GREGOR T H E FIRST, 
Sovereign P r i n c e of the Independent State of Poyais and i t s 
Dependencies, Caziqufe of the Poyer Nat ion e t c . , e t c . , e t c . , 
have, f o r the purpose of consol idat ing the said State, d e f r a y i n g 
the Expenses of the same, and p r o m o t i n g the genera l development 
of na tu ra l Advantages of the Country , negotiated and r a i s e d a Loan 
of Two Hundred Thousand Pounds S te r l ing , f o r the Service of the 
said State, and w h i c h has been placed at the Disposa l of the sa id 
S ta te . " 
L i t e r a t u r e was spread about ex to l l i ng the beauties of Poyais and the 
l i m i t l e s s pos s ib i l i t i e s f o r inves tment i n every k i n d of business ven tu re . 
Al though there i s much disagreement as to the p rec i se amount of money 
that was eventually los t i n the Poyais schemes, i n late 1823 bonds to the 
face value of £ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 r e f e r r e d to above, and issued at 80 w e r e being 
bought and sold on the Stock E x c h a n g e . 7 4 Land was sold, and i m m i g r a t i o n 
73 . P . H . E m d e n , o p . c i t . , f a c i n g p . 4 0 . F o r a shor t and sympathet ic account 
of M a c G r e g o r ' s l i f e , see M . G . M u l h a l l , o p . c i t . , pp .274-278. 
74. D i s r a e l i who sought to show that the Poyais scheme should not be con-
s idered i n the same breath as the respectable j o i n t - s t o c k companies i n 
wh ich he was in teres ted , see pp.88-97, d i smis sed the a f f a i r thus i n A n 
Enqu i ry Into The Plans, P r o g r e s s A n d P o l i c y Of The A m e r i c a n M i n i n g 
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was f r e e l y i n v i t e d and organized to Poyais , the ea r th ly parad ise . A s h i s 
name suggests, Gregor MacGregor was a Scot, and the ships wh ich sa i led 
f r o m L e i t h , conveyed emigran t s m a i n l y f r o m Scotland who had sold what 
l i t t l e they had to pa r t i c ipa te i n the en t e rp r i s e . "They. found Poyais , the 
ea r th ly paradise , to be a mi se rab le , desolate m a l a r i a l swamp. I t was 
Dickens ' Eden on a l a rge s c a l e . " ^ 
Colonel Low, who had been one of M a c G r e g o r ' s aides, l a t e r w r o t e of 
the t e r r i b l e condit ions that we re encountered on a r r i v a l , and re l a t e s that 
o f th& one hundred and f i v e people who d i sembarked f r o m the B r i g Skeen, 
the t h i r d and f i n a l emigran t ship, only s ix of t hem remained a l ive a f t e r a 
7fi 
month, such was the disease and pove r ty . Colonel L o w , inc iden ta l ly , 
b lames the f a i l u r e of the colony on the dishonesty of the merchants of 
B e l i z e , the nearest town, whom he al leges s tole a l l the m a t e r i a l s and p r o -
v i s ions destined f o r the new colony, al though i t i s imposs ib le f o r us now to 
know the f u l l t r u t h . 
MacGregor disappeared m y s t e r i o u s l y f r o m the Eng l i sh scene and of 
course, no in t e res t was ever pa id on the Poyais bonds. The fa te of the 
7fi 
emigran t s was w ide ly r epo r t ed i n the Eng l i sh p ress and d i d nothing to 
enhance the idea of e m i g r a t i o n among the w o r k i n g classes . 
74 contd. Companies (1825) p . 72 "We solemnly bel ieve that net one hundred 
pounds of th i s loan-was ever disposed of - I t was d iv ided among a few 
s tock- jobbers at a nomina l p r i c e , and had not been i n the m a r k e t f o u r 
and twenty hours before i t was blown . . " 
75 . P . H . E m d e n , o p . c i t . , p . 4 0 . 
76. G . A . L o w , The Be l i se Merchan ts Unmasked; o r a . r ev iew of t h e i r l a te 
proceeding's" againsfc-Poyais (1824) p . 51 
77 . M . G . M u l h a l l , op. c i t . p . 277,- r e p o r t s that MacGregor l i v e d f o r s eve ra l 
years i n P a r i s , and d ied i n Venezuela i n 1845. 
78 . See The T i m e s , Jan6th 1824, L o r d M a y o r hears of d i s t r e s s of s u r v i v o r s 
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Remarkably , a t tempts we re made by other p r o m o t e r s to r a i s e m o r e 
money f o r supposed investment i n Poyais i n 1825 and 1826, but the publ ic was 
79 
not to be swindled a second t i m e . The Poyais bonds d i d , however, , appear 
on the Stock Exchange l a t e r as gambl ing counters du r ing the f o r e i g n loan mania! 
of 1 8 3 6 . 8 0 
' ' i 
" • ! 
• Conclusion 
The bubble i n government stock burs t l a t e r than that of the m i n i n g 
speculat ion. I t was occasioned by the f a i l u r e of the Colombian loan i n January 
1826, discussed above. P r i c e s f e l l r a p i d l y a l l round as inves to r s came to the 
sudden r e a l i z a t i o n that the only in t e res t they had rece ived had come out of the 
p r i n c i p l e of successive loans, and they we re l i k e l y to obtain m o r e only ad-
vancing i t . The South A m e r i c a n repub l i c s suddenly d i scovered that they could 
expect no m o r e assistance i n the immed ia t e f u t u r e . One by one, a l l the South 
A m e r i c a n nations, except B r a z i l , repudiated t h e i r loans . 
Discount ing the a lmos t certain f raudulence of the Poyais a f f a i r , i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to bel ieve that any of the South A m e r i c a n governments s e r ious ly con-
s idered the repayment of t h e i r debts, since schemes f o r payment w e r e only 
f r o m the Skene. Jan . 8th 1824, Story of a g i r l orphansed th rough the 
Poyais expedi t ion! Jan. 17th 1824, Subscr ip t ion f u n d f o r Poyais v i c t i m s . 
See also Hansard, N . S . X 747, f o r d iscuss ion on the subject of the "Poyais | 
. E m i g r a t i o n o f f i c e . " ; 
79 . See Take Care of Your Pockets , Another Poyais Humbug (1827), Proposed j 
Colony I n The D i s t r i c t Of B lack R i v e r On The N o r t h e r n Coast Of C e n t r a l 
: A m e r i c a , Commonly Cal led Poyais (1838) and Prospectus Of A Loan ot J ; 
£ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 S te r l ing (1825), a l l under "Poya i s " i n the B r i t i s h M u s e u m . ; 
80 . P . H . E m d e n , o p . c i t . , p . 4 0 . A s a s a t i r i c a l af ter thought , see " T h e B a n k s ' 
of Belize '^ - a poem i n The Gentle-roan's Magazine, . M a r c h 1825, p p ' . ^ O ? ^ 1 
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proposed i n de ta i l when the defaul ts o c c u r r e d . One must p resume that not 
Only was repayment v i r t u a l l y imposs ib le , but that i t was never se r ious ly 
enter ta ined . 
Both d u r i n g the r a i s i n g of the loans and when they we re i n defaul t , the 
B r i t i s h government ' s in te res t appears to have been m e r e l y pass ive . 
A s has been ind i ca t ed , " I t was v e r y easy to c a l l a count ry a r epub l i c , 
but i t was d i f f i c u l t to create c i t i zens and none the less so to const i tute s ta tes-
81 
men and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s " . M o r e o v e r , the ample revenue w h i c h they had 
been able at any t i m e to secure i n London tended to make the f i r s t r e v o l u t i o n -
a r y governments i n d i f f e r e n t to the opinion of t h e i r people at the v e r y t i m e 
when i t was of p r i m e impor tance to r e f l e c t i t . The violence, the c o r r u p t i o n , 
the i n s t a b i l i t y , the f i n a n c i a l recklessness wh ich cha rac te r i zed mos t of the 
South A m e r i c a n r epub l i c s d u r i n g a l a rge pa r t of the century a re i n a s m a l l 
way a t t r ibu tab le to the e a r l y l a x i t y of the London money market .** 2 
8 1 . Hyde C la rke , o p . c i t . , p . 302. 
82 . H . H . P a r i s h , D i p l o m a t i c H i s t o r y Of The Monarchy Of Greece (1838) 
DP. 366-367. 
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C H A P T L K 1V 
BRITISH INVESTMENT I N SOUTH AMERICAN 
MINING COMPANIES 
As has a l r e a d y been i n d i c a t e d , t h e p u b l i c were c a u g h t 
up i n a w h i r l w i n d o f s p e c u l a t i o n i n t h e f i r s t h a l f o f t h e 
decade w h i c h commenced i n 1 8 2 0 . The f r e n z y g a t h e r e d f o r c e 
d u r i n g t h e s e f i v e y e a r s , and w h i l e t h e p r o m o t i o n o f g o v e r n -
ment l o a n s was more s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h a t much more money 
was a c t u a l l y r a i s e d , t h e s p e c u l a t i o n f e v e r w h i c h g r i p p e d 
a l l s e c t i o n s o f s o c i e t y was m a i n l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e 
p r o m o t i o n o f new c o m p a n i e s . A f e w s t r i k i n g , f i g u r e s w i l l 
convey some i d e a o f t h e r a p i d r a t e a t w h i c h company -
p r o m o t i o n went on i n t h e y e a r s 1824 and 1825* A t t h e 
b e g i n n i n g o f 1824 t h e r e were o n l y 156 c o m p a n i e s , d i s t i n c t 
f r o m Funds and L o a n s , known on t h e S t o c k E x c h a n g e , and t h e s e 
had a c a p i t a l o f £ 4 8 m i l l i o n s , o f w h i c h £ 3 4 m i l l i o n s was 
p a i d u p . B u t d u r i n g t h o s e t w o y e a r s no f e w e r t h a n 624 
companies were f o r m e d o r p r o j e c t e d , w i t h a n o m i n a l c a p i t a l 
o f £ 3 7 2 m i l l i o n s . 1 
1 . H e n r y E n g l i s h , A Comple t e V i e w Of The J o i n t S t o c k 
Companies Formed D u r i n g The Y e a r s 1824 And 1825(1827) 
A l s o , C h a r l e s D u g u i d , The H i s t o r y O f The S t o c k E x c h a n g e , 
p p . 123 - 1 2 4 . 
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N a t u r a l l y a l a r g e number o f t h e s e companies were s t i l l -
b o r n . No f e w e r t h a n 579 o f t h e m , w i t h a c a p i t a l o f £ 2 1 2 £ 
m i l l i o n s n e v e r r e a c h e d f r u i t i o n , and a n o t h e r 118 o f t h e m , 
w i t h a c a p i t a l o f £ 5 6 £ m i l l i o n s , o f w h i c h £ 2 £ m i l l i o n s was 
p a i d u p , had t o be abandoned w i t h i n a f e w months o f f o r m a t i o n . 
S t i l l , 127 companies w i t h a n o m i n a l c a p i t a l o f £ 1 0 2 £ m i l l i o n s , 
and a- p a i d up c a p i t a l o f £15 m i l l i o n s were l e f t , and a f t e r 
t h e c o l l a p s e o f 1825 and 1826 h a d w r o u g h t i t s e f f e c t , t h e numbei 
o f companies i n e x i s t e n c e was 2 8 3 , w i t h a n o m i n a l c a p i t a l 
p 
o f £150£ m i l l i o n s was p a i d u p . 
The M a n i a F o r M i n i n g S h a r e s . 
Of t h e 127 new companies added t o t h e number o f t h o s e 
known on t h e S t o c k E x c h a n g e , f o r t y - f o u r were m i n i n g com-
p a n i e s , whereas p r a c t i c a l l y no m i n i n g companies had been i n 
e x i s t e n c e p r e v i o u s l y . S l i g h t l y o v e r h a l f o f t h e s e companies 
were f o r m e d f o r w o r k i n g m i n e f s i n S o u t h A m e r i c a and i t was 
t h e s e t h a t gave t h e s p e c u l a t i v e man ia o f 1824 and 1825 i t s . 
u n i q u e c h a r a c t e r . T w e n t y - t h r e e companies w i t h a n o m i n a l 
c a p i t a l o f £ 2 0 , 0 0 2 , 0 0 0 had a c t u a l l y r a i s e d £ 3 , 6 3 6 , 0 0 0 by 
t h e end o f 1 8 2 6 ? b y w h i c h t i m e t h r e e o f . them h a d been abandoned. - ' 
2 . I b i d . 
3. C o m p u t a t i o n s f r o m H e n r y E n g l i s h , A C o m p l e t e V i e w e t c . 
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The f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the s h a r e f p r i c e s o f t h e S o u t h 
A m e r i c a n m i n i n g companiesjhave h a r d l y been r i v a l l e d b e f o r e 
o r s i n c e . B e f o r e e n q u i r i n g i n t o t h e methods o f company 
p r o m o t i o n and t h e p e o p l e i n v o l v e d , i t i s as w e l l t o keep 
. i n m i n d t h e p r o f i t s t h a t c o u l d be made n o t i n S o u t h A m e r i c a 
b u t on t h e London s t o c k m a r k e t a l o n e . The madness w h i c h 
p r e v a i l e d a t t h i s t i m e c a n n o t be shown more c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a n 
by t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t , w h i c h s p e c i f i e s t h e amount o f 
t h e i n s t a l m e n t s p a i d on e a c h - s h a r e , i n f i v e o f t h e p r i n c i p a l 
m i n i n g c o m p a n i e s , and t h e m a r k e t p r i c e s o f t h e s e s h a r e s on 
t h e 1 C t h o f December , 1824 and t h e 1 1 t h o f J a n u a r y , 1825 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . ^ 
Dec . 10th, 1824 J a n . 1 1 t h , 1825 
A n g l o - M e x i c a n £ 1 0 0 £ 1 0 p a i d £3>3 p remium £158 £115 £125 
B r a z i l i a n £ 1 0 0 £ 1 0 p a i d 10s d i s c o u n t . £ 6 6 £ 7 0 £ 4 4 p r . 
C o l o m b i a n £ 1 0 0 £ 1 0 p a i d £ 1 9 p r . ,„£82 " £ 6 2 £59 
R e a l d e l Monte £ 4 0 0 £ 7 0 " £550 p r . £1350 
U n i t e d M e x i c a n £ 4 0 £ 1 0 » £35 p r . £155 £115 £125 
As may be s een , t h e l e a d e r s h i p i n t h e S o u t h A m e r i c a n 
g o l d boom ivas h e l d by t h e s h a r e s o f t h e R e a l d e l Monte Company, 
a n o t a l t o g e t h e r w o r t h l e s s u n d e r t a k i n g , f o r o f t h e f i f t e e n 
m i l l i o n pounds w h i c h were expended on t h e mine b y t h e t i m e 
i t was abandoned i n 1 8 4 9 , t e n and a h a l f m i l l i o n s had been 
r e t u r n e d ; o n l y t h i r t y p e r c e n t o f t h e c a p i t a l a c t u a l l y 
i n v e s t - e d had t h e r e f o r e been l o s t . 
4 ; f # r 0 o k e , o p . c i t . , V o l E T , ( 1 ^ S ) P-153 
- 8 2 -
The l o s s s u s t a i n e d by t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s who hrad p a i d h i g h 
premiums was o u t o f a l l p r o p o r t i o n g r e a t e r . " i t i s on 
r e c o r d t h a t a s i n g l e sha re o f t h e R e a l d e l Monte m i n e , on w h i c h 
£ 7 0 had been p a i d , y i e l d e d 2000 p r . c e n t , h a v i n g r i s e n s p e e d i l y 
t o a p remium o f £ 1 4 0 0 p e r s h a r e . " - ' When t h e c r a s h came, t h e 
sha r e s f e l l t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c o u n t ; , t h a t i s t o s a y , t h e 
s e l l e r p a i d t h e p u r c h a s e r t o t a k e t h e s h a r e s f r o m h i m , so 
t h a t he m i g h t g e t p u t o f h i s l i a b i l i t y t o pay i n f u i l f o r 
any d e b t s i n c u r r e d by t h e company .^ 
The b a s i s f o r t h e m a n i a o f e v e r y t h i n g S o u t h A m e r i c a n l a y 
i n t h e i g n o r a n c e o f t h e p u b l i c . "Now was t h e t i m e f o r t h o s e 
who make t h e i r m a r k e t o f t h e u n w a r y t o come f o r t h and be b u s y . 
Needy s p e c u l a t o r s and s cheming a t t o r n e y s , and g a m b l e r s c f e v e r y 
c l a s s , used t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t y , f i r s t f o r e x c i t i n g t h e g a m b l i n g 
s p i r i t e v e r y w h e r e w i t h i n t h e i r r e a c h , and t h e n f o r i n t r o d u c i n g 
themseaLves i n t o a s o c i e t y where a t o t h e r t i m e s t h e y c o u l d 
have o b t a i n e d no a d m i t t a n c e . They knew t h a t t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t y 
7 
was s h o r t - ? : a n d t h e y w e d - i t d i l i g e n t l y . " ' As ThomaS B a r i n g 
g 
s a i d , t h e g a m b l i n g man ia had s e i z e d upon a l l c l a s s e s , and 
5 . H a r r i e t M a r t i n e a u , A H i s t o r y o f t h e T h i r t y Y e a r ' s Peace . 
A . D . 1816-1846 ( B o n n ' s S t a n d a r d l i b r a r y e d n . , 4 v o l s , 1877) 
p p . 8 - 9 -
6. P . H . Emden, o p . c i t . , p . 4 2 . H . M . Hyndman, C o m m e r c i a l . C r i s e s 
o f t h e N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y . ( 1 8 9 2 ) p p . 2 8 - 2 9 -
7 . H a r r i e t M a r t i n e a u , o p . c i t . , v o l l l , p . 2 . 
8 . H a n s a r d , N . S . X I I , 1 0 6 3 - 1 0 6 4 . 
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was s p r e a d i n g i t s e l f i n a l l p a r t s o f t h e c o u n t r y . ' " I f 
i t was t o be l a m e n t e d t h a t men o f t h e f i r s t r a n k and f a m i l y 
i i i t h e c o u n t r y h a u n t e d gaming -house s a t t h e w e s t - e n d o f t h e 
t o w n , i t was s t i l l more t o be l a m e n t e d , t h a t m e r c h a n t s a t 
t h e e a s t - e n d o f i t s h o u l d i m i t a t e t h e i r e x a m p l e , and make a 
g a m i n g - h o u s e o f t h e R o y a l E x c h a n g e . " He saw no d i f f e r e n c e 
be tween t h e g a m b l i n g o f t h e nob lemen i n t h e h e l l s o f S t . 
James ' S t r e e t , and t h e g a m b l i n g o f t h e m e r c h a n t on t h e R o y a l 
Exchange ; e x c e p t i n g t h a t t h e l a t t e r k e p t e a r l i e r h o u r s and 
more r e s p e c t a b l e company t h a n t h e f o r m e r . . 
A t a t i m e when e v e r y o n e w i t h any c a p i t a l was d i s c o n t e n t e d 
w i t h t h e l o v ; i n t e r e s t r a t e s t h e y had been r e c e i v i n g , . p r o s p e c t s 
now a r o s e f o r a q u i c k f o r t u n e . ; " b y s k i l f u l l y b u y i n g and 
Q 
s e l l i n g among t h e p r o j e c t s a f l o a t . ! ' "A y o u n g l a d y , whose 
b r o t h e r had e n c o u r a g e d h e r t o t a k e a s h a r e o f £ 1 0 0 i n some 
j o i n t - s t o c k p r o j e c t , m i g h t pay h e r f i r s t i n s t a l m e n t o f £5 
w i t h some t r e m b l i n g , and wonder When t h e n e x t c a l l w o u l d 
come. B u t i f h e r b r o t h e r b r o u g h t h e r £ 1 4 0 i n a f e w d a y s , w i t h 
t h e hews t h a t he had s o l d o u t f o r h e r w h i l e t h e p remium was 
t h u s h i g h , w o u l d " s h e s i t down c o n t e n t w i t h h a v i n g f o r once 
g a i n e d £35 b y h e r £5? Would she n o t be as e a g e r t o i n v e s t 
a g a i n as t h e managers c o u l d be t h a t she could? . . Thus, i t was. . 
w i t h many t h o u s a n d s o f l a d i e s and g e n t l e m e n as. i n e x p e r i e n c e d ' . 
asr t h e y " • 
9. H a r r i e t M a r t i n e a u , o p . c i t . , V o l . I I , p . 7» • • ' : . • 
1 0 . I b i d . • v 
- 8 4 -
The f o l l i e s o f 1824 and 1825 s u r p a s s e d e v e r y p r e v i o u s 
f i n a n c i a l f o l l y . " A l l t h e b e s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e m i d d l e -
c l a s s seemed t o be swamped i n one o v e r m a s t e r i n g l u s t f o r gaming 
. . . O l d and y o u n g , men and women, r i c h and p o o r , nob le and 
11 
s i m p l e , one and a l l , . w e r e d r awn i n t o t h e t h r o n g . . " S o u t h 
A m e r i c a became t h e new and g e n u i n e E l D o r a d o . G o l d was t o 
be e x t r a c t e d f r o m t h e g o r g e s o f t h e C o r d i l l e r a s and f e a r s 
were e x p r e s s e d t h a t t h e v a s t q u a n t i t i e s t h a t were t o be 
12 
e x t r a c t e d w o u l d make i t a l m o s t v a l u e l e s s . The f i n d s w o u l d 
be so enormous t h a t i t w o u l d be p o s s i b l e t o redeem t h e 
N a t i o n a l D e b t , and i n one p r o s p e c t u s a t t e n t i o n was d r a w n t o 
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e n t e r p r i s e i n q u e s t i o n was "no s p e c u l a t i v e 
u n d e r t a k i n g - no p r o b l e m a t i c o r v i s i o n a r y scheme" O t h e r 
announcements s"aid t h a t p e a r l s were t o be d i v e d f o r o f f t h e 
c o a s t o f C o l o m b i a , and t h a t i n P e r u s i l v e r was so p l e n t i f u l 
t h a t a l l u t e n s i l s o f e v e r y d a y use were made o f i t . . 
F i n a l l y , t o g a i n a f u l l a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e a tmosphe re 
o f t h e t i m e s , we may r e l y on M r . John F r a n c i s , a d i r e c t o r o f 
t h e Bank o f E n g l a n d who has g i v e n a d e s c r i p t i o n cf t h e scenes 
w h i c h o c c u r r e d a t t h i s boom- t i m e n o t o n l y i n t h e S t o c k Exchange 
b u t more e s p e c i a l l y i n i t s v i c i n i t y . He d e c l a r e s t h a t t h e e n -
t r a n c e t o t h e S t o o k Exchange became so b l o c k e d up t h a t n o t h i n g 
b u t a f i n e o f f i v e pounds on t h o s e who s t o p p e d t h e way h a d any 
e f f e c t i n d i s p e r s h g t h e n u i s a n c e . He d e s c r i b e s t h e scene 
^ 1 . H . M . Hyndman, o p . C i t . , pp727-28. ~ 
12. See The Gent lemans M a g a z i n e , J a n . - J u n e , 1825% P » 4 4 0 
t h u s : " W i t h huge p o c k e t - b o o k c o n t a i n i n g w o r t h l e s s s c r i p ; ; 
w i t h c r a f t y c o u n t e n a n c e and c u n n i n g e y e ; w i t h showy j e w e l l e r y 
and t h r e a d - b a r e c o a t ; w i t h w e l l - g r e a s e d and u n p o l i s h e d b o o t s ; 
w i t h k n a v e r y i n eve r ; ' c u r l o f t h e l i p and v i l l a n y i n e v e r y t h o u g 
o f t h e h e a r t , t h e s t a g , as he was a f t e r w a r d s t e r m e d , was."a. 
p r o m i n e n t p o r t r a i t i n t h e f o r e g r o u n d . Grouped t o g e t h e r i n 
one c o r n e r m i g h t be. seen a k n o t of b o y s e a g e r l y b u y i n g and 
s e l l i n g a t a p r o f i t , w h i c h b o r e no c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e l o s s o f 
h o n e s t y t h e y each day e x p e r i e n c e d . Day a f t e r day were 
e l d e r l y men w i t h shabby f a c e s and huge u m b r e l l a s w i t n e s s e d 
i n t h e same s p o t , d o i n g b u s i n e s s w i t h t h o s e whose c h a r a c t e r s 
m i g h t b e . j u d g e d f r o m t h e i r company. A t a n o t h e r p o i n t , t h e 
y o u t h , j u s t r i s i n g i n t o manhood, c o n s c i o u s o f a f e w g u i n e a s 
i n h i s p u r s e , w i t h a r e s o l u t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o i n c r e a s e 
them a t any p r i c e , g a t h e r e d a g r o u p a r o u n d , w h i l e he d e l i v e r e d " 
h i s i n v e n t i o n t o t h e l i s t e n i n g t h r o n g , who r e g a r d e d h i m as a 
s u p e r i o r b e i n g . I n e v e r y c o r n e r , and i n e v e r y v a c a n t s p a c e , 
men m i g h t be seen e a g e r l y d i s c u s s i n g t h e p remium o f a new 
company, t h e r a t e o f a new l o a n , t h e r u m o u r e d p r o f i t of some, 
l u c k y s p e c u l a t i o n , t h e r u m o u r e d f a i l u r e o f some grea t . ; ; 
f i n a n c i e r o r w r a n g l i n g w i t h savage e a g e r n e s s : o v e r t h e f a t e o f :;'r 
a s h i l l i n g . " 1 5 
14- ' • : • H e n r y E n g l i s h r e m a r k e d t h a t companies f o r m e d p r i o r t o .•'•.! 
1824 were f o r m e d w i t h t h e o b j e c t o f r a i s i n g money w h i c h no 
1 3 . J o h n F r a n c i s , C h r o n i c l e s and C h a r a c t e r s o f t h e S t o c k Exchang 
• (184-9) p p . 2 6 2 - 2 6 3 . 
14-. H e n r y E n g l i s h , A Comple t e V i e w . . . , . e t c . p . 3 2 . 
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i n d i v i d u a l c o u l d r a i s e f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f some c o n c r e t e 
p r o j e c t . He sees a m a j o r i t y o f t h o s e f o r m e d d u r i n g 1824 
and 1825 a d a p t e d o n l y t o i n d i v i d u a l e n t e r p r i s e , "as b y t h e 
f o r m a t i o n o f a Company many o f f i c e s were c r e a t e d , and expenses 
e n t e r e d i n t o , w h i c h w o u l d p r e v e n t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f any p r o f i t 
a r i s i n g t o t h e s h a r e h o l d e r w h i l e t h e c a p i t a l a c t u a l l y r e q u i r e d 
was o f so i n s i g n i f i c a n t a n a t u r e , as t o r e n d e r t h e f o r m a t i o n 
o f a Company a measu re , o n l y t o be a t t r i b u t e d t o some s i n i s t e r 
15 
m o t i v e o f t h e p r o j e c t o r . " ^ T h i s may be an o v e r s t a t e m e n t 
where most o f t h e S o u t h A m e r i c a n m i n i n g compan ies a r e c o n c e r n e d 
b u t i t was c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t w h i l e p r o f i t s t o be g a i n e d i n 
t h e d i s t a n t l a n d s were unknown Jfco t h e p r o m o t e r o f a company, 
he c o u l d be c o n f i d e n t o f t h e f u t u r e o f h i s own money i n 
L o n d o n . 
The P r o m o t i o n o f t h e M i n i n g Companies 
A l t h o u g h s e v e r a l v a r i a t i o n s w i l l be o b s e r v e d , t h e o r i g i n 
o f many o f t h e schemes was as f o l l o w s . The p r o j e c t o r o r 
p r o j e c t o r s h a v i n g e i t h e r o b t a i n e d a p r i v i l e g e f r o m a. S o u t h 
A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t o r s u r m i s i n g t h a t t h e y m i g h t o b t a i n o n e , 
a s s o c i a t e d t h e m s e l v e s w i t h be tween t w e l v e and t w e n t y - f o u r 
d i r e c t o r s , o f c o u r s e s e l e c t i n g t h e mos t r e s p e c t a b l e and i n f l u e n t 
whom t h e y c o u l d p e r s u a d e t o u n d e r t a k e t h e o f f i c e . I t was 
a d v a n t a g e o u s t o have a Member o f P a r l i a m e n t , o r t w o , on t h e 
b o a r d . The B r a z i l i a n Company a c t u a l l y had e i g h t M. P « s 
15." I b i d . 
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on. i t s b o a r d of t w e l v e , and a l t o g e t h e r , t h e r e were t h i r t y - o n e 
Members o f P a r l i a m e n t who v/ere d i r e c t o r s o f S o u t h A m e r i c a n 
16 
m i n i n g c o m p a n i e s . 
The n e x t t a s k was t h e p u b l i s h i n g o f a p r o s p e c t u s . 
"Anon a p p e a r s , i n b e a u t i f u l p r o p o r t i o n , p y r a m i d i c a l l y shaped 
an a d v e r t i s e m e n t , s e t t i n g f o r t h i n g l o w i n g t e r m s , y e t w i t h . 
a c e r t a i n a i r o f g r a c e f u l r e s e r v e , t h e u n r i v a l l e d a d v a n t a g e s 
o f t h e scheme; a l o f t s u b l i m e upon t h e apex s h i n e s some name 
i l l u s t r i o u s e i t h e r a t t h e e a s t e r n o r w e s t e r n end o f t h i s happy 
17 
and m o n e y - g e t t i n g m e t r o p o l i s , t h e p r e s i d e n t ; ' b e l o w o h i s 
a w e f u l d i g n i t y , b u t s c a r c e l y i n f e r i o r r a n k , may be d i s c e r n e d 
t h e v i c e - p r e s i d e n t , who commonly a r e t w a i n d i v i d i n g t h e i r 
g r e a t n e s s ; and t o them s u c c e e d s , a r r a n g e d i n d o u b l e f i l e :bhe 
18 
a r r a y o f t h e d i r e c t o r s , t w e l v e o r t w e n t y - f o u r i n n u m b e r . " 
The p r o p e c t u s e s showed c e r t a i n s i m i l a r i t i e s , " ( t h e y ) a r e 
c o n c e i v e d so n e a r l y i n t h e same s p i r i t , and have so s t r o n g 
a f a m i l y l i k e n e s s , t h a t any one m i g h t s e r v e as a spec imen o f 
t h e w h o l e , t h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g , I t h i n k , t h a t t h o s e w h i c h 
r e l a t e t o p u r s u i t s t o be u n d e r t a k e n i n f o r e i g n p a r t s , t r e a t 
p r i n c i p a l l y o f t h e a d v a n t a g e s t o be d e r i v e d b y t h e a d v e n t u r e r s . 
1 6 . Henry E n g l i s h , A G e n e r a l "G^ide To The Companies Formed! F o r 
W o r k i n g F o r i e g n M i n e s .-(1825) ' 
1 7 « ' l t was a d v a n t a g e o u s t o have as P r e s i d e n t a h i g h - r a n k i n g p e r 
f r o m t h e c o u n t r y i n w h i c h t h e company was t o o p e r a t e . F o r 
e x a m p l e , see t h e case o f S r . Egana a n d l t h e C h i l e a n m i n i n g 
c o m p a n i e s , p p . 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 . 
" I t seems e x t r a o r d i n a r y t h a t many o f ' t h e p e r s o n s whose name 
appea r i n t h e s e p r o s p e c t u s e s , s h o u l d have p e r m i t t e d t h e i r 
i n s e r t i o n i n such d e i u s i v e p r o j e c t s " J o h n M i e r s , o p . C i t j 
1 8 . "An O l d M e r c h a n t " Remarks On J o i n t - S t o c k Companies(1825)-- E 
19. I b i d . pp.49-50 / . 
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The p u b l i c was t h e n i n f o r m e d t h a t t h e l i s t s o f s u b s c r i p t i c 
were f u l l , " b u t t h e d i s a p p o i n t e d a p p l i c a n t has t h e c o n s o l a t i o n 
o f h e a r i n g t h a t he has many companions i n a f f l i c t i o n , and t h a t 
20 
f i f t e e n m i l l i o n s have been t u r n e d away" M e a n w h i l e each o f 
t h e d i r e c t o r s had been a l l o t t e d a c e r t a i n number o f s h a r e s i n " 
t h e v e n t u r e ; t w o h u n d r e d was c o n s i d e r e d " l i b e r a l and b u s i n e s s 
l i k e " 2 1 
S o l i c i t o r s , b a n k e r s and e v e r y o n e a l s o c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e 
f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e new company w o u l d a l s o r e c e i v e a l e s s e r . 
22 
number o f s h a r e s . . Thus^ e n g e n d e r e d , t h u s p a t r o n i s e d , t h u s 
recommended, t h e s h a r e s o f t h e new company w o u l d s t a n d a t an 
i m m e d i a t e p r e m i u m , and by v a r i o u s d e a l i n g s , t h e d i r e c t o r s and 
o t h e r s , h o l d i n g a l l t h e s i i a r e s , c o u l d s e l l them a t a handsome 
p r o f i t . 2 5 
Many o f t h e p r o m o t e r s o f m i n i n g companies engaged w r i t e r s 
t o i n f o r m t h e p u b l i c o f t h e m a g n i f i c e n c e of t h e i r schemes 
i n n e w s p a p e r s , magaz ines : and b o o k s . T h i s was v i t a l w h i l e 
companies were b e i n g f o r m e d and c o u l d a l s o be u s e f u l f o r 
r a i s i n g t h e p r i c e o f a p a r t i c u l a r s h a r e once i t was >on t h e 
m a r k e t . An e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e a s s o c i a t i o n w h i c h e v o l v e d 
be tw e e n J . D ; 1 . P o w l e s , an a c t i v e ©ompany p r o m o t e r , and a y o u n g 
man named B e n j a m i n D i s r a e l i w i l l g i v e some i n s i g h t i n t o t h e 
w o r k o f t h e p r o p a g a n d i s t s . 
2 0 . i b i d . , "grin 
2 1 . I b i d . p . 4 7 . 
2 2 . I b i d . p . 4 9 . 
2 3 . See p p . 97-98. 
- 8 9 -
D i s r a e l i s t a r t e d s p e c u l a t i n g on t h e S t o c k Exchange a t 
t h e r i p e age o f t w e n t y t o g e t h e r w i t h a- f e l l o w s o l i c i t o r s c l e r k 
named E v a n s . When t h e t w o y o u n g men d e c i d e d t o p l a y f o r h i g h e r , 
s t a k e s t h e y j o i n e d f o r c e s w i t h t h e son o f a r i c h s t o c k b r o k e r 
24 
w i t h t h e name o f M e s s e r s . I n November , 1 8 2 4 , t h e y began 
o p e r a t i o n s , . a n d as t h e y c o n c e i v e d t h a t t h e p r i c e s o f A m e r i c a n 
m i n i n g s h a r e s were a l r e a d y above t h e i r r e a l v a l u e , t h e y s o l d 
f o r a f a l l . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , q u o t a t i o n s c o n t i n u e d t o s o a r , and 
by t h e end o f t h e y e a r t h e y h a d l o s t £ 4 0 0 . U n d a u n t e d t h e 
s p e c u l a t o r s s w i t c h e d t h e i r t a c t i c s and t r u s t e d i n a c o n t i n u i n g 
b u l l m a r k e t . They c o u l d n o t have chosen a worse p o s s i b l e 
moment, f o r no s o o n e r had t h e y b o u g h t - f o r a ' r i s e t h a n t h e 
c o l l a p s e i n p r i c e s f o l l o w e d . The a d v e r s e b a l a n c e a g a i n s t 
D i s r a e l i and h i s p a r t n e r s ? w h o . : w e r e o f c o u r s e , o p e r a t i n g on t h e 
m a r g i n t h r o u g h o u t , r o s e t o £ 7 , 0 0 0 by J u n e , 1 8 2 5 . 2 ^ 
A g l eam o f hope a p p e a r e d , t h o u g h y when D i s r a e l i was 
a p p r o a c h e d by J o h n D i s t o n Powles w i t h a v i e w t o w r i t i n g -propaganda 
t o f u r t h e r t h e i r m u t u a l i n t e r e s t i n m i n i n g s h a r e s . Powles 
was an i n s t i g a t o r o f S e v e r a l S o u t h A m e r i c a n m i n i n g compan ies 
( h i s p r o m o t i o n s . i n c l u d e d t h e A n g l o - M e x i c a n M i n i n g A s s o c i a t i o n ) '•. 
and he had made a l o t o f money. Howeve r , i n 1 8 2 5 , "the 
Government a p p e a r e d t o be c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t i t was 
t h e i r d u t y t o i n t e r v e n e i n what many c o n s i d e r e d a d a n g e r o u s ! 
b u b b l e . Powles saw t h a t i t was n o t t h e i r d u t y a s - f a r as he was 
2 4 . R o b e r t B l a k e . D i s r a e l i ( .1965; p . 2 4 . . . ' ' : • . '{•••• : " 
2 5 . I b i d . p . 25. 
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concerned, and he set out to reassure the public of the 
b r i l l i a n c e of the b r i l l i a n c e of the South American schemes 
?6 
and the dangers of governmental intervention. He wrote a 
pamphlet but h i s s t y l e was that of most businessmen and no-one 
read i t . . 2 " * 7 
Powles accordingly e n l i s t e d the pen of the young, able 
and impecunious D i s r a e l i , following the example of Robert 
28 
Harley who, i n 1710, nine years before the publication of 
Robinson Crusoe, had pamphlets ("Public C r e d i t " and "Loans"), 
fo r the promotion of h i s South Sea schemes written by Daniel 
Defos. The expert knowledge of Powles derived from personal 
experience was complemented by the b r i l l i a n t imaginative 
powers of D i s r a e l i and several f o r t h r i g h t essays r e s u l t e d . 
Under the patronage of Powles, a pamphlet was published, e n t i t l * 
!?An Inquiry into the Plans, Progress, and P o l i c y of the 
American Mining Companies" (1825) - the anonymous author's 
maiden appearance i n point. 
This "well - got - up brochure" 7 i s worthy of attention 
as i t contains many of the favourite arguments used by promoteri 
wishing, to encourage speculation. I t went through s e v e r a l 
editions and was even accorded the honour of a notice in. the 
Gentleman's Magazine..^0 The cleverness of the author i s shown 
26. P.H. Emden, op. c i t . , p. 4-8. 
27. Robert Blake, op. c i t . p. 25* 
28. Robert Harley, 1st E a r l of Oxford.. 
29. P.H. Emden, op. c i t . , p.49. 
30. Gentleman's Magazine, 1825* January - June, p.440. 
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" by the fact that the reviewer does not seem to have noticed 
that he was dealing with a.book with a purpose. . 
There i s no understatement of the problem i n hand. 
"Among the undertakings of the present age, paramount 
i n importance for the magnitude of the i n t e r e s t s which are 
involved-in t h e i r management, may be ranked the American Mining 
Companies. n > 
The method of "enquiry" adopted follows a common t r a i n 
of thought among the promoters and runs: b r i e f l y as follows^:-
The mines of pre-revolutionary South America were p r o f i t a b l e , 
and yet they were worked with almost a t o t a l l a c k of mechanical 
ass i s t a n c e and by men who knew nothing of geological p r i n c i p l e s . 
I n England there e x i s t s the f i n e s t and most modern mining 
machinery i n the world and a body of highly s k i l l e d miners. '. 
There i s also an excellent understanding of the science of 
geology. Therefore, i f the E n g l i s h experts with E n g l i s h 
equipment are allowed to work the American mines, the p r o f i t s 
to be gained w i l l be f a r i n excess of anything that was 
previously considered possible.. 
I t was the propagandist's job to show how inadequate.'' 
the former working of the mines had been and how sound 
were the prospects for the mining companies:; that had l a t e l y 
been formed i n London. D i s r a e l i wrote convincingly of the."utter 
deficiency i n the p r i n c i p l e s of subterraneous; geometry"^ 
51. B. D i s r a e l i , op. c i t . , p.5. 
52. I b i d . , p.14. 
-92-
under the old system, the lack of equipment and the problems 
with water which led him to conclude that costs had been very 
high. Alsc^ "the p r o f i t s which might have been acquired were 
diminished nearly one moiety, by the worker of the mine not 
being also the amalgamator of the o r e s . " ^ The prospects 
of the newly formed mining companies, were then discussed 
i n d i v i d u a l l y though a l l were seen through the same rose-
coloured spectacles and from time to time we f i n d the catch-
words current today for s i m i l a r uses. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the 
f i r s t company considered was Powles' "Anglo-Mexican Association" 
about which few doubts were entertained as to i t s eventual 
success. E a r l y reports from Mexico encouraged the b e l i e f i n . 
the introduction c a p i t a l , s k i l l , experience and machineryj 
the expenses of working these mines might be greatly deduced, 
and t h e i r produce much augmented." 
Many associations had apparently received valuable 
concessions f o r working mines from the respective governments, 
while others without t h i s advantage were undaunted. The 
author was pleased to quote the following from the prospectus 
of the Rio De La P l a t a Mining Association although to ; some of : 
h i s readers i t may.have given a hint of problems that were l i k e l y 
to a r i s e . 
"That most of these mines, not being i n l e g a l possession , 
of any proprietor, might be entered upon with .the undivided 
55. I b i d . , p. 60. : ' . •• . V .;. ' . . • ' • 
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enjoyment of the p r o f i t s ; or, i f any claims should a r i s e , i t 
was presumed that they would be s a t i s f i e d at a very easy 
r a t e . " 5 4 
Those companies which had been formed f i r s t had already 
published s a t i s f a c t o r y reports, the public was informed, and 
" i n many instances Unexpected advantages have beeirt obtained, 
and additional p r i v i l e g e s enjoyed. The greatest guarantee 
the public possessed as - to the s i n c e r i t y of the newer concerns 
was the character of the i n d i v i d u a l s by whom the a f f a i r s of 
the companies are d i r e c t e d . I n d e e d the author claims 
that any suspicions that had a r i s e n over the a f f a i r s of the 
mining companies were due to the rash behaviour of the investors 
who had got t h e i r fingers burnt. There i s a good measure 
of t r u t h when he s t a t e s that whereas a few years previous 
there had been "something invidious i n the character of a 
stock - j o b b e r , " 5 5 the position was changed when the mining 
shares came on the market and to inve s t money i n them "was 
c a l l e d patronising infant l i b e r t y and l i b e r a l p r i n c i p l e s , and 
there was' something gorgeous and a r i s t o c r a t i c a l i n the idea 
of succeeding to the possessions- of the Valencianas and the 
Reglas The West End rushed to the anticipated s p o i l . " > r 
34. I b i d . , p. 60. '• 
35. I b i d . , p.77. 
36. I b i d . , p.98. 
37. I b i d . , p.99. 
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.Thus the recent furore was due not to fraud but to 
human nature. 
"The t r u t h i s , that f or a couple of days a l l the country 
were buying shares i n the American mines. There was no reason 
for the excessive demand, and a f e a r f u l r eaction might have 
taken place, but Avarice preserved us from the misery which 
I n s a n i t y might have produced. Waiting for further p r o f i t s , 
the world missed those v/hich were already unreasonable, and 
the l o s s e s which were incurred by a very few simpletons, 
who bought at the highest, are, we s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e , a l l the 
'ruinous consequences' which have r e s u l t e d from the 'la t e great 
depreciation i n pric e s * so much talked of and so much wondered 
a t . " ' 8 
D i s r a e l i concludes thus, a "simpleton" with h i s tongue 
i n h i s cheek. 
"We now close these observations: imperfect as they 
may be, they have been penned i n the s p i r i t of s i n c e r i t y , and 
with no other view than that of enabling the public to form 
an opinion on a very important subject. As to the probable 
produce of the American mines under t h e i r present management, 
i t i s impossible to form any estimate; but we have shown 
t h e i r average annual produce under t h e i r former management, 
the means by which i t i s intended to obtain i t ; and on the 
highest a u t h o r i t i e s we st a t e , that the mineral treasures of 
America are, as yet, most imperfectly developed."-" 
38. I b i d . , p.107. 
39- I b i d . , p.130 
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With a few closing remarks on the dangers of parliamentar 
intervention, D i s r a e l i had seated h i s case well to an 
ignorant public, although i t soon became obvious to him that 
he was fi g h t i n g a losing b a t t l e -
However, another lengthy pamphlet soon came out with the 
t i t l e of "Lawyers and L e g i s l a t o r s : or notes on the American 
Mining Companies"(l825) i n which the author returned i n 
depth to the dangers of parliamentary int e r f e r e n c e , going 
so f a r as to blame the Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon, as the 
person mainly responsible f or the disastrous f a l l i n share p r i c 
by v i r t u e of a speech inlvhich he shed doubt on the new 
companies and spoke of imminent l e g i s l a t i o n . As t h i s 
pamphlet i s almost whol|ly concerned with parliamentary 
41 
a f f a i r s i t i s refer r e d to i n some d e t a i l elsewhere. The 
clo s i n g remarks, though, are worthy of space here, i f only to 
ind i c a t e with what trepidation any publications of t h i s time 
concerning mining companies must be approached. 
"These sentiments come not from one who s i t s i n Royal 
Councils, or mingles i n the assemblies of l e g i s l a t i v e wisdom, 
but they come from one who has had some opportunity of i n v e s t -
i g a t i o n , some patience for inquiry, whose opinions are unbiased 
by s e l f - i n t e r e s t , and uncontrolled by party influence, who, 
whatever may be the r e s u l t , w i l l f e e l some s a t i s f a c t i o n , 
perchance some pride, that at a time when wavering ^Bd 
40. Ibid., p.$4. 
41. Baal pp. See p. 138. 
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inconsistent councils were occasioning the very rAjflft which 
they affected to deprecate, when Ignorance was the ready slave 
of I n t e r e s t , and Truth was deserted by those who should have 
been her stoutest champions, there was at l e a s t one attempt 
42 
to support sounder p r i n c i p l e s , and in c u l c a t e a wiser p o l i c y . " 
The t h i r d and f i n a l e f f o r t of the team of Powle s and 
D i s r a e l i to bring about a r e v e r s a l of public opinion was the 
lengthy pamphlet, "The Present State of Mexico"(1825), which 
was aimed s p e c i f i c a l l y at r e v i v i n g the fortunes of the "Anglo-
Mexican" Naturally, the public was informed that the mines 
of Mexico were ripe f or exploitation and much play was made 
of the l i b e r a l nature of the new government whose Secretary 
of State, Alaman, i s quoted at length. Alaman had evidently 
s a i d that, "The mines are the r e a l foundation of the wealth 
of t h i s nation, and a l l that has been s a i d by speculative econo-
mists, i n opposition to t h i s p r i n c i p l e , has been refuted 
43 
by experience." ^ 
D i s r a e l i was impressed, "Such are the men who are 
d i r e c t i n g the resources, and regulating the measures of the 
republic of Mexico I f they be not pure and p r a c t i c a l 
p a t r i o t s , we know not what names should be i n s c r i b e d on the 
44 
i l l u s t r i o u s r o l e of national gratitude" I n f a c t , Alaman, 
42. I b i d . , p.98-99. 
43. Tp.41. 
44. ^  p.55. 
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was being paid on the side by the mining companies i n orders 
to look a f t e r t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . 
The purpose of these publications - to stay the drop, 
i n p r i c e s - was not achieved, nor were the young author's 
hopes r e a l i z e d of being able at any r a t e i n part to s e t t l e 
h i s old d i f f e r e n c e s . They remained as a b i t t e r legacy 
and i n order to c l e a r off e x i s t i n g l i a b i l i t i e s he was forced 
to borrow elsewhere. Indeed, i t was only t h i r t y years later,> 
when he was leader of the House of Commons and Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, that D i s r a e l i f i n a l l y paid off the debts 
contracted i n the mining mania of 1825. 
We now turn b r i e f l y to the "share-rigging" which was' 
outlined above. Let us suppose that the c a p i t a l of a new 
company was to be one m i l l i o n pounds-. The shares could 
be divided among f i f t y gentlemen who each held two-hundred 
shares for which they paid £5 each. The shares would then 
be put on the market and declared to be at a premium of £16 
each.55 At t h i s r a t e , and with a c a p i t a l outlay of £1000, 
a projector could s e l l only 66 of h i s shares and r a i s e £1,056, 
thus r e t a i n i n g 134- with -which'to make money, without the . 
r i s k of a f a r t h i n g . I f he got only £16 :for each of these-
shares} he would pocket £2,144, b u t . i f , as i n the case of the 
Pasco Peruvian Company, the p r i c e had r i s f c i to £50, the 
projector could r e a l i s e a l l h i s 134 shares and receive £6,700. 
45. This description i s based upon Mr,•Hobhouse's views of 
the Pasco Peruvian Mining Company, Harvard, N.S., X I I 
1048-1056. 
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Supposing the shares should r i s e i n value, as some did, to 
£500 or £700 per share, i t would be possible to s e l l out for 
between £80,000 and £90,00C. The fewer the d i r e c t o r s , or 
promoters, of course, the greater the p r o f i t , while the 
r i s k stayed the same; n i l . 
A good example of the methods employed above was the 
case of the Arigna Mining Company whose shares reached a 
premium of £25• One of the f i r s t cases of cornering 
i n the Stock Exchange was commented upon i n the Times of 
25th March, 1825- "We understand," i t s a i d , "that a stratagem 
of a very unusual nature has been resorted to, to r a i s e 
a r t i f i c i a l l y the pric e of the shares. . I t i s well known 
that a p r a c t i c e e x i s t s at the Stock Exchange of s e l l i n g 
at a di s t a n t period without the p a r t i e s having any of the 
stock or shares at the time The persons engaged 
i n the new company i n question are s a i d to have taken 
advantage of t h i s gambling mania, to buy i n for time more sihares 
than they know they have beea issued, and which consequently 
i t w i l l never be i n the power of the s e l l e r to d e l i v e r . 
The e f f e c t has been to r a i s e the shares to four or f i v e 
times the value at which they were f i r s t issued." These r i g s 
and corners were numerous at t h i s time, but e s p e c i a l l y amongst 
the new mining shares. 
46. Thomas Wilson alleged that d i r e c t o r s of the Pasco Peruvian 
Company were bound to r e t a i n 100 shares each, but there i s 
no record that t h i s was c a r r i e d out, and i t was c e r t a i n l y 
not a general r u l e . Hansard N.S., XII.. 1060-1062. 
H' ^ n i7 ^ U s h , A Complete View etc.. p.32. 
48. Charles Duguid, op. c i t . , p.127. 
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The b a s i s for the mining companies was the former 
prosperity of the mines under the Spaniards. Before the revo-
l u t i o n a r y wars, the value of the amounts extracted was around 
£8,000,000 according to one estimate, 7 with Mexico providing 
nearly £5,000,000. The mines had, however, been worked 
through forced labour, oppression and e x t o r t i o n . ^ Humboldt, 
who t r a v e l l e d extensively i n South America and was an-.expert 
i n mining was often quoted by those who wished to impress 
upon the public the wealth that was l y i n g dormant. 
Baron Humboldt had written that "from 1770 to 1809, 
(the year before the Revolution), the produce of the mines 
appears to have been nearly double the amount r a i s e d during 
any other corresponding periody since the o r i g i n a l conquest 
of Mexico, three centuries ago."^ This was pleasing to the 
promoters of companies formed to work i n Mexico1 and more so 
when Humboldt c a r r i e d on that " i n the working of the mines 
there.was an equal want of judgement or indeed of common sense," 
and that i n h i s opinion two-thirds of the expenses of the 
"te n i t o r e s " ( p o r t e r s ) might have been s a v e d . ^ While the 
old system was p r o f i t a b l e , therefore, dishonesty, poor s k i l l 
and indifference to change had acted so as too reduce t h e i r 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y . 
49. The Bu l l i o n Committee of 1810, quoted in-Joseph Lowe~i : .' 
The Present State of England (1822), p.267. 
•-50. F.B. Head, Rough Notes "Taken During: Some Rapid Journeys 
. Across The Pampas And Among The Andes (1826; pp.156-159* ; 
51. Quoted i n S i r William Adams, The Actual State Of The ! 
Mexican Mines, And The Reasonable Expectations of The 
An^lo-Mexican Mine Association I1025J ' ' 
52. Tbid.p .51. See also Captain Garby's views of the.Mexican Mine 
55. I b i d \ (n.p P i41-42^ 
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Repcrts sprang up i n the years 1824 and 1825 of the 
minerals throughout South America that were ready f o r 
exp l o i t a t i o n . "Gold, of a l l the metals, i s that which i s 
most abundant i n C h i l i ; and i t may be aaid that there i s 
not a mountain or h i l l but contains i t i n a greater or l e s s 
degree".^ 1" 
I n f a c t , the application of E n g l i s h machinery to the 
mines of South America had already been t r i e d and shown not 
to be the panacea that many supposed i n 1825 i t to be. A 
Draining Company had used En g l i s h steam-engines and En g l i s h 
miners i n the Pasco region of Peru i n 1814. The Company 
55 
was a t o t a l f a i l u r e and a l l except one of the miners died.-'-' 
Over twenty companies, though r e l y i n g on s i m i l a r t e ch-
niques were i n operation i n some form or another by 1825• 
Certain of them had sent out commissioners and miners, others 
were arguing over t h e i r respective " r i g h t s " to the mines of 
South America, while a few were already folding up. 
54. The Abbe Don. J . Ignatius Molina, Report On The S o i l And 
Mineral Productions of C h i l e . (1825;, P«30. The w r i t e r 
of the preface s t r e s s e s the f a c t that t h i s work "was 
written many years before i t was ever contemplated to 
embark B r i t i s h c a p i t a l i n any of the present undertak-
ings, and consequently may be considered an i m p a r t i a l 
account, e n t i r e l y free from that influence which might 
j u s t now lead to misrepresentation." *Tb i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
to speculate as to who took the tromble to have i t 
published. 
55- Mr. Hobhouse, Hansard, N.S., X I I , 1048-1056. Also Thomas Baring, i b i d . , 1063-1064. 
-101-
Henry E n g l i s h reported i n 1825 5^ on the progress of 
each company and could not.hold out great hope s for a l l of 
them; "Of t h i s Company (Guanaxuato) l i t t l e can be s a i d ; had 
the contents of the Prospectus been true, of which we enter-
t a i n our doubts, the success of the Company was c e r t a i n . . . 
The Company (General South American), at the period of i t s 
formationy not being i n possession of Mines, we may presume 
deemed i t unnecessary to enter into any d e t a i l , as r e l a t e d 
to the advantages a r i s i n g from the s i t u a t i o n of Mines i n 
any p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i c t , orjbheir p e c u l i a r claims to public 1 . 
a t t e n t i o n " . 5 8 
Reasons For The F a i l u r e Of The Mining Companies. 
The Rio De La P l a t a Mining Association was, according 
to E n g l i s h , i n a d i f f e r e n t category, "from the l i b e r a l 
conduct, of the Government, evinced i n favour of t h i s 
Association, no doubt can be entertained of i t s success".^ . 
This Association was soon to f a i l , however, as were i t s 
competitors, and the reasons for t h e i r f a i l u r e are due to:. \. 
fa c t o r s common to them a l l . The story of the Rio De La .. 
P l a t a Mining Association has been f a i r l y w ell documented and : 
w i l l serve to demonstrate the misconceptions which surrounded 
the l i v e s of the mining companies and which l e d t o . i n e v i t a b l e 
d i s a s t e r . This account w i l l be compared with that of John Miers 
56. Henry E n g l i s h , A General Guide etc., ~ " " . 
57. I b i d , p.88. • • 
58. I b i d , p.86. 
59. I b i d , p.100. 
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who was one of the few with f i r s t - h a n d knowledge of the 
i m p r a c t i c a l i t i e s of the Chilean Mining Associations. 
The Rio P l a t a Mining Association was formed at the 
London Tavern, on the 4th of December, 1824, for the pur- . 
pose of working the mines i n the region of the Rio P l a t a 
60 
i n the .Province of Buenos A i r e s . The p r i n c i p a l m i n i s t e r , 
Don Bernardino Rivadavia accepted the o f f i c e of President 
61 
of the Board of Management with the assurance that the 
mines of h i s country were, under c e r t a i n circumstances, to 
6? 
be "at the d i s c r e t i o n a r y choice of the Company". I t . 
appears that the d i r e c t o r s agreed that Rivadavia should 
eventually be paid £30,000 fo r the goodwill of the specula-
t i o n . 6 3 
Rivadavia gave descriptions of the mines which were 
printed with the prospectus of the a s s o c i a t i o n . "We can 
affirm, without hyperbole, that the two f i r s t c u r r a c i e s , 
Rincnnda and Santa-Catalina, contain the greatest r i c h e s i n 
the universe. I am going to prove i t by a single a s s e r t i o n 
which i s a t t e s t e d by thousands of witnesses. I n i t s f i e l d s 
the gold springs up with the r a i n , as i n others weeds: the 
great mass of t h i s s o i l i s composed of earth-stone-water-and 
l a r g e r and smaller grains of gold; these l a s t appear i n sight 
when the r a i n washes away the dust which covers t h e i r surface. 
60. P.B. Head, Reports Relating To The F a i l u r e Of The Rio P l a t a 
Mining Association 11327,?. p.1. ••. • .•. 
61. I b i d , p. 145: ' • " 
.62. I b i d , p . l . 
63. I b i d , p.144. 
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After a very heavy r a i n , a woman stepping f o r t h from her hut, 
a few yards from her door, found a piece of gold weighing 
twenty ounces; another, when gathering wood, on p u l l i n g up 
some grass, discovered amongst the roots a grain of from 
three to four ounces. These instances happen so frequently 
i n the rain y season, that i t would require much time to de-
t a i l them. 
The sweepings of the houses and sheds f o r mules are 
64 
washed, and generally more or l e s s gold i s found i n them." 
The mines of Uspallata i n p a r t i c u l a r were s a i d to be 
i n a region r i c h with pasture, wood, water and indeed every-
thing that the miners might require. ^No company could have 
asked for brighter prospects and H u l l e t t and Company 
organised the peddling of the shares with a nominal c a p i t a l 
66 
of £1,000,000. Unfortunately, the company was to ex-
perience competition, for while Rivadavia had given i t the 
concession which included the mines of Famatina which were 
generally judged to have the greatest p o t e n t i a l , the Governor 
of La R i o j a Province had granted a concession for the mines 
to a group of Argentine politicians and landowners who sold i t 
to a B r i t i s h company e n t i t l e d the Famatina Mining Company. ^ 
64. I b i d , p.143-144. 
65. I b i d , p.l70.v 
66. H.S. Ferns, op.cit.p.135« 
67- I b i d , Also F.B. Head, Reports R e l a t i n g etc p.146. 
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Undaunted, the Rio P l a t a Company appointed S i r 'Francis 
68 
Bond Head as commissioner for the party to s a i l to Buenos -
A i r e s , and watched the shares r i s e i n value on the. Stock 
Exchange. Head l a t e r r e c a l l e d the confusion which 
surrounded the sending out of a party to South America. 
"The subject of working s i l v e r mines was one to which very 
few people i n England had ever di r e c t e d t h e i r attention; and 
nothing can prove the profound ignorance which p r e v a i l e d among 
us, more than the assortment of commissioners and miners 
that were now embarked f o r America 1 1. 6 9 Apparently, the 
d i r e c t o r s of the mining companies were rather at a l o s s to 
know what sort of person should command the miners and 
conduct the whole speculationi' One of the companies 
considered t h a t , i n order to guard-their property, no person 
could be better than an o f f i c e r of the Guards; other directors 
decided that as gun-powder would be required i n the mines, i t 
would be well to procure o f f i c e r s from the A r t i l l e r y . 
Several saw that o f f i c e r s of h i s Majesty's navy would be use-
f u l where hauling up ores and water from the depths of the 
mines was concerned, while one company whose mines were f i l l e d ; 
with water and widely separated from each other, concluded !: ! 
that to encounter d i f f i c u l t i e s both on land and water was • 
indisputably the province of an o f f i c e r of the Marines'. ^  , 
68. I t i s to Head that we owe the f u l l story of the Rio P l a t a 
• • Company. ' /. 
69. F.B. Head, Descriptive Essays (1857), P.25. 1 
70. I b i d . p.p. 25-26. 
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However, although the party embarking for South 
America knew very l i t t l e of the conditions they would meet, 
the shareholders knew l e s s , and the whole system being that 
of the b l i n d leading the blind, the commissioners s t a r t e d • 
out for the New World v/ith l e s s confidence than they l e f t 
b e h ind. 7 1 
jv-1? Head assembled a party of Cornish miners and capital 
72 • 
equipment, and with these he s a i l e d to Buenos A i r e s . 1 
He soon discovered that there was a serious contradiction 
between the f a c t s on the spot and the f a c t s in. the company's 
prospectus. I n January 1825* a law had been adopted by the 
Government i n Buenos Aires that i t belonged to each province 
to regulate i t s e l f . Head found Rivadavia weak i n the presence 
of d i f f i c u l t i e s . " I e a s i l y perceived," he t o l d the di r e c t o r s , . 
"that p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s were strongly opposing our progress; 
that Mr. Rivadavia's p o l i t i c a l opponents were s t r i v i n g to 
overturn a l l h i s plans; that he had evidently no i n c l i n a t i o n 
to a s s i s t us."'-^ Head was not content to t a l k i n Buenos A i r e s 
•71. "The confusion and hurry i n which miners and miners' wives, 
machinery, and commissioners were huddled on board, can 
hardly.be forgotten. Itmay a l s o be remembered that these 
Companies were of such hasty growth, that they were s c a r c e l y 
considered to e x i s t at a l l , u n t i l i t could be reported that; 
the miners and machinery had been (the phrase was ominous); 
. despatched. As soon as t h i s was known, the value of the 
shares rose r a p i d l y " I b i d . p.35« 
72., A company formed for working i n Mexico suffered an e a r l y 
, setback. "The miners and machinery were landed, but of one 
company of forty-four i n d i v i d u a l s , almost the f i r s t act . 
'which twenty-six of them performed was - to di e . " I b i d , p«37. 
73. F.B. Head, Reports Relating ..... e t c . , p.6,, , 
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and t r a v e l l e d widely over 6,000 miles meeting p r o v i n c i a l 
governors and making surveys, plans and repeats of the mines 
nu,. 
which he v i s i t e d . ' Not one of the governors would give the 
7 
"discretionary choice of mines" granted by Rivadavia o r i g i n a l l y , ' 
and although c e r t a i n mines were offered, Head did not consider 
the working of them f e a s i b l e ; "San Juan was i n a state of . 
revolution. The mines of Fiendoza were altogether d i f f e r e n t 
from the reports which had been published and. were t o t a l l y 
incapable of supporting the,expense ,of the establishment which 
had been proposed f o r them.11 ^ 
However, the d i r e c t o r s reported to the shareholders 
that a l l was proceeding w e l l , and c a l l e d upon them for a 
further i n a c i r c u l a r l e t t e r dated 14th January, 1826, 
nearly four months a f t e r they had heard d i s t r e s s i n g news from 
Head. 
"Captain P.B. Head . .. has been received with favour . 
and encouragement by the Government of Buenos A i r e s , and by 
the Governors of two of the p r i n c i p a l Mining Provinces, 
Mendoza and San Juan, with every demonstration of anxiety to 
a s s i s t and promote the introduction, and establishment of;the •' 
Association i n those Provinces. 
74. I b i d , p.2. 
75. I b i d , p.148. 
76. ; I b i d , p.175» Some companies purchased mines 700 or 800 miles 
.  away from each other. P.B. Head, Descriptive Essays, p.37» 
' I" : "one single Company engaged the whole or parts of t h i r t y - f i v e 
large mines, besides smaller ones, nine haciendas, and three ; 
.; hundred m i l l s , which l a s t they took on l e a s e s for nine or 
twelve years; and t h i s same Company, a f t e r expending about 
eight hundred thousand pounds, have now gust determined to 
abandon a l l t h e i r mines together, excepting four..''Ibid.,. p.40. 
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A l l the mines and lodes i n "both Provinces, excepting 
only a small part, held as private property, have been 
77 
tendered to the acceptance of the Association." f r 
Head was further confronted by a large detachment of 
German miners who had a r r i v e d i n Buenos A i r e s for the s e r v i c e 
of the company. He soon dismissed the German miners, ordered 
the Cornish party to embark for England, and reached London 
himself on the 13th A p r i l , 1826.^ He r e a l i s e d , of course, 
that h i s own return would displease the shareholders and 
more so, the d i r e c t o r s , who had requested him to stay i n . 
South America, and would h i t the p r i c e of Rio P l a t a Mining 
'Association shares badly^ "for had i t been necessary only 
to enrich the Directors and t h e i r Shareholders, I could have 
r a i s e d the value of t h e i r shares almost ad l i b i t u m , " ' 
Although the company had a nominal c a p i t a l of £1,000,000, 
the amount a c t u a l l y l o s t i n the Argentine venture amounted to 
only £52,000. For t h i s the d i r e c t o r s had no thanks to o f f e r 
Head who s*at down to write "Reports Re l a t i n g to the F a i l u r e of 
80 
The Rio P l a t a Mining Association" to explain h i s a c t i o n s . 
77. P.B. Head. Reports Relating ... e t c . p.184. 
78. I b i d . , p.2. 
79. I b i d . , p.225. 
80. See also Observations on Captain P.B. Head's "Reports 
R e l a t i v e To The F a i l u r e Of The Rio De La P l a t a Mining 
Association", by L t . Grosvenor Bunster R.N.; agent i n 
the s e r v i c e of the Association (1827)* where Head i s 
blamed f o r everything. 
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The Rio P l a t a Association c a r r i e d on f o r a while and 
succeeded i n l o s i n g additional sums i n C h i l e . I t s 
competitor, the Famatina Company, also f a i l e d ; i n 1827 i t s 
shares on which £50 had been paid were s e l l i n g f o r £2. 
John Miers set out i n 1819 to i n s t a l copper m i l l s i n 
C h i l e , b e l i e v i n g that he could- r a p i d l y make h i s fortune. He 
was unsuccessful and found "on return to England the numerous 
misconceptions which were entertained, and the i n c o r r e c t 
accounts which had been published r e l a t i v e to these countries? 
He had t r a v e l l e d out with the misapprehension that 
the demand for sheet copper along the P a c i f i c coast was 
very great, and that coal might be procured for nothing i n 
Chil e and that labour costs were l e s s than a quarter of those 
i n England. He records that "these t a l e s were magnified by 
the South American deputies then i n London; and from the 
two Ch i l e ambassadors I received strong assurances that the • 
government would afford every f a c i l i t y , protection and a s s i s -
tance, to an enterprise of such vast importance to that 
o p 
i n f a n t country." 
After h i s own experiences had proved so d i s i l l u s i o n i n g , 
f l i e r s r e a l i z e d that among thosehaving even the smallest'know-
ledge of Chi l e i t was well-known that the nature of the country ' 
and the state of i t s mines were such that the i n j e c t i o n of 
En g l i s h c a p i t a l for large s c a l e minig projects, could not be 
s u c c e s s f u l . He a s s e r t s that company formation f o r mining i n . 
81. - John Miers, op. c i t . , p.IV. * '. .- . •: . 
82. I b i d . , p.2.. \'v . .1 v 
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C h i l e was d e c e i t f u l from the outset. Those i n England "the 
best informed of the r e a l s t a t e of C h i l e , and of the u t t e r 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y of employing any considerable sum of money i n 
mining with the l e a s t chance of i t s being productive of any 
p r o f i t whatever, put f o r t h proposals f o r r a i s i n g immense sums 
from the c r e d u l i t y of persons l e s s informed than themselves, 
f o r the purpose, as i t was pretended, of working mines of gold, 
s i l v e r and copper, which were to produce immense p r o f i t s . " ~ 
Accordingly, three companies were formed f o r t h i s purpose,, 
the "Chilean.Mining Association", the "Chilean and Peruvian 
Mining Association" and the "Anglo Chilean Mining Association," 
the f i r s t two having His Excellency Don Mariano de Egana, Minfetea 
Plenipotentiary from the Republic of C h i l e , as President, and. 
the l a t t e r being established with h i s Excellency's sanction 
and approbation. 
The prospectus of the Chilean Mining Association stated 
that 'the Republic of Chi l e contains nine mining d i s t r i c t s , or 
r e a l s , producing gold, s i l v e r , copper, lead, t i n and i r o n . 
They have the advantage of being situated on that branch of the 
C o r d i l l e r a of the Andes nearest the sea coast. The climate i s 
healthy 7 labour i s cheap - wood and water are generally 
abundant - and coal i s to be found on the coast of Conception." 
The Anglo Chilean Mining Association i n i t s prospectus informed 
that "the t e r r i t o r i e s of C h i l e , and more p a r t i c u l a r l y those 
parts which are situated between the p a r a l l e l of t h i r t y - f i v e 
83. I b i d . , p.417. 
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degrees of southern l a t i t u d e and the northern boundary, 
are known to abound i n r i c h mines of gold, s i l v e r , copper, 
t i n and other minerals." The Chilean and Peruvian Mining 
Assocd£tion i n i t s prospectus gcesto even greater lengths; i t 
assures that "the copper ores of C h i l e e x i s t i n extraordinary 
abundance, and i n general are e a s i l y a c c e s s i b l e , being at a 
l i t t l e depth from the surface, and at a short distance from 
the sea coast ... Coals, a preferable material to charcoal 
which i s now employed for smelting copper, are found i n 
in-exhaustible q u a n t i t i e s on the coast of C h i l e , and, i t i s 
considered, may be conveyed to the mines at a t r i f l i n g 
expense." 
These, Miers a s s e r t s , a r e misrepresentations, I n 
p a r t i c u l a r when the Chilean Minig Association, of which Mr. 
Egana was President, s t a t e s that "few countries are so well 
watered as C h i l e , affording means, of conveyance by water to 
the ports of the P a c i f i c ; and that north of 35 deg. S. l a t . 
are the great mining d i s t r i c t s , " i t i s a f a c t , "of which Mr. 
Egana could not by any p o s s i b i l i t y be ignorant, that north 
of 35 deg. S. l a t . there i s not a single r i v e r navigable i n 
any way; that there i s s c a r c e l y a s t i c k of timber of any kind 
84 * and no c o a l s . " Further, i t was Miers experience that not 
one mining d i s t r i c t for gold and s i l v e r e x i s t e d i n the whole 
of C h i l e , that the streams were unnavigable and "neither c o a l s , 
nor f u e l of any s o r t , can be procured i n the country for any 
but a very small establishment." 8^ 
- I l l -
I t i s not always clear whether the South American 
mining companies were sincere i n d e s i r i n g to work the mines 
or whether they were formed merely f o r the p r o f i t s to be 
gahed on the Stock Exchange, but i n the case of the Chilean 
companies, the above v/ould c l e a r l y seem to ind i c a t e the l a t t e r . 
Head's writings, based on an unfortunate and shortr-
l i v e d career i n South America s i m i l a r to Miers, with t h e i r 
a n a l y s i s of the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n as well as the 
descriptions of the actual resources of the provinces which 
i t had been proposed to exp l o i t , constitutes the best explana-
t i o n of why c a p i t a l investment by Europeans i n i n d u s t r i a l 
e nterprises i n Argentina at t h i s time was impossible. 
I n "Rough Notes Taken During Some Rapid Journeys Across 
The Pampas And Among The Andes", Head sees the main d i f f i -
c u l t i e s as p h y s i c a l , moral and p o l i t i c a l , "and these 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n many parts of the provinces, would be so 
great, that i t might s a t i s f a c t o r i l y be proved that the s i l v e r 
extracted from such mines would s c a r c e l y be worth i t s weight : 
i n i r o n by the time i t reached England; , whiie the iron which 
was sent from England would cost nearly i t s weight i n s i l v e r i 
by the time i t reached the mine. . 
The main p h y s i c a l problem was the sheer distance^ which 
;:. separated the mines from the supplies of men, materials and J 
provisions and the consequent d i f f i c u l t y of transporting the 
ores over desolate and unprotected p l a i n s to.the ports where 
they would be shipped - "the distance being, upon the average, 
• 8 6 . p. 1 4 9 . 1 : ""* ; ~~ ; : • - ~ 
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more than a thousand miles of l a n d - c a r r i a g e . " 8 ^ A great 
amount of time would be l o s t t r a v e l l i n g over bad roads, and 
crossing t o r r e n t s and r i v e r s with an ever-present danger of 
attack from bandits to reach mines s i t u a t e d i n l o f t y and 
barren mountains. 
The dryness of the climate was a further problem as 
there was often l i t t l e to drink, l e t alone to use on machinery-
Therefore, machinery, such as steam-engines, were a p h y s i c a l 
impossibility-, and the mines were better adapted to work on 
a l i m i t e d scale by a few people than the extensive operations 
88 
of an E n g l i s h a s s o c i a t i o n . 
The"moral" problems were numerous. The l a c k of education 
l e f t the population d i s i n c l i n e d for change^and whitfi the r i c h e r 
c l a s s e s i n the provinces - were unaccustomed to business, 
the poorer c l a s s e s were unwilling to work. There could be 
l i t t l e r e l i a n c e on a contract and no understanding of 
pun&uality or the value of time. Within any l o c a l i t y a 
monopoly existed i n day-to-day needs which pushed p r i c e s up, 
while l o c a l laws were powerless to stop the wild and 
plundering habits of the "gauchos"- The wants off" E n g l i s h 
and European workmen were expensive to s a t i s f y and the 
workmen themselves novices i n the techniques needed to 
work ores new to them. A l l too often they were overcome 
by the heat and became "indolent from possessing large s a l a r i e s 
87. p.150 
88. Ibid.. 
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i n a country where wine and s p i r i t s were cheap. One of the 
Cornish miners wrote home to h i s "brother i n Cornwall, "You 
have no idea, B i l l , how t h i r s t y t h i s here hot, dry climate 
do make us . 
As the mines were great distances from each ofher, i t 
was necessary to place confidence i n i n d i v i d u a l s handling 
gold and silver, many of whom would not have appeared t r u s t -
worthy. Also, dangers arose from the character of the l o c a l 
women. 
The p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s were obvious. Governments 
were unstable and unpredictable. J e a l o u s i e s e x i s t e d between 
provinces fand between the provinces and the national govern-
ments, with the r e s u l t that one might over-rule the decisions 
of the other. I n spite of decrees or contracts, governments 
would not allow large p r o f i t s to go out of t h e i r provinces, 
or even pass through them without contributions being made. 
The decrees of one junta could be repealed by the next with 
no compensation f o r an unlucky a s s o c i a t i o n that found i t had 
l o s t i t s r i g h t s to be there. Companies might be encouraged 
to lend money to the South American governments - "one hundred 
thousand d o l l a r s were l e n t to one Government"^ 
With a l l t h i s i n mind, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that the 
mining companies were a f a i l u r e . I t was l a t e r evident that 
the "old" system of mining was not only the r e s u l t of 
i n t e l l i g e n c e , t r i a l and experience, but was adapted to the 
89» F.B. Head, Descriptive Essays, p.29 
90. I b i d . , p.37. 
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character, habits and state of c i v i l i z a t i o n of the 
countries where i t had lon£ been operated- However, mining 
techniques i n B r i t i a n , e s p e c i a l l y the use of steam engines, 
had been greatly improved i n the f i r s t quarter of the 
nineteenth century, and the plans to apply these techniques 
abroad were not, perhaps, as f o o l i s h as hindsight may suggest. 
I t was more a matter of a f a i l u r e to f i n d out the r e a l 
p o t e n t i a l of the South American mines and a f a i l u r e to under-
stand the very d i f f i c u l t conditions under which the mining 
would have to be c a r r i e d out. 
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CHAPTER V 
PARLIAMENTARY REACTIONS' TO THE 
INVESTMENT BOOM AND SOUTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS 
This chapter represents an attempt to analyse the 
response i n Parliament to three aspects of the events that 
have so f a r been outlined. F i r s t l y , the movement among 
c e r t a i n Members of Parliament and Peers to put pressure 
on the Government to recognize the independence of the 
South American States, which was backed by a hard core of 
f i n a n c i a l and merchant opinion; secondly, the movement for 
the repeal of the Bubble Act which was f i n a l l y shown, by the 
investment boom to be an anachronism, and t h i r d l y , the 
reform of the Navigation Acts. 
The Pressure To Recognize The South American Republics 
Ever since the South Americans had begun t h e i r f i g h t s . 
for independence, they had found an a l l y i n the merchants 
of B r i t a i n who saw immense p r o f i t s from an increasing 
trade with the l i b e r a t e d continent. By 1822 the great topic ! 
which exercised the minds of those with connections i n 
South America was the attit u d e l i k e l y to be taken up by' 
the B r i t i s h Government i n regard to the question of recognition 
of the new rep u b l i c s . Naturally, on the stand taken i n t h i s 
matter would depend the fortunes or otherwise of t h e i r , 
undertakings i n the old Spanish Empire-
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This subject was by no means new, but i t was pressed 
forward with additional force i n t h i s year by the mercantile 
i n t e r e s t s oving to an o f f i c i a l communication, dated P a r i s , 
8th A p r i l , 1822, made by Don F. Zea,. the Columbian mentioned 
above'', to the cabinets of Europe, and founded,it appears^ 
on a decree of the Colombian republic that the new st a t e 
would not communicate or permit any commercial intercourse 
2 
With nations which did not recognize i t s independence . 
I t i s highly u n l i k e l y that t h i s would ever have been c a r r i e d 
out, but the statement was taken s e r i o u s l y by many i n 
B r i t a i n who were further worried that the p r i n c i p l e might 
spread to other South American nations. I t was feared, 
consequently, that unless B r i t a i n took steps to declare 
recognition, much of the trade with South America would be l o s t 
A memorial was submitted by the merchants,, shipowners, -
tr a d e r s , and manufacturers of London, i n A p r i l , 1822 
which pressed strongly for recognition,while i n May, a 
s i m i l a r memorial was issued by the merchants of Liverpool. 
The Liverpool merchants, v/hile s t r e s s i n g the in c r e a s i n g imp-
ortance of the South American trade, were p a r t i c u l a r l y 
alarmed by the declaration of Don F. Zea. I n consequence 
of the r i s k that was now presumed to e x i s t i n trading to 
1. See pp.48-52. 
2. J.S. Jones, Ph.D. op. c i t . , p.278 
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Colombia, the under-writers at Lloyd's would not execute 
p o l i c i e s on B r i t i s h v e s s e l s going there except at very 
extravagant premiums, without a warranty being i n s e r t e d 
i n them of "Free from capture or se i z u r e , or the consequences 
thereof."^ The s i t u a t i o n was a cause of alarm to the 
Liverpool merchants i n view of the f a c t that they had 
several ships preparing for, and some on the way to, South 
America, and e s p e c i a l l y as the U.S.A. was about to acknowledge 
the independence of the new governments. 
An almost i d e n t i c a l memorial, with a few a l t e r a t i o n s 
i n the text to s u i t the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances of the 
town, was also presented by the Nottingham merchants trading 
to the B r a z i l s and South America. They, too, claimed to have 
suffered an interruption and embarrassment to t h e i r commerce 
from the e f f e c t of the decree of the Colombian government; 
they had been i n the habit of exporting large q u a n t i t i e s of 
stockings and la c e to South America, and they had at the time 
manufactured goods of considerable value i n the Colombian 
States as well as on the way there, w h i l s t they had also 
a great quantity of a r t i c l e s on hand manufactured p a r t i c u l a r l y 
f o r that market and which were not c a l c u l a t e d for home 
consumption, i f the other s t a t e s followed the example of 
3. I b i d . , p.280 
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Colombia, they feared His Majesty's subjects might be t o t a l l y 
excluded from any p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h i s branch of trade. 
Mr. Joseph Marryat i n a l e t t e r to the Marquis of 
Londonderry, 28th January, 1822, r a i s e d the same question of 
recognition on commercial grounds'. Taking exception to the 
reappointment of S i r Ralph Woodward to the governorship 
of Trinidad, i n that the l a t t e r had refused the admission of 
Independents into the i s l a n d when the R o y a l i s t army was 
marching on La Guayra, i n consequence of which they were 
forced back and massacred, and that the nomination would 
induce a f e e l i n g of h o s t i l i t y towards B r i t a i n , he took 
occasion to remark that already the establishment of commercial 
intercourse with the new governments was becoming an object 
of serious i n t e r e s t to every nation. "Great B r i t a i n , whose 
only p o l i t i c a l r e l i e f from the heavy labours i s the prosecution 
of her commercial pu r s u i t s and the find i n g of new markets f o r 
the s a l e of her manufactures, and who must look to the New 
World to indemnify her for the r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed upon her 
industry by the jealousy and hatred of the Old, ought not 
to be the l a s t i n the race of commercial enterprise nor i n 
readiness to acknowledge the triumph of freedom."^ 
4. I b i d . 
5. I b i d . , p.282 
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Although commercial opinion was l a t e r to be voiced 
with greater vigour i n Parliament, Canning was Member of 
Parliament for Liverpool from 1812 to 1822 and was by no 
means bli n d to the commercial advantages which might accrue 
from close r e l a t i o n s h i p s with the South American nations. 
6 5 As was seen above, h i s decision i n 1823 to appoint commissionez 
for Colombia and Mexico and consuls for Buenos A i r e s , Monte-
video, C h i l e and Peru was i n part a ploy to a s c e r t a i n the 
trading p o s s i b i l i t i e s for the future. 
The business of sending out consuls and r e c e i v i n g reports 
from the other side of the world was time consuming and 
worrying for commercial i n t e r e s t s i n B r i t a i n , e s p e c i a l l y 
when the South American s t a t e s had been recognized by the Unitec 
States with the Monroe Doctrine of December, 1823, and that 
country was threatening to enlarge i t s mercantile i n t e r e s t s 
a t B r i t a i n ' s expense.. The year 1824 was then an anxious one 
for many i n B r i t a i n concerned with exporting goods or c a p i t a l 
to South America, and i t i s here t h a t attention i s now 
focused to enquire into the pressure groups that used P a r l i a -
ment to press f o r recognition and the arguments that they 
put forward, some of which have already been seen. 
The King's Speech on February 3rd, 1824,at the opening 
7 
of the new Parliamentary session,' while on the whole extremely 
£• See plC. 
7. Hansard, N.S. X, 1-5-
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o p t i m i s t i c i n view of the growing prosperity of the country, 
gave l i t t l e hope of ea r l y recognition of the South American 
s t a t e s . Consuls had been appointed,and, "As to any further . 
measures, h i s majesty has reserved to himself an unfettered 
d i s c r e t i o n , t o be exercised as the circumstances of those 
countries, and the i n t e r e s t s of h i s own people, may appear 
o 
to h i s majesty to require." I n f a c t , the King was fi r m l y 
against recognition as i t seemed to him to encourage revolution 
everywhere. The cabinet did not agree with him, with the 
exception of the Duke of Wellington. Parliament as a whole 
seems to have been w i l l i n g to accept that Canning was playing 
a waiting game u n t i l the r i g h t moment, p o l i t i c a l l y and economic-
a l l y , a r r i v e d . Canning was always w i l l i n g to speak at length 
on the problem of recognition but was c a r e f u l to point out 
that i t was not h i s intention to embarrass Spain i n her 
q 
e f f o r t s to recover her l o s t colonies. 
The Marquis of Lansdownewas quick to comment on the 
King's Speech mentioned above and from the sheer di l i g e n c e 
with which he pursued the cause i n the House of Lords, he 
appears to have been the leader there of the f a c t i o n 
advocating immediate recognition. He "observed with regret, 
that the a f f a i r s of South America, teeming as those a f f a i r s 
did with importance to the commercial i n t e r e s t ofihis country, 
8. Ibid.,3-
9. Hansard, N.S.X, 70-84. Address on the King's Speech. 
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were touched upon so very s l i g h t l y in. the Speech from the 
10 
throne." This great question was to be viewed "not merely 
with reference to i t s advantages to South America, but 
to the B r i t i s h empire; and p a r t i c u l a r l y as there might e x i s t 
a d i s p o s i t i o n to exclude, as much as p o s s i b l e , our 
manufactures from the European markets. Let t h e i r lordships 
look to what had happened i n the United S t a t e s . There a 
population of three m i l l i o n s had, i n the course of forty 
years, been increased to ten m i l l i o n s . I n the united provinces 
of Spanish America, there was at present a population of 
sixteen .millions, exclusive of about four m i l l i o n s i n the 
B r a z i l s ; and assuming the same r a t i o of improvement i n the course 
of fort y years to come, we might have an intercourse with a 
population of from f i f t y to s i x t y m i l l i o n s , and that too, 
a population of a consuming character; for from recent c a l c u -
l a t i o n s i t was estimated, that each person consumed to the 
11 
value of £2 10s of B r i t i s h manufactures annually." 
The leader of the group i n the House of Commons that 
was urging recognition at the e a r l i e s t opportunity was S i r 
James Mackintosh who presented two p e t i t i o n s - one from 
12 
the merchants of the c i t y of London and one from the 
merchants of Manchester 1^ - "praying that the House would 
10. I b i d . , 20. 
11. I b i d . , 20-21. 
12. Hansard, N.S. X I . 1344-1406. 
13. I b i d . , 1475. 
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t 
adopt such measures as t o them may seem meet, t o induce 
h i s majesty's government t o Recognize the Independence of 
the states of those countries who have i n f a c t established 
14 
independent governments." (A p e t i t i o n was also sent t o the 
1 5 
King from the merchants of L i v e r p o o l ) . ^ 
The Manchester merchants o f the e a r l i e r nineteenth 
century had paid great a t t e n t i o n t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
opening up new markets f o r cotton goods i n South and Central 
America; i n the records of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 
B r a z i l , Mexico, Colombia and Buenos Aires f i g u r e d much more 
largely than Canada, the West Indies, or even the United States. 
The p e t i t i o n drawn up by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
pointed out the "varied nature, steady growth, great extent 
17 
and expanding prospects of the South American trade " V 
Concern was thus nationwide and n a t u r a l l y concentrated 
wherever the mercantile classes were d i r e c t l y concerned 
with South American trade and finance. Mackintosh, i n 
presenting the London pet i t i o n ^ t h o u g h t i t r i g h t t o give the 
House such information as he possessed " r e l a t i n g t o the number 
and character of the p e t i t i o n e r s , t h a t i t may be seen how 
f a r they are what they profess t o be; what are t h e i r means of 
14. I b i d . , 1344. 
15. I b i d . , 1381. 
16. Arthur Redford, Manchester Merchants And Foreign Trade, 
1794-1858 (Manchester, 1934; p. 97. 
17• Proceedings of The Manchester Chamber of Commerce, 17th 
June, 1824. Quoted i b i d . , p.100. 
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knowledge; what are l i k e l y t o be the motives of t h e i r 
a p p l i c a t i o n ; what f a i t h i s due to t h e i r testimony; and what 
weight ought t o be allowed t o t h e i r judgement. Their number 
i s one hundred and seventeen. Each of them i s a. member of a 
considerable commercial house i n t e r e s t e d i n the trade t o 
America. The p e t i t i o n therefore conveys the sentiments of 
three or four hundred merchants. The signatures were 
co l l e c t e d i n two days without a public meeting or even an 
advertisement; i t was confined t o the American merchants, 
but the p e t i t i o n e r s have no reason t o believe t h a t any 
merchant i n London would have declined t o put h i s name t o i t . 
I am but imperfectly q u a l i f i e d t o estimate the importance 
and s t a t i o n of the p e t i t i o n e r s . Judging from common inform-
a t i o n , I should consider many of them as i n the f i r s t rank 
of the mercantile community. I see among them the f i r m of 
Baring and company, which, without disparagement t o any 
others, may be placed at the head of the commercial estab-
lishments of the world. I see also the firms of Herring, 
Powles and company; of Richardson and company; Goldsmith and 
company; M o n t e f i o r i and company; of Mr. Benjamin Shaw, who 
as chairman of Lloyd's coffee house represents the most 
numerous and d i v e r s i f i e d i n t e r e s t s of t r a f f i c ; together 
w i t h many others not equally known t o me, but whom, i f I 
d i d know, I have no doubt t h a t I might w i t h t r u t h describe 
as persons of the highest mercantile r e s p e c t a b i l i t y . I -
perceive among them the name of Ricardo, which I s h a l l ever 
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honour, and cannot now pronounce without emotion.. I n a word, 
the p e t i t i o n e r s are the c i t y of London. They contain i n d i v i d u a l s 
of a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ; they are deeply i n t e r e s t e d i n the 
subject, p e r f e c t l y conversant w i t h a l l i t s comnercial 
bearings; and they could not f i l l the high place where they 
stand, i f they were not as much distinguished by i n t e l l i g e n c e 
and p r o b i t y , as by those i n f e r i o r advantages of wealth, which 
w i t h them are not fortunate accidents, but proofs of personal 
worth and professional merit." 
There was l i t t l e doubt i n the Marquis of Lansdownds 
mind t h a t the new states were p o l i t i c a l l y and economically 
stable, Colombia being the perfect model, i n t h a t i t was 
not dangered by "democracy". He was pleased t o note t h a t 
20 
only one el e c t o r was allowed f o r every 4,000 in h a b i t a n t s . 
I f the governments of South America were unstable, why 
should i t be t h a t t h e i r stock i n London was s e l l i n g at a 
higher p r i c e than Spanish stock?" I f i n d on looking at the 
value of the stock, or debts, of the .various governments I 
have alluded t o i n South America, tha t they f l u c t u a t e bet-
ween the prices of 67 and 82; and upon my looking a l i t t l e f u r t h e r 
f o r the value of the stock of the ancient government of Spain 
18. Hauard, M.S., X I , 1344-^555 
19. Hansard, N.S.,X, 974-981. 
20. Ibid.., 979. 
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from t l i e s o l i d i t y of which the South American governments 
have been detached, and have by t h a t detachment sunk, i t i s 
said, i n t o a state which presents neit h e r confidence nor 
s t a b i l i t y - I f i n d the stock of the ancient government was, 
on Saturday l a s t , at 18 and 20. 
22 
As has been indicated previously, trade w i t h South 
America had been on the increase during the early 1820*s 
as was pointed out i n Parliament on a number of occasions.^ 
I f every opportunity were taken t o promote our i n t e r e s t s 
i n South America, there was no reason, i t was argued, why 
they should not carry on developing at a continuous r a t e . 
To show the value of free intercourse with South America, 
S i r James Mackintosh r e l a t e d a story of Captain B a s i l Hall's 
from h i s t r a v e l s i n South America. Apparently, t h i s gentle-
man had encountered a c e r t a i n semi-barbarous native and began 
a discussion of p o l i t i c a l and economic problems. On being 
asked h i s opinion of free trade - "My opinion", said he, 
(the native) " i s t h i s - formerly I paid nine d o l l a r s f o r the 
piece of c l o t h of which t h i s s h i r t i s made, I now pay two -
Oh. 
t h a t i s my opinion of the fr e e trade." South American 
i n t e r e s t s could be at one w i t h B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , and the 
miner i n Chile s e l l i n g h is copper and the peasant i n Mexico 
21. Ibid.., 980-981. 
22. pp. 11-25. 
23. Hansard, M.S., X, 986-988, X, 1381-1383. 
24. Hansard, N.S., X I , 1384-1385. 
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bujiing h i s s h i r t could both r e l y on B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y . ^ 
Lord Ellenborough was almost moved t o poetry by the 
prospects i n the new states. To him, South America's "mountains 
and her p l a i n s , her noble r i v e r s and her f e r t i l e v a l l e y s , 
excited the strongest emotions of admiration f o r the b e a u t i f u l 
works of nature, and the unbounded beneficence of the Creator.. 
Even the power of mtmmm seems t o be discovered at the 
most favourable moment f o r g i v i n g f a c i l i t i e s t o the nav-
i g a t i o n of t h e i r r i v e r s , and the working of t h e i r precious mines. 
South America seemed destined, by a chain of circumstances 
concerning w i t h her almost boundless resources, t o carry 
t o the greatest possible extent the c i v i l i z a t i o n and happiness 
26 27 of mankind." Therefore, p e t t y advantages of trade" ' 
should be f o r g o t t e n since what h i s Lordship desired was 
the hearts of people, and r e c o g n i t i o n of independence should 
be conferred "not w i t h the cold, c a l c u l a t i n g f e e l i n g of 
m i n i s t e r s , but w i t h the warm-hearted and sympathetic f e e l i n g s 
which became the l e g i s l a t u r e of a great and generous nation." 
However^others were more concerned w i t h the p r a c t i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g from t r a d i n g w i t h nations t h a t were not 
o f f i c i a l l y recognized. The powers of the consuls and comm-
issioners t h a t had been sent out were confined t o commercial 
25. I b i d . , 1385-1386. 
26. Hansard, N.S.X, 1006. 
27. I b i d . 
28. I b i d . 
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a f f a i r s , and not a l l the mishaps t h a t confronted a merchant 
were w i t h i n the province of these men. The English t r a d e r 
pq ' at Buenos Aires, i t was argued, J ought not to f e e l less 
secure than American merchants. "The American trader i s 
not l e f t t o gather information, so es s e n t i a l t o h i s comfort, 
from conjecture or reasoning;: he d a i l y sees and f e e l s i t : 
he i s assured of i t by the view of those badges of n a t i o n a l 
p r o t e c t i o n which mankind have i n a l l ages regarded w i t h 
veneration.."^ 0 Mackintosh states t h a t the i n f e r i o r i t y of the 
English trader was considerably aggravated by the knowledge 
t h a t B r i t i s h p o l i c y could not be looked upon i n a f r i e n d l y 
l i g h t i n the state t h a t he was f o r a time subject, but t h i s 
i s almost c e r t a i n l y overstating h i s case since many of the 
states were already r e c e i v i n g c a p i t a l from the London money 
market. I n f a c t , there i s no evidence t h a t B r i t i s h traders 
were i n d i f f i c u l t i e s because of the government's cautious 
p o l i c y . Evenjso, Mackintosh considered t h i s t o be an important 
point.. "You(the government) have no r i g h t t o deprive B r i t i s h 
subjects of such important advantages, and t o expose them 
at l e a s t t o disfavour i n the country where they trade, or t r a v e l 
or reside. You ought not without the weightiest reasons t o 
continue a p o l i c y , sure, even i n the f i r s t instance, t o excite 
29- Hansard, N.S., X I , 1368-1369. 
30. I b i d . , 1368. 
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some suspicion and a l i e n a t i o n , which i n time may grow i n t o 
d i s t r u s t and displeasure, and at length rankle i n t o anger and 
h o s t i l i t y . " 5 1 
S i m i l a r l y , the loans to the South American states 
would be more secure i f t h i s country had o f f i c i a l s who 
could make d i r e c t representations t o the r e c i p i e n t ; governments. 
Thus, the p r o t e c t i o n of such dealings was a p e r f e c t l y good 
a d d i t i o n a l reason f o r hastening to do t h a t which was pre-
v i o u s l y determined t o be " p o l i t i c and j u s t - " 5 ^ 
The campaign f o r recognition was s h o r t - l i v e d since i t s 
object was achieved i n 1825» and i t s influence on the govern-
ment should not be over-stressed. Nevertheless, i t was 
pursued r e l e n t l e s s l y as any reader of Hansard f o r the year 
1824 can t e s t i f y , and appears t o have been quite w e l l co-
ordinated between the Upper and Lower Houses. The London 
p e t i t i o n contains some strange bedfellows - f o r example, 
Thomas Baring was strongly opposed t o some of h i s f e l l o w 
p e t i t i o n e r s who were r a i s i n g money f u r i o u s l y for any South 
American nation and forming dubious companies f o r e x p l o i t i n g 
the South American mines. The f a c t was t h a t men of commerce 
and finance could see diverse ways of f u r t h e r i n g t h e i r i n t e r e s t ! 
i n South America and were temporarily w i l l i n g t o act together 
t o press f o r the recognition of the new states which they saw 
as the f i n a l s e curity f o r a prosperous f u t u r e . Their hopes, 
31. Ib£d., 1^69. 
32. I b i d , 1383. 
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o£ course, were soon t o be dashed. 
The Pressure To Repeal The Bubble Act. 
I n the f i r s t quarter of the nineteenth century the 
law r e l a t i n g t o j o i n t - s t o c k companies was i l l - d e f i n e d and 
contradictory. The speculation of 1824 and 1&25 brought out 
c l e a r l y the i n a b i l i t y of e x i s t i n g laws t o deal w i t h contemp-
orary problems and forced the executive t o formulate more 
reasonable l e g i s l a t i o n . 
The Bubble Act of 1720 s t i l l had a r e s t r a i n i n g e f f e c t on 
company promotion one hundred years a f t e r i t s rush through 
parliament onto the statute book. I n 1720 at the height 
of the p r e v a i l i n g orgy of company promotion and specultion, 
"a panic s t r i c k e n Parliament" as Maitland has put i t , "issued 
a law which even when we now read i t , seems t o scream at us 
from the Statute book."^ A century l a t e r i t was p e r t i n e n t l y 
said of t h i s s t a t u t e t h a t l i k e a l l laws passed upon the exigency 
of an occasion i t had more of temporary malice and revenge than 
of permanent wisdom and p o l i c y . ^ The Bubble Act had been 
aimed at persons "who contrived dangerous and mischievous 
undertakings or projects under f a l s e pretense of the p u b l i c 
good;11 who had "presumed t o open books f o r p u b l i c subscriptions 
33. F.W. Maitland, Trust And Corporation I I I Papers(Cambridge,19ll' P-390. 34. The Morning Chronicle, February 9th, 1825* 
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and draw i n unwary'persons to subscribe" and "to act as i f 
they were corporate bodies;" who had pretended t o make t h e i r 
shares t r a n s f e r a b l e , " w i t h out l e g a l a u t h o r i t y ; who had 
"acted or pretended to act under some charter formerly granted 
by the Crown" for o t h e r purposes, and had "acted under 
obsolete Charters" A l l such "undertakings and attempts" were 
t o be " e f f e c t u a l l y suppressed and r e s t r a i n e d " as tending t o 
"the common grievance, prejudice and inconvenience" and t o 
be punishable as public nuisances. Futhermore,the g u i l t y 
were to sustain the ancient penalties of a "praemunire;" 
i n j u r e d p a r t i e s were to be e n t i t l e d t o sue f o r . t r e b l e damages; 
and brokers dealing i n the shares of such "companies" became 
l i a b l e t o a f i n e of £ 5 0 0 . 5 5 
The Act of 1720 and the ensuing collapse of the great 
speculation arrested the development of j o i n t - s t o c k enterprise 
f o r many decades. I n consequence, incorporation remained 
p a r t i c u l a r , not general, and indeed, the l e g i s l a t i o n of 1720 
was t o exercise a deterrent psychological e f f e c t upon the 
pressures of the 1820's. On occasions, Parliament would 
consent t o grant charters, however, and the English canal. 
•zf. 
system was b u i l t up l a r g e l y by incorporated companies. 
On the other hand, without b e n e f i t of Parliament 
or Crown and i n the face of denial of i n c o r p o r a t i o n , company 
35. B.C. Hunt, The Development Of The Business Corporation I n 
England 1800-1867 (Cambridge, Mass., 1936) p.7. 
36. I b i d . p.10 * r 
-131-
organization i n the form of numerous partnerships grew, 
especially i n insurance, as w e l l as here and there i n 
manufacturing. Many societies whose applications f o r i n -
corporation were refused by Parliament c a r r i e d on regardless, 
w i t h t r a n s f e r a b l e stock, but without any i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t i n 
any associate to bind the other associates', or to deal w i t h 
the assets of the association. 
During the early nineteenth century, there were 
vigorous e f f o r t s t o widen the sphere of j o i n t - s t o c k organization, 
37 
The success of corporate enterprise i n banking,-" i n insurance, 
and especially i n the development of canals, had i n s p i r e d the 
opinion t h a t "companies might be extended t o every branch of 
trade and manufacture. M > Evidence of a contemporarily 
expanding s e c u r i t i e s market i s found i n the f a c t t h a t bet-
ween 1803, when the o f f i c i a l p r i c e l i s t , "Course of Exchange" 
was f i r s t published under the a u t h o r i t y of the Stock Exchange, 
zq 
and 1811 the number of s e c u r i t i e s quoted more than doubled./-' 
The years 1807 and 1808, i n Tooke's words "a period of almost 
40 
universal excitement, leading as usual t o hazardous adventure' 1 
witnessed an outburst of promotions, "some w i t h exclusive 
41 
p r i v i l e g e s , but i n general without any such advantage.." 
37. Especially the Bank of England. Other j o i n t - s t o c k banks i n 
England were i l l e g a l , but i n Scotland j o i n t - s t o c k banking 
companies w i t h many hundred partners were f l o u r i s h i n g by 
t h i s time. 
38. The Tradesman, 1(1808), p.24f. 
39. Duguid, of. c i t . , p.96. 
40. T. Tooke, op. c i t . , Vol.1, p.277-
41. I n other words, without incorporation. The Tradesman, I 
(1808), p.24. 
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Aroused by the proportions of the new movement and the 
character of some of the companies, the Attorney General s t a r t e d 
proceedings against two of those r e c e n t l y formed as schemes 
which v i o l a t e d "the express provisions and p l a i n p o l i c y " of 
the Act of. 1720. Alarm spread among investors and company 
Promoters. New ventures folded-up. Pamphleteers examined 
the question of l e g a l i t y and sought t o combat the attempts t o 
disparage j o i n t - s t o c k companies.^ However, i n the Court of 
t 44 
King s Bench, the main question as t o whether the r a i s i n g 
of large sums of money and the creation of transferable 
shares i n the j o i n t stock were i n themselves unlawful and 
p r o h i b i t e d was not decided. Further l i t i g a t i o n , although c l e a r l y 
i n d i c a t i v e of the h o s t i l i t y and suspicion of the Courts towards 
the new species of organization, l e f t i n doubt what exactly 
was l e g a l and what was not. 
The i n t r o d u c t i o n of l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y was severely 
opposed i n and out of Parliament and t h i s was probably the one 
f a c t o r t h a t held back company promotion more than any other. 
Indeed, as John Austin wrote i n 1825» "compared with t h i s 
r u l e of the e x i s t i n g law, the mysterious t e r r o r s of the 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e Bubble Act were a feeble obstacle t o the 
45 
establishment of j o i n t - s t o c k companies." ' 
42. November, 1807-
43. See, Henry Day, op. c i t . 
44. Rex. V. Dodd (1808), 9 East 516. 
45. John Austin, J o i n t Stock Companies, Parliamentary History 
And Review (1825) p. 711• 
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Even some who advocated t h a t a l l j o i n t ^ s t o c k companies 
should be put on a secure l e g a l f o o t i n g were s t i l l against the 
46 
wholesale granting of l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y . 
The quasi-corporate company of the early 1820's was, 
then, something of an unknown quanti t y . I t was almost 
impossible f o r i t t o evade being sued i t s e l f , as each 
i n d i v i d u a l would have t o be sued and the composition might 
w e l l be changing a l l the time.. The dangers t o shareholders 
of u n l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y are obvious, since a man could be 
stripp e d of everything he possessed t o pay o f f the debts of 
the company. I f some shareholders preferred a s p e l l i n p r i s o n , 
the debts were l e f t to be paid o f f by others. 
When the speculation mania of the 1820's got under way, 
Parliament was not by any means b l i n d t o current develop-
ments. Company enterprise and speculation encountered sharp 
challenge and stern resistance. Early i n May, 1824, Huskisson 
voiced strong objection t o l e g i s l a t i v e incorporation unless 
charters were f i r s t r e g u l a r l y obtained from the Crown, f o r 
only then was revocation of p r i v i l e g e s possible i n event of 
abuse. He was especially opposed at t h i s time t o the 
l i m i t a t i o n of l i a b i l i t y , "to t a k i n g every w i l d and i d l e 
speculation out of the general operation of the laws of the 
c o u n t r y - " ^ Angry i n q u i r y as to how f a r shareholders were t o 
46. See, An Old Merchant, op. c i t . , p.92. 
47. Hansard, N.S. X I , 608. 
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be l i a b l e , he quieted w i t h a promise t h a t f u t u r e b i l l s extend-
i n g p r i v i l e g e s , at least t o any insurance company, must 
contain s p e c i f i c clauses s e t t i n g f o r t h i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
There was no objection t o granting power t o sue and be sued 
c o l l e c t i v e l y , however. Coincident w i t h the appeal of i n d i v i d -
u a l pawnbrokers against the projected Equitable Loan Company, 
Hobhouse declared t h a t i f i t s b i l l were c a r r i e d , "there 
was no reason why j o i n t - s t o c k companies of butchers and 
49 
bakers should not be established! 1 ' Deeper fears a g i t a t e d 
others - Lords Redesdale and Westmoreland were apprehensive 
l e s t the creation of so many companies prove dangerous t o 
the C o n s t i t u t i o n I ^ 
Parliament was beseiged w i t h applications which sought 
51 
f o r j o i n t - s t o c k enterprises. I n March^ there were t h i r t y , 
by A p r i l ^ two hundred and f i f t y of such p r i v a t e b i l l s before 
the House of Commons. 
The Lord Chancellor (Eldon) spoke against those who 
"speculated on obtaining a charter" and to become "an 
i n t o l e r a b l e nuisance and a source of systematic fraud"P 5 
He proposed t o bri n g i n a b i l l t o require the names of 
partners t o be enrolled i n the courts; t o give power t o sue 
any two of them and t o take execution, and fco make members 
48. I b i d . , 842. " 
49. I b i d . , p.1339-
50. I b i d . , p.79*1, re the b i l l of the General Gas Company 
51. Annual Register, 1824, p.2. 
52. Gentleman's Magazine, Vol. 94, pp. 364f 
53. Hansard, X I , p.1456. 
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l i a b l e u n t i l notice of t h e i r withdrawal from a company-
were f i l e d . . ^ Lauderdale, i n an e f f o r t t o provide against 
"the mischief now going on," t o take care th a t companies 
should not be incorporated without f i r s t g i v i n g assurance 
of having adequate c a p i t a l , secured additions t o the standing 
orders of the House of Lords which required t h a t , except 
i n the case of turnpi k e , canal and l i k e companies, no b i l l 
should go t o a second reading u n t i l three quarters of the 
c a p i t a l of the proposed enterprise had been deposited w i t h a 
public t r u s t e e d 
Despite these p r o t e s t s , the manufacture of promotions 
went on g i d d i l y without b e n e f i t of Parliament. However, as 
has been seen,^ members of Parliament were not slow i n a v a i l -
in g themselves of the advantages of d i r e c t o r s h i p s . Perhaps 
the f i r s t " d i r e c t o r y of d i r e c t o r s " ever published was t h a t which 
appeared i n The Times of February 7th, 1825- There were one 
hundred and twenty-nine names, each of which had been advert-
57 
ised as d i r e c t o r of more than three companies.. The l i s t > f 
included twenty-eight members of Parliament. 
The King's Speech at the opening of Parliament i n 
February, 1825» was charged w i t h optimism: "There never was 
a period i n the h i s t o r y of t h i s country when a l l the great 
54. I b i d . pp. 856,1076,1100 
55. i b i d . . , p. 1339. 
56. S»d pp.86-87-
57. Hansard, N.S. ,XII,1065 
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i n t e r e s t s of the nation were at the•same time i n so t h r i v i n g 
a c o n d i t i o n . " ^ 8 Nevertheless, some weeks l a t e r , the Prime Mi n i s t e i 
f e l t c a l l e d upon t o issue a warning. A " f u r y f o r companies" 
had taken possession of the people. Those who were i n -
volved could not look t o the Government f o r any b i l l of r e l i e f 
i n event of d i s t r e s s consequent upon the speculation spread 
over the country.^ Lamterdale, as w e l l , urged h i s colleagues 
t o take steps t o "stem the t o r r e n t " . Indeed, f o r s-everal 
months Hansard i s . f u l l w i t h debate on joint-^stock e nterprise. 
One member c a u s t i c a l l y advised "gentlemen t o keep t h e i r money 
against a r a i n y day rather than invest i n companies t o bri n g 
60 
s a l t water from Bognor, a i r from Heaven, and blasts from H e l l . " 
Objection was. even made t o the grant of the r i g h t t o sue c o l l e c t -
i v e l y , f o r promoters might then hold out t o the public 
61 
something l i k e Parliamentary sanction. Huskisson r e i t e r a t e d 
h i s p o s i t i o n of the preceding session. Apart from w i t h -
olding l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y , the l e g i s l a t u r e could not i n t e r f e r e . 
The House could not undertake t o d i s t i n g u i s h good from bubble 
p r o j e c t s ; the public must decide. As f o r the law, one 
62 
existed which bound companies f o r any v i o l a t i o n . 58. I b i d . , p.1. 
59. I b i d . , p.1194. 
60. I b i d . , p.612. 
61. I b i d . , p.718. 
62. I b i d . , p.1075. 
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The Act of 1720 was s t i l l to be reckoned w i t h . Decisions 
and d i c t a from the bench as wel l as the declarations of 
the Lord Chancellor from h i s seat i n the Legislature now 
placed a damper on speculative enthusiasm and created decided 
uneasiness among promoters and investors. Parliament had no 
more than opened when the Equitable Loan Bank was declared ill- . 
egal as a company without a u t h o r i t y . ^ Shares had been issued 
i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of obtaining an act of Parliament f o r the 
Government of the Society. A l l contracts f o r the sale of shares 
under such circumstances were declared v o i d . Another 
circumstance attending the issue of the shares (on which only 
one pound had been paid) was t h e i r sale at a premium o f 
over f i v e pounds. This widely prevalent p r a c t i c e c a l l e d f o r t h 
severe condemnation from the Chief Ju s t i c e : i t s "necessary 
e f f e c t was to introduce gaming and rash speculation t o a ruinous 
extent." 
The Lord Chancellor had also repeatedly denounced 
such p r a c t i c e . Now, "tasking h i s ingenuity and l e g a l sublety 
t o frame a panacea f o r the grand disease of England," he 
r e i t e r a t e d h i s i n t e n t i o n of introducing a b i l l t o prevent the 
sale or t r a n s f e r of the shares of any j o i ^ - s t o c k company 
u n t i l i t had received the sanction of a charter or an act 
of Parliament.-^ Furthermore, from the bench he intimated 
63. Josephs V. Pebrer (1825) 3B & C. 639. 
64. "An obstinate i n c l i n a t i o n on the par t of the people t o be 
cajoled out of t h e i r money" Morning Chronicle, Feb. 9th,1825 65- Hansard, X I I , 31; 127-
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that companies of a l l descriptions were i l l e g a l unless 
so sanctioned. I n consequence, dealers panicked and 
66 
quotations melted. 
I n f a c t , the threatened b i l l did not appear, for the 
Chancellor was c a l l e d upon to s i t i n h i s j u d i c i a l capacity and 
therefore r e f r a i n e d from declaring, i n h i s l e g i s l a t i v e 
capacity, what the law ought to be. I n Parliament, he f i n a l l y 
concluded that "parties had enough to f e a r from the law as 
i t stood." 
I n the Real del Monte case,^? which appears to have served 
as a t e s t case for the South American mining companies, the 
Lord Chancellor threw out the suggestion that assuming to 
act as a corporation, even i f not within the Bubble Act, 
was i l l e g a l at common law. D i s r a e l i was pleased to quote 
from t h i s case i n "Lawyers and L e g i s l a t o r s " , "the cases 
which were c i t e d to prove the r e s t r i c t e d power of t r a n s f e r 
contained i n the deed of the Real del Monte Company, exempted 
68 
i t from the p e n a l t i e s of the Bubble Act . . . . . . . . l e t us 
congratulate the Lord Chancellor and the country that the 
l e g a l i t y of the deed of the Real del Monte Company was l e f t 
untouched" 7 Hoivever, His ijordship was not e n t i r e l y s a t i s -
f i e d . Stock jobbing was an i n d i c t a b l e offence. Persons 
56. The Times, February, 18"23 
67. Kind V. Taylor (1825) 3L.J. Ch. 68. Quoted i n B. C. Hunt, 
op. c i t . t p. 39 • 68. p.11. 
69. p.14. 
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who sold shares might be ordered to refund the money. Indeed, 
were not companies taking away from i n d i v i d u a l s "the power 
of e x e r c i s i n g themselves i n trade?" Was the time not approach-
ing when people "would neither be allowed to eat, t o drink, 
or wear clean l i n e n , " except upon terms which companies imposed? 
How could the power of d i r e c t o r s to c a l l f o r " m i l l i o n s and 
m i l l i o n s of money" be "consistent with the public c r e d i t ? " 
I n the eyes of the editors of the Chronicle Lord 
Eldon's d i c t a did not j u s t i f y r e v i s i o n of t h e i r view that 
the Chancellor's opinion's "as a P o l i t i c i a n , were seldom 
worth much." For obviously, ihe^0 were superior to i n d i v i d u a l 
e n t e r p r i s e . P r o f i t a b i l i t y , i t was argued, would determine 
t h e i r proper l i m i t . Had the Chancellor himself not i n d i c a t e d 
the c o r r e c t i v e of a l l unprofitable speculation - the l i a b i l i t y 
of d i r e c t o r s and shareholders to t h e i r l a s t s h i l l i n g and 
acre, knowledge of which would deter a l l r a t i o n a l men from 
speculation? I t was, further, -. an abuse of terras to apply 
"monoply" to a company of a hundred men i n v e s t i n g t h e i r 
70 
thousand pounds apiece./ 
The alleged r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by the Bubble Act 
brought f o r t h the f^-rth 'from one Leguleitfs: 
"Let i t not be imagined that speculation would be 
checked or fraud prevented by the t o t a l i n t e r d i c t i o n of a l l 
companies not established by charter or Act of Parliament. 
follow.™? 
I v l O i l 
70. Morning Chronicle, Match 30th, 1825-
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the speculations have been as large, and the frauds as numerous 
i n the incorporated as well as the unincorporated a s s o c i a t i o n s . 
I know incorporated companies which have needlessly r a i s e d 
c a p i t a l and created shares, for the mere purpose of s e l l i n g 
the l a t t e r at a premium. I know d i r e c t o r s of them who have 
jobbed t i l l t h e i r names savour i n the market l i k e a t h i r d 
day's f i s h at B i l l i n g s g a t e . 
I would conjure the L e g i s l a t u r e not to trench upon that 
sacred and golden p r i n c i p l e of p o l i t i c a l economy - not to 
i n t e r f e r e with the mode i n which i n d i v i d u a l s employ, or 
even squander t h e i r money, not to l a y r e s t r i c t i o n s upon 
that freedom for the p a l t r y object of protecting those 
who w i l l not use t h e i r energies or their sense to protect them-
se l v e s . We are happily now beginning to shake off those 
well meant r e s t r a i n t s which the wisdom of our ancestors 
thought b e n e f i c i a l to encumber us. We have ceased to f e t t e r 
the public press We have ceased attempting to keep 
the country r i c h by preventing i t from sending i t s spare 
coin abroad to buy u s e f u l commodities we have given over 
expecting to grow r i c h by foreign commerce, while we refuse 
to take the only return a country can give f o r the a r t i c l e 
we s e l l , - we are gradually destroying chastered companies 
and monopolies and throwing open every possible channel to the 
energies and enterprise of our countrymen Do not l e t 
us act upon contrary p r i n c i p l e s i n the case of domestic J o i n t 
Stock Companies! 
71. Morning Chronicle, April 1 s t , "1825 ' 
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F i n a l l y the government took action. I n March, 1825 
a leading company promoter, Peter Moore, had moved for the 
7 ? 
repeal of the Bubble A c t / as "the law i n respect to these 
73 
companies was very obscure and ill-understood," ' but he 
had withdrawn h i s motion a f t e r one of the most useful debates 
on the whole Speculation mania.. I n June, on the motion of the 
74 
Attorney General that " s t r i n g of non-sequiturs"' the Bubble 
Act was f l a t l y repealed,*^ as u n i n t e l l i g i b l e and impossibly 
76 
severe, and, furthermore, as having r e s t r a i n e d the form-
ation of companies "established on j u s t and equitable p r i n c i p l e s 
1/77 
and f o r landable objects. f Doubt- as to the immediate 
relevance of thejeighteenth-century l e g i s l a t i o n was swept 
away. The Attorney General considered the common law 
s u f f i c i e n t to deal with fraudulent promotions, that addit-
i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n on t h i s matter was unnecessary - "at once 
d i f f i c u l t , unwise and impo l i t i c ' / ^ 8 
Two other provisions of t h i s statute of repeal are 
worth b r i e f consideration. Under common law, l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y 
« 
was an tnseperable incident of incorporation. Henceforth the 
Crown was empowered to prescribe to any extent the degree of .72. Hansard,NJ3. X I I , 1279-
73* Ibid.See alsro, Copy of the Bubble Act Draft B i l l . . . 
by Peter Moore for the amendment:;, and f o r the prevention of 
•auds i n Joint Stock Companies (1825) 
7^. John George, op. c i t . , p.53. 
75. 6. Geo.IV, c.91. 
76. For the Attorney General's argument see Hansard M.S.XIII, 1019 
77. See the r e c i t a l of the b i l l -fro r e peal, P.P.I(1825) No. 149. 
78. Hansard, N.S. XIV,416 
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shareholders 1 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Even so, the^rant of charters 
continued to be very j e a l o u s l y guarded. F or another provision f 
to the e f f e c t that notwithstanding the repeal of the Act of 
1720 "the sever a l undertakings should be adjudged andi dealt 
with according to common law," Eldon was responsible. 
As has been seen, he had expressed h i s confident b e l i e f that 
to act as a corporation, not being a corporation, was an 
offence at common law. Much l i t i g a t i o n had to ensue before 
t h i s dictum, reinforced by the Chancellor's great authority^ 
l o s t i t s influence and became dead d o c t r i n e . ^ 
I n f a c t , the pressure of economic development apart, 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how Parliament could have done other-, 
wise than repeal the Act of 1720, or, on the other hand, £0 
understand how the lawyers could l o g i c a l l y maintain that 
the unincorporated a s s o c i a t i o n was i l l e g a l at common law. 
Actually, quasi-corporations had been recognized i n adjudged 
cases; de facto j o i n t - s t o c k banking companies continued 
to f l o u r i s h i n Scotland. I n no case was i t ever a c t u a l l y 
decided that an unincorporated j o i n t - s t o c k company was 
i l l f i g a l at common law. 
As has been indicated, during the boom, company promoters 
had stormed Parliament with applications for corporate 
p r i v i l e g e s , i n some instances f o r f u l l incorporation, i n 
79^ B.C. Hunt, op. c i t . , pp.4-1-4-2. 
80. #.B. Lindley, A T r e a t i s e On The Law Of Companies 6th ed. (1902) 
-143-
others for mere power of s u i t i n the name of an o f f i c e r . 
I t i s apparent that what we should now term "public u t i l i t i e s " 
were much more succes s f u l i n t h e i r pursuit of p r i v i l e g e s 
than companies for a l l other purposes. Indeed, Austin 
declared that those who had the determining voice i n t h i s 
"occasional interference of the l e g i s l a t u r e " were "ignorant, 
i n d i f f e r e n t or i m p a r t i a l . " 
The Morning Chronicle had argued that the L e g i s l a t u r e 
ought to pass, not a separate law f o r t h i s or that company, 
but a general law securing a s s o c i a t i o n s against inconvenience 
and securing the public against fraudulent attempts to escape 
go 
from l i a b i l i t y . I n l i k e vein, various members, including 
Baring, Gurney, and G r e n f e l l , had repeatedly urged the n e c e s s i t y 
of some general measure of control to take the place of 
innumerable b i l l s of exception to the law of the land, to 
provide a system of r e g i s t r a t i o n , o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y , even to 
l e g a l i z e the continental"societe' anonyme." 
As was i n e v i t a b l e , a f t e r the crash a motion was brought 
before the House of Commons to order a general inquiry into 
the companies formed during the mania. Shattered expectations, 
^Tumours of dubious methods used to obtain p r i v a t e a c t s , and 
suspicion of various kinds of f i n a n c i a l slight-of-hand and 
81. 3fohn Austin, op.cit., p.720. 
82. March ,fOth, 1825-
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and Speculation i n the a c t i v i t i e s of promoters and d i r e c t o r s 
demanded s a t i s f a c t i o n . 8 ^ Canning and Huskisson took 
the proposal as a sweeping censure on a l l j o i n t - s t o c k companies. 
The l a t t e r rose to the defence: " I f there was any one c i r -
cumstance, to which more than any other, t h i s country owed i t s 
wealth and commercial advantages, i t was the existence 
of j o i n t - s t o c k companies." "There was not greater error 
than to cry down companies as public e v i l s . 1 1 Attwood declared 
that there was "no more harm i n buying and s e l l i n g a share, 
than i n purchasing or s e l l i n g a shawl; "the f a i l u r e i n 
mining p a r t i c u l a r l y proved nothing; j o i n t - s t o c k enterprise 
if 
contained great p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n many d i r e c t i o n s . The motion:. 
was amended so as to set on foot an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the 
A f f a i r s of only one company, the Arigna Iron and Coal Mining 
84 
Company. 
In f a c t , Huskisson went beyond mere parliamentary defence 
of the j o i n t - s t o c k compony. Guided i n part by s u c c e s s f u l 
S c o t t i s h experience, he affirmed h i s f a i t h i n corporate 
enterprise i n h i s measure for the organization of E n g l i s h 
banking. 8-* By the Act of 1826 the establishment of j o i n t -
83. Hume had attempted early i n the boom, but without success, 
to secure a standing order to exclude a l l Members who had 
an i n t e r e s t i n p rivate b i l l s from s i t t i n g on such 
committees (Morning Chronicle, May, 27th, 1824) gee, 
a l e t t e r to the Times, December, 14th 1825: "Members who 
compose Private Committees are too often i n t e r e s t e d 
s&ares are set aside for Parliamentary f r i e n d s whose vote 
and influence nromise success." 
84. P.P. I I I ( f l 8 2 6 - 2 7 ) , 37-
85. 7 Geo. IV, c. 46. 
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stock banks without l i m i t a t i o n on the number of partners was 
henceforth authorized beyond a s i x t y - f i v e mile radius of Lon-
don. They were empowered to sue and be sued i n the name of 
a p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e r . Limited l i a b i l i t y , however, was 
withheld. Huskisson, s u r p r i s i n g l y , would have consented to the 
grant of t h i s p r i v i l e g e but for the pronounced objection of 
the Bank of England. 8 6 
I n sum, the j o i n t - s t o c k company had come by 1826 to 
play an important part i n the organization of England's 
economic l i f e . Alongside the incorporated companies, a 
large number of quasi-corporations 8^ had forged something 
l i k e l e g a l status and had achieved f i n a n c i a l success injbhe 
face of determined l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l opposition. 
Although nearly a l l of the South American mining companies 
were t o t a l f i n a n c i a l f a i l u r e s , they played a leading part i n 
bringing to the notice of the nation the inadequacies that 
had existed with regard to company l e g i s l a t i o n . 
86. Hansard, N.S.XIV, 143. Also Barinp;, i b i d . , p.209. 
87. Lord Eldonused the term inDavis V. F i s k (1823) to 
d i s t i n g u i s h companies which had obtained powers of s u i t , 
e t c . from Parliament. Quoted by B.C. Hunt, op. c i t . , p.54- n 
Such associations had "the power, emblems, and to a given 
extent the p r i v i l e g e s of a body without having been in c o r -
porated." Quoted i n a l e t t e r from George Parren to The 
Times, October 11th, 1838. 
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The Reform Of The Navigation Acts. 
To meet the ecomomic s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g a f t e r 1815» 
B r i t a i n , whose i n t e r e s t was predominantly commercial and who 
consequently had to pgy p a r t i c u l a r regard to the needs of the 
merchant c l a s s e s , was compelled to overhaul the en t i r e 
f a b r i c of the Commercial Code upon which she had r e l i e d since 
the time of C h a r l e s I I as an instrument f o r building up her 
power and prosperity. I n r e l a t i o n to these changes, the L a t i n 
American trade played no small part, p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard'' 
to the Navigation Acts. 
Under the old regulations, i t was enacted that commoditiej 
from Asia, A f r i c a and America could only be brought to B r i t a i n 
i n B r i t i s h ships and d i r e c t from the places of o r i g i n of the 
a r t i c l e s . I n 1822, the memorial of theLondon merchants, 
DO 
shipowners and traders,mentioned above, remarked that 
since the establishment of independent governments i n the 
countries of South America an extensive trade had been c a r r i e d 
on with them d i r e c t l y or through the medium of other places. 
This commerce, they held, with due encouragement and protect-
ion might become of greater importance i f not interrupted. 
They wanted therefore a r e l a x a t i o n of the Navigation Acts to 
admit v e s s e l s of these newly-formed s t a t e s into the ports 
of the United Kingdom i n the same manner as were the ships of 
the U.S.A. and B r a z i l . I f t h i s were not done, foreign countries 
e s p e c i a l l y the U.S.A. whose commercial regulations were 
adapted to those formed by the new governments, would 
88. p. 11$. — 1 
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f 
secure advantages over the B r i t i s h . 
By the Act of 1822, the products of Asia and A f r i c a 
had s t i l l to be c a r r i e d i n B r i t i s h v e s s e l s , although 
they could be imported from any part of those continents 
instead only of the place of o r i g i n as before, but i n regard 
to the foreign countries of America, B r i t i s h ships or the 
ships of the country of o r i g i n of the commodities could be 
employed. This was d e f i n i t e l y a bid f o r the trade of the new 
independent s t a t e s of South A m e r i c a ^ 
89. J J 3 . Jones, Ph.D., op. c i t . , pp.425-427. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 
1825 - 1826 - . . . 
TO BRITAIN AND TO SOUTH'AMERICA 
The boom which came to an end in 1825 had important economic con-
sequences for Britain. Inevitably, also, it affected those of the Latin 
American nations which had come to rely on British investment. This 
episode set the lines on which the long-term economic relations between 
Britain and South America developed later in the nineteenth century. 
It is no over-statement to say that the financial crisis of 1825-1826 
- showed the merchants and polit icians of Britain that her financial and 
business structures were not yet equal to the opening perspectives of in-
dustrial expansion. Thus, radical changes in banking and company legis-
lation were imperative, and it is probable that the extent of the commercia 
depression and financial collapse prompted the decision to take swift actioi 
The Crash 
The depression hit society at all levels. "Every man seemed ready 
to seize his debtor by the throat and say 'Pay me that thou owest'. The 
hilarity and openness of heart and hand which had made England such a 
sunny place a year ago were gone; and instead there was now the suspicion 
with which every man regarded his debtor and his creditor; the daily 
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dread of the post; the eager glance at the gazette; the walking out to await 
the mail; The manufacturer looked round the stocks on his over-
loaded shelves, and for every thousand pounds' worth of goods now reckoned 
five hundred. The widow lady and her daughters, who had paid ready 
money all their lives, now found themselves without income for half a year 
together, and could not enjoy a meal, because the butcher's and baker's 
bill was running on. The dying man, who could not wait for better days, 
altered his will with a sigh, lessening his children's portions by one-half 
or two thirds. Young lovers, who were to have had a jocund wedding this 
autumn, looked in one another's faces, and saw that it must not be thought 
of at present. 
Suffering was acute among the workers in the manufacturing districts 
of the large towns. It was clearly evident among the hand-loom weavers 
of Lancashire where loom breaking was rife. Like every other mania, the 
craze for speculation of 1824 and 1825 had the most serious consequences 
for the whole community. It was hard enough that no gold should be raised 
from the mines in South America, but this, after all, only directly con-
cerned the shareholders who had sunk their money in them. That bullion 
should flow to South America and be lost completely was a disaster for the 
nation in general. The £llf millions in coin and bullion which remained 
1. Harriet Martineau, op. c i t . , p. 11. 
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in the Bank of England in October 1824 had by February 1825 been reduced 
to £8f millions, and by August to £3f millions. Throughout the first half 
of 1825, the Bank allowed its own note issue to expand and it was not until 
November that it seriously began to restrict commercial accommodation. 
Such was the delicacy of the position by that time, however, that as soon as 
it did so the whole mass of inflated credit collapsed. 
On 23rd November complaints came from the City that the Bank was 
returning a considerable portion of the bills sent for discount by even the 
largest houses. By the end of the week there were runs upon the country 
banks in several districts and within the next three weeks, sixty-one country 
banks and six important London houses ceased payment. 
The terrible despair and helplessness of everyone in the first week 
of ;panic, in face of the complete refusal of both the Bank and the Government 
to render assistance, were remembered for many years. ^  The bankruptcies 
were increasing as obligations contracted earlier in 1825 fell due at a time 
when prices were declining, and many merchants found their position 
illiquid. 
The crisis in London reached its peak in the week 12th to 17th Decem-
ber. By the latter date the Government and the Bank of England had decided 
on an abrupt reversal of policy. It decided to issue small notes, to advance 
money freely upon the Exchequer bills the publie already held, to lend if 
2. P.H.Emden, op.cit., pp.54-55. 
3. A.E.Feaveryear, op.cit., p.220. 
4. Ibid., p.221. 
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necessary even upon goods, and indeed to take in every kind of security 
people could offer. ^  By the end of 1825 the crisis was over although the 
run of bankruptcies continued through the first months of 1826, until 104 
banks i n London and the country with a total liability of nineteen million 
pounds, had come to grief. 
In the storm which brought so many low, two firms came to grief 
which were not strictly bankers. Their names came to be well known during 
the days of the boom and have been mentioned before as issuers of foreign 
loans. In 1826, A.B.Goldschmidt and Co. failed, and in 1828, Barclay, 
Herring, Richardson and Co. suffered a like fate. Colombia, which may 
have been a bad debtor but was a remunerative client for a financial house, 
was decidedly unlucky in its London agents, for the collapse of these two 
firms came at a time when the State had a credit balance with both. 
Once reports of failures ceased, confidence gradually returned, and 
the money market made a surprisingly quick recovery. The series of good 
harvests which followed on 1826 had their share in healing the nation's 
severe wounds. 
The Reform of the Banking Structure 
There was no Parliamentary inquiry after this crisis and despite the 
5. Ibid., p.222. 
6. P.H.Emden, op.cit., p.59. K.F.Dixon, op.cit., p.183. 
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fact that the country banks blamed the Bank of England and the Bank of 
England blamed the country banks, few people had much doubt as to where 
most of the blame lay. The fault lay in the system. It was the hundreds of 
small independent note issues, all capable of easy expansion and all liable 
to rapid discredit, which were to blame. Cobbett summed up as follows, 
"The Bank is blamed for putting out paper and causing high prices; and 
blamed at the same time for not putting out paper to accomodate merchants 
and keep them from breaking. It cannot be to blame for both, and indeed it 
i s blamable for neither. It is the fellows that put out the paper and then 
break that do the mischief." ^  
Scotland1 s experience of banking had been very different from that of 
England. There had been no monopoly of joint-stock banking north of the 
Border since the exclusive privilege granted to the Bank of Scotland in 
1695 had lapsed 21 years later. Two other chartered banks ® had been estab 
Q 
lished and three more large joint-stock banks had grown up during the 
eighteenth century. Nearly all the banks had more than six partners and 
nearly all of them had several branches. They had been remarkably free 
from runs and failures. In the crisis of 1825-1826 there were two or three 
bank failures, but no-one among the older or the fully developed joint-stock 
7. William Cobbett, op.cit., p.25. 
8. The Royal Bank of Scotland and the British Linen Bank. 
9. The National Bank of Scotland, the Commercial Bank of Scotland, and 
the Aberdeen Town and County Bank. 
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banks, and not one in Edinburgh or Glasgow.^ Scotland showed the way that 
new banking legislation should take for England and Wales. 
The monopoly of the Bank of England was out of date. The majority 
opinion was that other joint-stock banks should be permitted, which would 
compete with the small partnerships and give greater security. At the same 
time, the Bank might be encouraged to compete itself by opening branches in 
the provinces. Similarly, when Parliament met, opinion was nearly unanim> 
ous in condemning the small notes and Lord Liverpool was quite willing to get 
rid of al l notes under £5, the Bank of England's as well as the others. The 
great increase of the issues had been mainly due to small notes, and it seemed 
clear that no one could be trusted to manage them properly. 
Two acts were passed to give effect to Liverpool's proposals. The first, 
dated 22nd March 1826, in effect prevented the issue in England and Wales 
of any more notes of less than £5 payable to bearer on demand, and provided 
12 
that all out-standing ones should be redeemed by 5th April 1829. * The 
second, dated 26th May, permitted joint-stock companies to carry on the 
business of banking and to issue notes at any place more than 65 miles from 
London, provided that they did not open an office within that radius. The 
Bank was empowered to appoint agents in any part of England, on condition 
. i 
10. J.Clapham, op.cit., vol.11, p. 102. 
11. The public had been prepared to some extent for the establishment of 
joint-stock banks through the work of a pressure group led by Thomas 
Joplin, see A.E.Feaveryear, op.cit., p.233. 
12. 7G., IV, c.6 
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that notes issued by those agents should be payable locally a s we l l a s in 
1 ^ 
London. 
These were not, however, the only immediate changes produced by 
the c r i s i s . F o r the bi l l brokers a most important consequence was a move 
by the London bankers to l imit their rel iance on rediscount faci l i t ies at the 
Bank in t imes of c r i s i s . Barc lays mentioned the way the London bankers 
were thinking in a letter to the Norwich Bank early in 1826, " the late 
events cannot fa i l to induce the reflexion that the Bank of England may not 
find it satisfactory in case of an adverse state of the Exchanges, to grant 
so l iberal an assistance by Discount a s on the late occasion, and it may 
very much res tra in the accomodation to be afforded to the public. It should 
seem therefore that it w i l l be prudent for the great banks of the country to 
make such arrangements as that their welfare may not very importantly be 
dependent a s s u c h . 1 1 ^ 
The position of the London bankers had in fact been rudely shaken, the 
more so a s the banking c r i s i s had been precipitated by the suspension of 
one of their number. In the past they had gradually pursued a policy of 
us i ng their resources to the full , freely discounting at the Bank of England 
whenever needs for cash were press ing. But the events of December 1825 
13. 7 G . I V , c .46 . A o E . F e a v e r y e a r , op .c i t . , p. 224. P . H . E m d e n , op .c i t . , 
p .62. W . T . C . K i n g , History of the London Discount Market (1936) p .37 . 
14. F r o m the records of Barc lay , Tritton and Bevan 24/1/1826, K . F . D i x o n 
op .c i t . , pp. 186-187. 
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had brought home to them the fact that in time of acute c r i s i s the Bank of 
England had to bear the discount demands of practical ly the whole country, 
and that in such circumstances even its superior resources might not suffice 
for their own urgent needs. A s King points out, ^ from this realization 
there arose the central reserve system which for many years was a unique 
feature of the London Money Market, for after the c r i s i s the London bankers 
dropped their practice of re-discounting which was never resumed. The 
banks instead began to establish adequate cash re serves of their own, holding 
them partly in Bank of England notes and partly in a balance at the Bank itself. 
Meanwhile, the Bank of England had awakened to a greater sense of i ts 
responsibil it ies. The directors had been forciby reminded of the great r e -
liance placed upon them by the mercantile and banking community, and had 
also discovered that the safe conduct of their a f fa irs under a Gold Standard 
required a degree of prudence which they had never been called upon during 
the Restrict ion period. F r o m their standpoint, the c r i s i s must c lear ly be 
regarded a s a milestone in the history of central banking, for the Bank began 
to follow a much more cautious policy inithe management of its r e serves , 
and gradually assumed functions which a r e now considered a s the normal 
duties of a central bank. 
Down to 1825 the Bank was s t i l l pr imari ly a profit-motivated company 
competing with other bankers. Its a f fa irs were s t i l l private, and information 
15. W . T . C . K i n g , op .c i t . , pp.37-38. 
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concerning them was jealously concealed by the D irec tors . No accounts or 
returns were published unless Parl iament called for them. "When appear-
ing before Parl iamentary committees the Directors showed a strong tendency 
to answer very curtly the question put, to volunteer no information and to 
take refuge in ignorance when asked anything regarding the relationship 
between the management of the Bank and the general control of cred i t . 1 1 *® 
It i s from 1825, truly one of the key dates in banking and particularly b i l l -
market history, that the growth of scientific management by the Bank of 
England real ly begins. The Bank Charter Act of 1833 which greatly strength-
ened the hand of the Bank in exercising control of credit a s wel l a s allowing 
joint-stock banks in the metropolis, was passed s t i l l in the shadow of the 
c r i s i s of 1825-1826 and was a logical progression from the actions taken 
17 
immediately following the c r i s i s . 
Recapitulating, it may be said that the 1825-1826 c r i s i s produced 1 the 
following main lines of change in banking structure - the beginnings of joint-
stock banking; greater control over note issue; the establishment of Bank of 
England branches; the cessation of re-discounting by the London private 
banks; and the assumption of certain central banking functions by the Bank 
of England. 
16. A . E . F e a v e r y e a r , op .c i t . , p. 229 
17. P . H . E m d e n , op .c i t . , p.62 
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Changes In Company Organization And The Investment 
Mechanism 
The boom of 1824-1825, rather than the c r a s h which followed it, was 
responsible for measures taken to improve company legislation, and in 
It 
particular, the repeal of the Bubble A c t . A s this has been discussed above, 
there i s no need to reiterate the pressures which forced its repeal . It was 
important that large companies rais ing capital amounting to mill ions of 
pounds should be put on a f i r m legal footing, in order to safeguard both 
those managing the companies' a f fa ir s and those investing in them, and it 
was the vast increase in company promotion in the mid eighteen> twenties 
which revealed the impossibility of the existing state of a f fa i r s . 
A l e s s important although significant out-come was the start at this 
time of f inancial journal i sm. The Stock Exchange began to attract attention 
a s never before and during the mania of 1825 the P r e s s natural ly described 
and commented on the latest sensational events, and this led to the establish 
ment of the daily money ar t i c l e . Of course, quite early in the century, the 
P r e s s had begun to quote the pr ices of securit ies , but the l i s t was generally 
furnished by some stockbroker who was allowed in return for his trouble to 
append his name. Gradually there crept in fugitive paragraphs relating to 
Stock Exchange business, but these were served up irregular ly with other 
news and not in the form of a daily City ar t i c l e . T h i s began to appear about 
18. See pp. 129-145-
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1825, whereas a decade previously such a paper a s the Courier did not even 
mention the pr ices of stocks. ^ 
The boom in foreign loans in the twenties caused the Foreign Loans 
Market to r i s e in importance and require a more favourable site. F r o m 
the time of the f i r s t foreign loan, more than a hundred years , before, it had 
been situated in the Royal Exchange, and had not followed the Stock Exchange 
proper to Capel Court . But on the f i r s t day of 1823 they made a move and a 
Foreign Stock Exchange was established in a building adjoining and connected 
with the Stock Exchange proper. T h i s exchange was, however, a distinct 
organization with its own committee, with a chairman and deputy-chairman 
and its own price l ist . It was not until some years afterwards that the 
Foreign Stock Exchange was absorbed into the Stock Exchange which it a d -
joined. ^ 
The Connection Between The Loans And 
South Amer ican Trade 
While the effects of boom and crash on the B r i t i s h economy a r e fa ir ly 
easy to see, the consequences for South A m e r i c a which had given the episode 
its unique character a r e more difficult to ascerta in . Certainly, it appears 
that most of the money ra i sed for the South Amer ican governments was not 
used for any significant economic purpose, but was rather lost while in the 
19. C.Duguid, op.cit . p. 131. 
20. I b i d . , p. 121. 
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hands of government officials or used to wage war on unfriendly neighbours. 
However, at least some of the £ 1 7 mill ions lent between 1822 and 1825 
was used in payment for the increased imports of cotton, which, together 
with woollens and linens formed the bulk of B r i t i s h exports to South A m e r i c a . 
By P e r u , Colombia-and Mexico at least, they were used a s funds in England, 
against which bi l ls were drawn and circulated in the course of commerce, at 
a time when these countries were beginning to feel a scarc i ty of bullion and 
21 
specie, due to the neglect of mining during the revolutionary w a r s . I s it 
possibl e therefore to see a close connection between trade to South A m e r i c a 
and the export of capital? 
The sums lent to the revolutionary governments amounting in a l l to over 
£ 1 7 mill ions were distributed a s follows:-
1822 Colombia £ 1 . 6 4 m. 1824 B r a z i l £ .8 m . 
1822 Chile £ .7 m. 1824 Mexico £1 .85 m 
1822- 4 P e r u £ 1 . 0 m. 1825 B r a z i l £ 1 . 7 m . 
1824 Buenos A i r e s £ .85 m. 1825 Mexico £ 2 . 8 7 m . 
1824 Colombia £ 4 . 2 m. 1825 P e r u £ .48 m . 
1825 Guatemala £ 1 . 0 4 m . 
The declared value of Br i t i sh produce and manufactures exported to Central 
and South A m e r i c a during this period also showed an increase , but not s i f f i c -
ient to cover the loans. (See figure 2 . ) . 
A s in the case of Europe at this time, the trade with individual countries 
does not lead to any definite conclusions. In some cases the loans were 
accompanied by increasedjsxports, but in others they were not. 
21. J . S . J o n e s , P h . D . , op .c i t . , pp.410-411. 
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F r o m this table it i s seen that where the loan i s ostensibly covered 
by goods, the increase in Br i t i sh exports does not by any means absorb 
the whole of the sums lent. Litt le change occurred in the trade with 
Colombia, although she was the heaviest borrower. 
Jenks t h i n k s 2 2 that the loans were remitted in the form of merchand-
ise and that possibly two-thirds of the amount actually remitted made a 
direct demand upon various industries concerned in mil i tary and naval 
stores, while the balance was consigned in cotton goods and hardware. A 
close analys is of the South Amer ican trade for the period of the loans by 
J . S . Jones , 2 ^ however, does not bear out this statement. 
The total exports of B r i t i s h manufactures (declared value) to Centra l 
and South A m e r i c a in the four years ending 1821 was slightly in excess of 
£ 1 2 mill ions, while that for the four years ending 1825 was only £ 1 9 
mill ions, giving an increment of only about £ 7 mill ions over what might 
94 
be regarded a s normal trade. Of the second amount, cotton alone account-
ed for £ 1 1 mill ions, while the remainder consisted largely of a great 
number of miscellaneous commodities in smal l quantities, a s an illustration 
of which, totals for the year 1825 may be cited. (See figure 3 ) . 
Mexico borrowed close on £ 5 mill ions but there i s no evidence of this 
amount in the trade with that country nor of the shipment there of large 
22. L . J e n k s , op .c i t . , p. 59. 
23. J . S . J o n e s , M . S c , op .c i t . , pp.265-269. 
24. F igures from G . H « P o r t e r , op .c i t . , p .359. 
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suppliel of mil i tary and naval stores . The declared value of the total exports 
of B r i t i s h manufactures to Mexico between 1822 and 1825 was only £ 1 . 7 9 
mill ions of which cotton goods constituted £ 1 . 1 6 mill ions, the remainder con-
sisting chiefly of linens and woollens. Trade to a l l parts of the world was 
extended at this time by Bri ta in , and particularly to South America , where , 
a s i s c lear , the cotton manufacturers pushed their sa les enormously. It 
becomes consequently a moot point a s to how much the increase in trade with 
South A m e r i c a was due on the one hand to the export of capital and on the 
other to the enterprise ot B r i t i s h merchants during the period of boom. It i s 
doubtful whether a definite answer w i l l ever be made with conviction. 
The L o n g - T e r m Effects Of The C r i s i s On Anglo-South 
American Relations . 
The commercia l and financial c r a s h in Br i ta in in 1825 had a consider-
able effect in the immediate short term on a i l her foreign markets which, in 
some cases , ieit the results oi it after Bri ta in herself had recovered from the 
shock. Br i t i sh goods, unsaleable at home, were thrown in masses on the 
25 
foreign markets, depressing pr ices to a great extent. However, B r i t i s h 
trade with South A m e r i c a , a s with other areas , soon recovered, and con-
tinued to increase while, interesting enough, B r i t i s h investment there was 
virtually at a standstil l . 
After 1827, investors regarded government loans with distrust, ana 
2b. H.M.Hyndman, op .c i t . , p .37 . 
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South American government loans with disgust. The South Amer ican 
governments found it impossible to ra i se money in London or anywhere for 
nearly two decades%during which time Br i t i sh capital flowed particularly 
to the United States to finance rai lways and canals . Both South A m e r i c a 
and the United States were sheltered by the Monroe Doctrine which was 
enforced by the B r i t i s h fleet, but the excellent credit, expanding, economy 
and prosperity of the United States promised greater and more certain divid-
ends to Br i t i sh investors. 
S i m i l a r l y , the various unfortunate experiences of South American 
emigrants from Britain, particularly associated with the"Poyais''affair, 2 , 1 
and the views of those such a s F . B „ H e a d who wrote "A Few P r a c t i c a l 
Arguments Against The Theory Of Emigration, 1828" held back the emigra-
tion movement for a number of years , and perhaps kept from South A m e r i c a 
skil led personnel who might have ra i sed the level of economic life there. 
It i s worth repeating that B r i t i s h trade with South Amer ica expanded 
after the disasters of the mid-1820's. In particular, in the 1830's the 
South Amer ican trade flourished even without the impetus of B r i t i s h invest-
ment there. The Americas a s a whole provided an expanding market for 
Br i t i sh manufactured goods at a time when her share of the European 
26. R . W . H i d y , op .c i t . , p .67. ~ 
27. See pp. 75-76. 
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markets was not expanding. 
The trade with South A m e r i c a which increased almost continuously 
throughout the century laid the basis of confidence necessary for a re - in tro -
duction of the investment processes which had failed in the 1820's. B r i t i s h 
investment in South Amer ica in the latter half of the nineteenth century, in 
both governments and companies, reached vast proportions. Indeed from 
the B r i t i s h point of view it truly became an a r e a of "Informal E m p i r e " . 
The connection established in the 1820's between Br i ta in and South A m e r i c a 
were to have a lasting significance. In particular, Rothschilds kept their 
association with B r a z i l and floated several successful loans for that country 
later in the century, while Baring Brothers who f i r s t became involved in 
South American a f fa irs in 1824 with the floatation of the loan for Buenos 
A i r e s , retained their connection and later became financial agents for the 
confederation of Argentina for whom they ra i sed capital in Br i ta in . Bar ing 
Brothers were, of course, temporarily to regret their association with that 
country in 1890 when the f i r m almost collapsed under the weight of worthies 
Argentine stock. In the main, however, the latter investment may be con-
trasted with that of the 1820's. The economic conditions in South A m e r i c a 
were more comprehensibly understood and the trading links more f i r m l y 
established. In sum, the investment process therefore was successful . 
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STATISTICAL TABLES. 
Figure 1. Loans To Foreign States, 
1822 - 1825-
Figure 2. ' United Kingdom Exports To Mexico 
and South America, 1822 - 182?. 
Figure 3« United Kingdom Exports To Central 
and South America, 1825. 
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fi g u r e 2. United Kingdom Exports to Mexico and South 
America, 1822 -- 1827 (£m Declared Value) 
1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 
Mexico .09 .27 .39 1.04 .47 .69 
Guatemala - - - - - -
Colombia .07 .2 .3 :..45 .2 .21 
Rio .98 .66 1.14 .85 .37 .15 
C h i l e .39 .38 .71 .53 .24 .4 
Peru .11 .29 .4-3 .6 .2 .23 
B r a z i l 1.52 2.42 .2.59 2.94- 1.71 2.31 
Total 3.16 4.22 • 5.56 6.41 3.19 3.99 
xiKXHXXXI^XXgXggg) 
(P.P., 1826-7, X V I I I , as quoted i n J.S. Jones, E n g l i s h Foreign 
Trade In The F i r s t HaltE Of The Nineteenth Century. Together 
With Some Observations On The War Period Of 1793-1814. 
London University, M.Sc, 1928, p . .266.) 
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Figure 3. United Kingdom Exports To Central and South 
America, 1825 Declared Value) 
Cotton Goods 3-21 
" hosiery .13 
Linen goods .47 
Woollen goods' .77 
S i l k » .07 
Haberdashery and 
apparel .07 
Hats .06 
Leather .05 
Sadlery .02 
Earthenwere .06 
Glass .07 
Brass and Copper 
go"ods .06 
Iron and S t e e l .06 
Hardware and 
c u t l e r y .11 
Butter and Cheese .06 
Misosllaneous 1.14 
Total 6.41 
(P.P., 1826. X V I I I , as quoted by J.S. Jones, i b i d . , p. 267). 
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